SPINOZA

THE ETHICS

English presentation by Henri Lurié

1989

THE GOLDEN RULE FOR READING SPINOZA: KEEP CONSTANTLY IN MIND, FOR EACH TERM, THE DEFINITION GIVEN BY SPINOZA. HE WHO WELL READS SPINOZA, POSSESSES THROUGH HIM THE WHOLE WISDOM: NOT AN IOTA AND NOT A DOT ARE MISSING IN HIS WORLD OF IDEAS, WHERE ALL THOUGHTS APPEAR IN THE STRICT ORDER AND CONNECTION OF A COHERENT SYSTEM.

CONSTANTIN BRUNNER (1862-1937)

IN OUR OWN TIMES SPINOZA'S GREATNESS EMERGES ON SOME VITAL GROUNDS. NORBERT WIENER, THE FOUNDER OF CYBERNETICS CALLS HIM, ALONG WITH LEIBNITZ, THE ONLY PHILOSOPHICAL PREDECESSORS OF HIS NEW DISCIPLINE. IN OUR CENTURY OF TRIUMPHANT SCIENCE, THROUGH SPACE ROCKETS, THROUGH NUCLEONICS, THROUGH AUTOMATION, AND THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WHERE THE HORIZONS OF MANKIND HAVE EXPANDED TO INFINITY, LEAVING NO ROOM FOR CHILDISH AND BLIND ANTHROPOMORPHISM OR FOR AN IRRESPONSIBLE TRIGGER-PRETENSE OF SOME SORCERER'S APPRENTICE, THREATENING PEOPLE WITH APOCALYPTIC PERSPECTIVES, CHRIST AND SPINOZA SHALL AND WILL REMAIN THE SPIRITUAL AND ESPRITAL LEADERS OF HUMANITY.

H. L.

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PREFACE

This is not a translation, for there already exist numerous translations of the Ethics and I must say that even a very careful translation such as R. H. M. Elwe's still remains far from the original!

Goethe, in a little poem A Parallel gives the keynote of the problem:

> The other day, I picked meadow flowers
> And carried them pensively home;
> But from the warmth of my hand's firm holding,
> Their corollas went downward bending.
> I placed the bunch in a glass of water
> And what a miracle was I to behold!
> The corollas came up, one by one,
> Stalks and peduncles shone bright and green,
> And all the flowers looked so healthy,
> As if still planted in their native soil.
> The same thrill once came over me
> As I heard my songs in a foreign tongue.

The translation of a poem is like a rose plucked from the bush. It makes for the enjoyment of the gatherer for a while but then it fades away, and what remains is hardly a reminder of the living beauty. If such is the case for works of arts, the destiny of philosophical translations is even more problematic. For here another difficulty arises, concerning the thorough understanding of the ideas expressed by the author, with the help of his specific terminology.

This happens particularly in the case of **Benedict Spinoza** (1632-1677), the so called solitary "lens-grinder of Voorburg" who, rejected by the Jews of Amsterdam and held in suspicion of atheism by the Christian circles of Holland and of Western Europe, composed in his retreat the chief philosophical treatise ever written by man, **the Ethics, which is indeed, and one day, will be universally recognized as the code of modern human civilization.**

Spinoza more than any other writer knew the importance of clear and distinct ideas. He took particular care in defining all the terms he used, and using them always with the same basic meaning. Now, if the translator does not really understand the ideas presented in the original language--as it often happens--but tries to catch the secret thereof like in puzzle-solving, by some piecemeal recomposition of philological hardship, what else can be expected of such an enterprise, than some monster pretending to represent the original ideas? No wonder that "***traduttore--traditore"*** has become proverbial among us.

Let us therefore mention some of those "**sacred cows" of modern Academic-Spinozism.** What a sacred cow is, everybody knows through India's critical socioeconomic state, due to the fact that their religion forbids them the slaughtering and consumption of bovines. As to modern Academic-Spinozism, it is t**he official version of a still ostracized doctrine,** offered simply in a historical context to undergraduate students of philosophy, or expounded by some specialized scholars at the graduate level.

In fact, each particular domain of human endeavor, be it artistic, scientific, practical, or religious possesses its own terminology and peculiar jargon, which is somehow part of its tradition and will resist any attempt for change. By extension, one speaks also of sacred cows a preps some specific slogans and statements, which in a given domain are taken for granted without discussion by partisans, or rejected by opponents of the system. For example, the "categorical imperative" and the "things-in-themselves" characterize Kantianism; the "survival of the fittest through natural selection" characterizes Darwinism; the "Idea of Ideas" characterizes Platonism; "Nirvana", Buddhism and "Substance with infinite Attributes", Spinozism.

Similarly, modern Academic-Spinozism will be found to have its own sacred cows. Indeed, **according to Cybernetics, entropy is present in all communication systems which lack an appropriate feedback to their input or source of information**. Such a lack of feedback exists automatically, when the original message is given in a foreign language and requires the intervention of translators.

Spinoza wrote the Ethics in the Latin used by 17th century Scholastics, but to combat the weaknesses of Scholasticism, he employed a *geometrical* method of proofs like that used by mathematicians. Spinoza defined each of his fundamental concepts, as soon as he had designated that concept by a term conveying a meaning different from its current acceptation. **We will show that in so doing, he constantly reverted to the original significance of that term in concordance with its Greek equivalent.**

Spinoza's wager was indeed unique in its kind--as his modern apostle Constantin Brunner (1862-1937) has masterly shown in his Spinoza gegen Kant und die Sache der geistigen Wahrheit (K. Schnabel, Berlin, 1910), whereof our English translation SPINOZA VERSUS

KANT AND THE CAUSE OF ESPRITAL TRUTH is presently available. He says there repeatedly that "all a reader has to do, in order to understand well the Ethics, is to keep constantly in mind, for each term, the definition given by Spinoza. "But I have to add, that such a reader **must** be familiar with the original Latin text, so as to grasp and learn by first hand the author's ideas and so as not to rely on any translation. Of course, such a congenial reader will be able to transpose and present those ideas in his own everyday language and make in sort that others benefit also from his diligent labors.

What happened in reality in the last three hundred years--in all linguistic areas!--was a wild orgy of attempts, by enthusiasts as well as by opponents, and foremost by professional philologists, to penetrate the "secrets" of the Ethics, through literal word by word translation. So came into existence those sacred cows of Academic-Spinozism, which make the reading of the Ethics, **in any** English or other language translation, not only very difficult and tedious, but also an unbearable challenge to the logic and common sense of an unprejudiced reader. Wherever the sacred cows of Scholasticism can prosper uninhibited, they transform the lands into a desert of fanaticism and of thoughtlessness.

It was my privilege and destiny to detect **three** sacred cows of Academic-Spinozism and to eliminate them from the present English text of the Ethics, (as I did already in 1974 in my French translation), in order that, henceforth readers, and especially the young ones, may more easily grasp the treasures of eternal wisdom contained in that immortal Opus.

1) Essentia: I solemnly affirm that the Latin word *essentia* as used and defined by Spinoza (Eth. II. /d. 2) must be correctly translated into English as "beingness" and not as "essence" as all other translators have done.

Nowadays, indeed, the word "essence" is currently used to designate "some elementary ingredient or constituent, or hidden kernel; the inward nature, or constitution of anything; also some spiritual or immaterial entity (cf. , quintessence)." Further, one makes generally no distinction in our lands between "being" and "existence." Starting with his very first definition (Eth. I. /d. 1.) Spinoza uses the term "essentia" as **axiomatically distinct** from the term "existentia," in stating that for Causa Sui (the Self-Caused), "essentia" implies "existentia," since it is that, which by its very nature, is thinkable only as existent. And, to make sure that besides the unity of the Self-Caused --where the one (essentia) is unthinkable without the other (existentia)--this distinction remains permanent for all the particular things of the thinghood, he

adds (Eth. I. /a. 7.): "If a thing is conceivable as nonexisting, its essentia does not imply existence."

For an attentive reader it may already be evident that Spinoza's "essentia" is not congruent to what nowadays is generally understood by our English term "essence." And, indeed, Spinoza returns to that question immediately in Eth. II. /d. 2 and defines his concept:

To the "essentia" of a thing belongs that which by its presence necessarily establishes the thing and, by its absence, necessarily abolishes the thing; in other words: that, without which the thing and, vice versa, which itself without the thing, is neither possible nor thinkable.

At this point, our attentive reader knows that he could not substitute for Spinoza's "essentia" our English word "essence," since it would only partially satisfy the above definition: **the essence or hidden kernel of a thing is indeed possible and thinkable without the thing itself.** And Spinoza deems necessary to add some clarifying last remarks on that subject in Eth. II. /10. sc. 2. in speaking of his opponents:

> All agree that God is not only the cause of things in respect of creation, as they say, but also in respect of being. But at the same time most of them assert that an element without which a thing is neither possible nor thinkable, belongs to the "essence" of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God belongs to the "essence" of created things, or else that a created thing could be possible and thinkable without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent speech.

And he says in conclusion:

> But, enough about that. My intention here was only to justify why I did not say: "that without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essentia of that thing."

Putting together all our quotations, the puzzle of Spinoza's "essentia" is satisfactorily solved, in translating his essentia into our English word "beingness" i.e. , "the fact of being," which is the etymological meaning of the original Latin "**essentia = *actus essendi***" in the same way as our "existence" means "the fact of existing," derived from the Latin "**existentia = *actus existendi***"

A very important confirmation of our thesis is found in ***Seneca ad Lucilium, epistula LVIII***, where Seneca attributes to Marcus Tullius Cicero the paternity of the Latin neologism "essentia," a term serving to translate the Greek ***ousia***, itself derived from the ultimate philosophical ***To On* = *quod est* = that which is.**

But the general usage quickly disregarded that absolute meaning, and we find already in the times of Plotinus and Porphyry (3rd century A. D.) speaking of the ***quattuor essentiæ*** i.e. , the four elements: Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, whereto later the Medieval Scholasticism added its ***quintam essentiam***, that well known Quintessence of Christian Theology, whereof even today our *essence* still retains some of its divine spells and smells.

On the other hand, there is evidence that the classical Latin and notably Seneca, still ignored the word ***existentia*** (written also *exsistentia*) a derivation of the important verb ***sisto (sistere, steti, statum)***, which transitively means to place and intransitively to sit (to dwell) and which counts no less than thirteen derivations, the last one in date (only 35 years old!) is our electronic transposer, the **transistor!**

That absence in the classical ancient world of a specific name besides the real being = **einai** also for the fugitive and ephemeral **fainomenon**, proves to what extent the truth of **panta rei** constituted then a living fact. Only their logicians opposed dialectically Plato's **eidos** (idea) to the **eidion** = ***forma seu ideatum*** of Aristotle.

But the Christian Middle Ages had completely dismissed Plato's world of ideas, in tolerating only the frozen forms of Aristotelianism. Those forms became then the "***existenta creationis"*** and their state, the ***exsistentia.*** In other words, all created things could pretend to have only an existence, since the essence pertained only to God (cf. , again Eth. II. 10. sc. 2) and so it came to pass that everywhere in Christianity ***existere*** was practically taken as synonymous of ***esse***. Man, of course, formed an exception among the things, having been created in the "likeness of God." He had an immortal soul which, at his death, rejoined the Quintessence in Heaven (which some theologians situated right on the surface of the Moon!). Even in the eyes of Descartes, the beasts and all the other animals still represented simple automata.

But then came Spinoza who, in his turn, dismissed the Christian Scholasticism and all scholasticism, by using their proper terms, but giving them precise meanings and definitions. He restored the original meaning of ***essentia* = ousia = to on = *quod est***, in stating (Eth. II. d. 2):

To the **beingness** of a thing belongs that which by its presence necessarily establishes the thing, and by its absence necessarily abolishes the thing. In other words, that, without which the thing **and**, vice versa, which itself without the thing is neither possible nor thinkable.

He assigned to existence, in his definition of the Self-Caused, its right place as a relative presence, as compared to absolute beingness.

Now, this comparison or analytical distinction is not evidenced by translating the Latin ***involvere*** literally as our English "involve." Since to us, "involve" is foremost synonymous of "include." To say that "essentia" (beingness) includes "existentia"--as done by many translators--is to reverse the roles, as if a worthless shell of "essentia" enclosed the precious kernel of "existentia" which obviously is absurd. We have therefore rendered "involvere" by the unequivocal term to imply, in saying **"that for which beingness implies existence.**" and so it will be formulated, henceforth, in any English text of the Ethics, liberated of the sacred cows of Scholasticism.

2) Forma: I solemnly affirm that the Latin word *forma*, as used and defined by Spinoza after Eth. II. /13. and exemplified in lem. 4-6 ibid. as well as in Eth. IV/ch. 19. has to be correctly translated into English as species (kind), and not as "form" as all other translators have done up to now. The only exception is R. H. M. Elwes, who tried desperately to avoid the stupid literal translation but only made things **even more confusing** by speaking of an "**actual being**" i.e. , of a body existing in act, or in fact, where Spinoza's definition after II. /13. calls for the kind, the specific nature of bodies. Elwes saw indeed that Spinoza uses "figura" wherever he speaks of a shape or form, as for instance in II. /13. ax. 3.

Seen from the etymological as well as from the historical view point, the term ***forma*** served in the times of Seneca to render the Greek ***eiMos*** which possessed four fundamental meanings: 1) form, 2) beauty, 3) idea, and 4) species (kind). In the Middle Ages meanings 3 and 4 were completely forgotten, and even today the usage of the English word "form" is still exclusively concerned with meanings 1 & 2.

But, as in the case of "*essentia*," Spinoza restored also to "*forma*" its original philosophical meaning of species (kind). The unassailable proof of it is won in observing successively:

a) the definition after Eth. II. /13.:

> When a set of bodies of the same or different size are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they move at the same or different speeds, to communicate their mutual movements at some fixed proportion, we say that such bodies are **united** and that together they compose **one** body or **individual**, which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

b) the immediately following axiom 3, which classifies bodies and shows how carefully Spinoza distinguishes **his** "*forma*" from the usual meaning of shape or form:

> Since the parts of an individual, or a compound body, remain in contact over more or less extended surfaces, it will be more or less difficult to make them change their position; consequently, the individual will be brought with more or less difficulty into another (***figura***) **form**.

c) the immediately following lemma 4, which exemplifies **his** concept ***forma* = specie**:

> If from a body or individual, compounded of several bodies, some bodies are eliminated and if, at the same time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without changing of its **(*forma*) species**. Dem.: Bodies (lem. 1.) are not distinguished in respect of substance and (by the last definition) that which constitutes the ***forma* = species** of an individual consists in the union of bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will be maintained (by our hypothesis). Therefore, the individual will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and of mode. qed.

d) the subsequent lemmas 5 & 6 which confirm the same use of *forma* = species (kind).

e) finally, the important Eth. IV. /ch. 19. which reads in the original: "***amor præterea meretricius, hoc est generandi libido quæ ex forma oritur***." makes us understand that the irresistible drive for joining a sexual partner, comes from the depth of our specific being, from the human species of which we are specimen, and not from our individual ego.

Here, of course, all other translators have rendered "*forma*" as "bodily beauty," without even being aware of the crudeness and narrow mindedness of their concoction.

Let us add that the adjective ***formalis*** is mostly used by Spinoza in conjunction with ***esse*** and ***essentia***, and is to be rendered correspondingly by the English word "specific" as opposed to the word "formal" which would be completely inadequate and misleading.

3) Appetitus: I solemnly affirm that the Latin word *appetitus* as used and defined by Spinoza in Eth. III. /9. + sc., has to be correctly translated into English as instinct and not as appetite as has been done by many translators.

One has simply to reflect on the well known expression ***appetitus se ipse conservandi,*** which is generally rendered as "instinct of self preservation," to realize how ridiculous an "appetite of self preservation" would sound.

Our English word "appetite" is indeed, synonymous with "desire" and, hence, always implies consciousness of its drive. "Appetite" is therefore completely inappropriate for translating Spinoza's *appetitus* as defined. We quote that definition from our presentation in order to show that any attempt to replace in it instinct by appetite would result in nonsense:

BE OUR THINKING CLEAR AND DISTINCT, OR BE IT CONFUSED, WE ALWAYS STRIVE TO PERSIST IN OUR BEING FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THAT EFFORT. This effort, when referred only to our mind is called **will**, but when referred to both, mind and body, is called **instinct**, which is in fact nothing else than our very beingness. Therefrom necessarily follow all those effects which tend to our self-preservation, and which we are therefore determined to accomplish. Further, between desire and instinct there is no difference, except that desire is generally referred to us insofar as we are conscious of our instinct. Desire is instinct with consciousness thereof.

Uninhibited by any dogma, Spinoza makes no specific difference between the human instincts and those of other animals. But Academic-Spinozism could never accept that freedom of thinking and, therefore, prefers to betray the author ("traduttore-traditore") rather than to abandon its own privileged position in the framework of the scholastic establishment.

It suffices. We have done away with these three sacred cows of Scholasticism which for more than three hundred years have perverted Spinoza's limpid language into an atrocious jargon and deformed his clear ideas into riddles and hermetic formulas.

But all this is of the past. **From now on, those who are attracted by Spinoza's omnianimatic (everything is animated) outlook on the World and Eternity, especially the young, truth seeking generations, will find in our English presentation of the Ethics an efficient tool to get acquainted with the underlying principles of human creativity that have shaped civilization.**

The previous examples illustrate the fundamental difference of approach between a translation and a correct presentation of works such as the Ethics. The Irishman Stephen Mac Kenna (1872-1934) is to be mentioned here for his pioneering achievement in presenting Plotinus' **Enneads** (Faber&Faber London 1956) and I quote from E. R. Dodd's foreword:

He was one of that great line of unprofessional scholars whose labors have enriched our literature--men who worked with no eye to academic preferment or financial reward, but because they thought the work important... For Mac Kenna believed the translation of a great work of literature or philosophy to be a sacred responsibility which demanded and deserved, a man's utmost effort. The translator in his view, must not rest until he had transferred every nuance of his author's meaning, emotional as well as logical, into the idiom of another language--an idiom which must be rich, flexible, dignified and, above all, contemporary. The finished version would necessarily be "free," but with a freedom which must be based, as he expressed it, on a rigorous "pre-servitude" and must be justified by the achievement of a closer fidelity to the spirit of the original than any literal rendering could hope to attain... Behind his translation lies the patient and often agonizing labor of more than twenty years.

A significant change of attitude has taken place in recent years among the Jewish people toward the man whom the Synagogue of Amsterdam had publicly excommunicated in 1656. Indeed, not only has this rejection been the object of a rehabilitation by the State of Israel in 1960, but there is evidence that today Spinoza is considered, at least here in the USA, one of the great Rabbis of his nation.

This is decidedly an important step toward justice and freedom of thought. Yet, it makes me speak of another great Rabbi, who really preached in their synagogues some two thousand years ago and who has been the tragic victim of an even greater mistrial. His genius was so powerful that it took him no more than three hundred years to establish his spiritual domination over the ancient Roman Empire, and since then over the whole of western civilization, styled today as the Christian Era. We hope that one day this great Rabbi will be officially rehabilitated by his nation. I know not of a more urgent act of eternal justice and human dignity, nor any more beneficial to the brotherhood of man. Might my Trilogy, **OUR FAITH**, contribute towards that end.

In our Era of triumphant Science, through space-rockets, through nucleonics, through automation and through electronic computers, where the horizons of mankind have expanded to infinity, leaving no room for childish and blind anthropomorphism, nor

for an irresponsible trigger pretense of some sorcerer's apprentice, Christ and Spinoza shall remain the spiritual leaders of Humanity.

On this point, Constantin Brunner speaks very eloquently in his work UNSER CHRISTUS, ODER DAS WESEN DES GENIES (Berlin 1921, pages 706, 712 & 713):

You world wonders, Beethoven, Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Rembrandt--but among the greatest, only you two, Spinoza and Christ, are those of whom one may affirm the highest and most sublime appreciation that man can ever receive: that You are rocks of certitude of the human spirit! Once in a thousand years, or even at longer intervals, a man is born blessed in his heart, ignoring fear and complaint, asking no questions, not amazed about the happenings in the world, but who entirely truthful, depending on himself, with an unshaken courage and with his pervasive love, can and must call down blessings on mankind, even if, in doing so, he should be deprived of his life. He must do so, for his Love is the will of his beingness and of his power, is the sacred and merciful will of his blessedness, to make even the wretched, the foes of blessedness join him--for, in fact, they are foes of their own blessedness.

We have Christ and Spinoza. Beside these two, there is nobody able to speak to mankind of Truth, so completely and with such a Love. In their ardent Love, they answer for us and display all their attractive power, to make us love them in return, so as to identify ourselves with the creative will-power of their Love and, in joining them, to make us join eternal Truth, degree by degree, steadily gaining in firmness. In comparison to these two men, all the others do not really care for our salvation; may their poems, may their paintings, may their music be precious and sublime to the highest degree, but all those wonderful men are our enemies and are telling us lies! And, who was ever prone to love one of them, in the way people love Christ and Spinoza? And, who has ever been rescued and really saved by one of them? Whereas Christ and Spinoza have really determined men to come back to Unity and to Conscience, and to overcome the rabble of fears, of sufferings, and of hateful intentions. He who, thanks to the assistance of **one** man, can enjoy the sublime happiness of his very being and of his peace of mind, and he who loves **one** man as the road and conveyance to the place where he may rest in freedom and exercise his faithful love, that man knows also the greatness of human existence--blessed be he who knows the meanness as well as the greatness of man--and he will never despise humanity, and will never hate any human being. To those who sincerely, with all their heart, desire to find the way back to their very beingness and consciousness, to those who know what is essential to man, I say: Stop searching and awaiting some savior to come, but open wide your eyes and find!

Here then is my English presentation of Spinoza's Ethics, which since it was first published in 1677, shortly after the premature death of its author, has stirred both the most vehement criticism and the most enthusiastic admiration throughout the world. It is long overdue that such an important philosophical treatise be made readable and understandable to our fellow-men and that its author be freed from all the malignant and indignant accusation which, for more than three centuries, have discredited his name and prohibited the printing of his works. Even today, prejudiced scholars refuse him the plain and objective audience of our students.

Usually Spinoza is characterized as a Cartesian who went astray. If people, at times, had not seen favorable statements by such illustrious admirers as Diderot, Goethe, Hegel, Claude Bernard, Albert Einstein, Albert Schweitzer, Bertrand Russell et al. they would not pay any attention to him at all. But the vague aura surrounding Spinoza's name shall be giving way to a direct contact with his ideas, especially when people find out that the publicity, which puts the blame on his hermetical style, in qualifying as very difficult the access to his ideas, is wrong and due exclusively to the translator's galimatias. People will feel the powerful presence of Spinoza. his actuality, his unprejudiced authority and thereby gain spiritual, or as we say their esprital comfort.

Closer to us in time, Constantin Brunner exemplified the inspiring power of the Ethics on his own ideas and abstractions. Spinoza's hapax legomenon ***omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata*** (II. /13. sc.) finds in Brunner's DOCTRINE OF THE ESPRITALS AND THE PEOPLE a magnificent exposition in his Pneumatology which crowns the volume dealing with our Practical Understanding. As for the mysterious ***Ens constans infinitis attributis*** (I. /d. 6.) it is treated in a masterly way in Brunner's MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM.

In our own times Spinoza's greatness emerges on some vital grounds. Norbert Wiener, the founder of CYBERNETICS calls him, along with Leibnitz, the only philosophical predecessors of his new discipline. Indeed, the two postulates on which Cybernetics is founded: 1) The unity of mind and body and 2) The perfection of Living Reality, are both formulated by Spinoza, and only by him (cf. , Eth. II. /7 & II. /d. 6).

The book SPINOZA, THE YOUNG THINKER WHO DESTROYED THE PAST by Dan Levin shows that the personality of Bento, as much as his ideas, fascinate the spirit and the imagination of modern man.

"The human race is on the verge of suicide! Unless man chooses to fight for his continued evolution, he is doomed to extinction as a species." claims John David Garcia, a young and dynamic writer in his MORAL SOCIETY, A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO DEATH where he presents a revolutionary ethical theory, much in the spirit of Spinoza. John David

Garcia has also published PSYCHOFRAUD AND ETHICAL THERAPY where he outright declares that "no other person has ever expressed or practiced Ethical Therapy with greater clarity than Spinoza."

In the past decades many important landmarks have occurred on humanity's erratic journey to maturity. Two of them, although from unrelated domains, offer that omnianimated inkling which readers of Spinoza particularly welcome. The first concerns the victory of surgery over prejudice and bigotry, in performing heart transplants. The second is man's stepping on the Moon's surface and confirming, de visu, that our Mother Earth provides for Life an ideal ecological environment which should be protected from technological pollutants.

The mission of true wisdom is to combat superstition in all its forms, so as to liberate from slavery all those who are capable of liberation; all devotedness and all heroic way of life tend essentially to that aim, The wise man will address himself especially to the young, the most malleable and receptive toward true and generous ideas. He will also pay great attention to the structure of human society in general, and of his own country in particular, and he shall be a fervent promoter of a State that secures Law and Freedom whereof C. Brunner writes:

Our modern State should become more and more that Law-State. with its laws remaining as steadfast as God's mountains in face of violence and diabolic deception; our State should be for and against **all** citizens the unbreakable dam it is supposed to be (otherwise it will soon cease to be a dam at all). **Our State shall not tolerate any trifling with the constitutional laws** and shall not show any meekness in presence of delusive and subversive plots, from wherever they may come.

Our Law-State shall speak out under all circumstances in a direct and honest way, in order to prevent agents of social injustice and deception from perverting public opinion and from corrupting de State's own machinery; in short, to prevent chimerical constructions and Arcadian dreams of social inequity from becoming part of our living reality.

Our State shall prohibit all printed or other circulation of notorious lies, propagated by those who use the political arena for their private ambitions, and who disgrace the State and the Nation by their arbitrary and ruthless methods. **Organized lie and organized slander shall not be tolerated under any name**--when they tend to subordinate the law of the land to injustice. **As to the freedom of the press and of the media, beware my friend, that after having overthrown the "tyrants," that same freedom be not used to help enthrone the tyranny of the lie !!** Our State of Law and Freedom shall render the orators responsible, not for their useless speeches, but for their harmful speeches, aiming at insidious and malicious purposes; for one of **the State's basic missions is to make bona fide citizens of all political**

parties realize that human beliefs are purely subjective and often untrue, since human nature per se, is delusive.

Despite all objectors and antagonists, our wise democratic State is and remains the plank of salvation of all viable and authentic social structure. The wise State is feasible, for it takes human nature **as it is,** and does not postulate fictitious qualities for mankind. The wise State is the only one to truly promote Public Welfare.

Still, our greatest enemy, our only enemy, is **intolerance**. And let us never forget that "He who brandishes the sword of intolerance, will perish by that same sword." And let us also not forget that our wise State could never be exclusively "The State of the wise men," for it will always mean "The State of the Sages and of the Fools." To tolerate all creeds in the State and to warrant a public education which is respectful of all faiths, will of necessity allow superstition to reign over quite many souls but, by the same token, **it will also allow and warrant Truth to make herself heard without risking judicial harassments as in the past**.

Truth, indeed is the only Truth, but one cannot impose her by force. **Do not trust those who, pretending to be "Champions of Righteousness and of the Just Cause" seek domination over the world. "The just cause" is not of this world--here we have only a multitude of causes, of which each is just for the ones and unjust for the others. Our compass-needle which points to salvation and coexistence, becomes evident if we follow the road of tolerance. Blessed be those who never depart from it!**

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July 1989

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE ETHICS

a. **axiom**

af. **affective states** (definitions at the end of part III)

ax. **auxiliary axiom** (e.g.: "ax. 1/lem. 3" = first axiom after lemma 3)

cf. ***confer***, compare

ch. **chapter** or leading head in **appendix of part IV**

cor. **corollary** (e.g.: "cor. 1/p. 14" = first cor. after 14th prop.)

d. **definition**

def. **auxiliary definition** (e.g.: "def. /lem. 3" = def. after lem. 3)

dem. **demonstration or proof**

e.g. ***exempli gratia***, for example

gda. **the general definition of affectivity** (end of part III)

i.e. ***id est***, which means, that is

lem. **lemma or helping theorem** (in part II. after prop. 13**)**

p. **proposition** (e.g.: "p. 27" = 27th proposition of this part)

po. **postulate**

qed. ***quod erat demonstrandum*****,** which was to be proved

sc. **scholium or note** (e.g.: "sc. /p. 57" = note to prop. 57)

I. **part one** (e.g.: "I. /30" = 30th prop. of part one).

II. **part two** (e.g.: "II. /17. sc." = note after prop. 17 of part II.)

III. **part three** (e.g.: "III. /af. 2." = 2nd def. of affective states)

IV. **part four** (e.g.: "IV. /ch. 29" = 9th leading head in appendix)

V. **part five** (e.g.: "V. /29" = 29th prop. of part five)

THE LIFE OF BENEDICT SPINOZA

Spinoza was born at Amsterdam on the 24 November 1632. The name Baruch (blessed) was changed to Benedict, its Latin equivalent, after he was excommunicated by the Amsterdam Jews. The family was originally Spanish, and Spanish was Spinoza's mother tongue. He had two sisters, Rebekah and Miriam. His father Michael, was a modest merchant who had not the means to help his son in business and therefore decided to let him take up the study of Hebrew literature.

Lucas relates from Bento's (affectionate form of Benedictus) early years an incident which had on him an unmistakably authentic impact:

One ought not to be astonished if he waged war against superstition all his life; apart from the fact that he was impelled thereto by a natural bent, the teachings of his father, who was a man of good sense, contributed a great deal towards it. This good man had taught him not to confuse superstition and genuine piety, and wishing to test his son, who was only ten years old as yet, he instructed him to go and collect some money which a certain old woman in Amsterdam owed him.

When he entered her house and found her reading the Bible, she motioned him to wait until she finished her prayer; when she had finished it, the child told her his errand, and this good woman, after counting her money out to him, said as she pointed to it on the table "Here is what I owe your father. May you some day be as upright a man as he is; he has never departed from the Law of Moses, and Heaven will only bless you in the measure in which you will imitate him." As she was concluding these remarks she picked up the money in order to put it in the child's bag, but having observed that this woman had all the marks of false piety against which his father had warned him, he wanted to count it after her in spite of all her resistance. He found that he had to ask for two ducats, which the pious widow had dropped into a drawer through a slit specially made on the top of the table, and so he was confirmed in his thought. Elated by his success in this adventure, and by the praise of his father, he watched these sort of people with more care than before and he made such fine fun of them that everybody was astonished.

Bento must have attended the elementary and intermediate midrashim of the Jewish parochial school until about fourteen. The next step would have been the senior division, the

Talmud-Torah proper, there he would study to be a rabbi. The class records of that senior division (taught by the rabbis Isaac Aboab da Fonseca and Saul Levi Morteira) have survived. These lists are just as they were, without erasures or scratch-outs, and the name of Bento Despinoza (or any variant thereof) **is nowhere** among them. This negative evidence is clear and distinct. Bento was a dropout. "For this kind of study," says Lucas, "was not capable of satisfying completely a brilliant mind like his. He was not yet fifteen years old when he raised difficulties which the most learned among the Jews found it hard to resolve."

Neither the kabbala nor Maimonides could have inspired young Spinoza. But a whole mental environment is not abandoned at a stroke. Before he was exposed to the impact of Bacon, of Hobbes, or to Democritus, Lucretius, Epicurus, or anyone else, he was exposed to the Jewish stream of inquiry.

The first tragedy of life we come to, on this trail, was typical of what rebellion must have meant in the marrano setting, where the waves that beat against orthodoxy came from two sides: Catholicism and freethinking. The man was Uriel Dacosta or Acosta, and his tragic story impinges rather directly on Bento's, for there is a strong oral tradition and circumstantial evidence that he was Bento's uncle--probably in the family of Hana Debora, Michael's second wife, Bento's mother.

Spinoza learned Latin from a German master, but afterwards (which was certainly after his fathers death in 1654) from Dr. Franciscus Van den Enden, a physician in Amsterdam, who not only practiced medicine but in about 1652 set up a "Latin school," informally, a school for both "Latin and the New Philosophy." Van den Enden had a daughter, Clara Maria, who was able to teach her father's scholars in his absence; and according to Colerus, Spinoza fell in love with her, and often confessed that he designed to marry her. She accepted however (in 1671) a rival named Kerckrinck.

When he had learned Latin, Spinoza gave up what Colerus calls "Divinity" and betook himself to the study of natural philosophy and of Descartes. He must have worked hard at his natural philosophy, for his books and his letters show a considerable knowledge of mathematics, both pure and applied, which helped him largely afterwards in his trade. He now began to forsake the synagogue and the Jewish doctors.

They expected that he would become a Christian, but they were mistaken; for, although he abandoned the religious practices of his fathers, he never professed conversion to any other recognized creed. At the outset, the Jews endeavored to bribe him into conformity. A pension of one thousand florins was offered to him if he would remain quiet and appear now and then in the synagogue. The offer was declined, and on the 27th July 1656 he was excommunicated with a curse (Charem), which may be read at length in Van Vloten's ***Supplementum***. Van Vloten says

that it is known that Spinoza was not present when the sentence was pronounced on him, but that he sent an answer.

Denounced by his accusers to the civil authorities as a dangerous heretic and blasphemer, he was expelled from Amsterdam. But by early 1657 the term of his exile had probably expired. There is reference soon, in the narrative of his life by Lucas, to an event that took place "near the theater." A young zealot of the Holy Community tried to stab him.

In 1661, as we learn from a letter from Oldenburg, Secretary to the English Royal Society, Spinoza was in Rijnsburg. Oldenburg had called on him there and had discussed with him "God, Extension and Infinite Thought"; and he now addresses his friend as ***clarissime Domine, Amice colende.***

Spinoza's first work, the ***Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiæ more geometrico demonstrata,*** with his appended ***Cogitata metaphysica,*** was published in 1663; it was to be the only one published during his lifetime under his name. In June 1664 he moved to Voorburg, distant only one mile from the Hague and spent what remained of his life writing his own books, which either appeared anonymously or remained unpublished in his lifetime. He had his friends, disciples and admirers, mostly Collegians and freethinkers, but none of them was a Jew. The motto of Meijers publishing firm ***Nil ardentibus arduum*** ("Nothing is hard for the devoted") probably explains the spirit in which some of them met in "circles" to ponder Spinoza's unpublished manuscripts.

A pension from the brothers De Witt (the political leaders of Holland) and a smaller one from their estate, after they were torn apart by a mob, helped Spinoza live; his ideas were useful in the struggle for the intellectual's minds, against Orange and the theologians. When his ***Tractatus Theologico--Politicus*** appeared in 1670, without an author's name, one theologian cried out that the book had been "forged in hell by a renegade Jew and the devil, and issued with the knowledge of Mr. Jan de Witt!" He believed in self-education; his life's work has shown what could be done with it. He also painted, according to his landlord Van Spyck. Van Spyck recalled years later (to Colerus) that one painting he produced was a "portrait" of the Italian freethinker Masianiello--a bold man who came to a bitter end. Van Spyck said the painting looked just like Spinoza. The biographer Lucas says nothing about either this hobby or the lens-grinding. What the lens-grinding undoubtedly did, was to provide a pretext that other thinkers of the time could use, for corresponding with a man so tainted. At least Leibnitz used this pretext, when he first got in touch with Spinoza. This is also the only existing correspondence that has to do with the subject, and Spinoza's reply shows that he had real knowledge of the theory of optics. A budding establishment man, Leibnitz was attracted to Spinoza's iconoclastic ideas. He struggled against them, and his philosophy of the monads is largely a reaction.

The Palatine Elector once offered Spinoza a job as a professor at Heidelberg, on condition that he respect "the official religion of the country" in his lectures. He declined gracefully. "My private and solitary life," he explained, made him unsuitable for lecturing. There would be no more big events. The one big event, the Cherem at age of twenty-four, had exhausted the drama that fate had in reserve for him: but its importance transcended itself enough to make up for this.

Spinoza's constitution was sickly; "he was unhealthy and lean" according to Colerus, "and had been troubled with a Pthysick above twenty years." His friend Schuller, a young doctor, wrote to Leibnitz on February 6, 1677: "I fear that Mr. B. de S. will soon be leaving us, for phthisis (his hereditary sickness) seems to be worsening daily."

Either he did not expect his death, or expecting it, the anticipation of it did not affect him, for on his landlord's return from church on Saturday, the 20th of February, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, Spinoza went downstairs, as he was used to do, and joined the portrait painter and his wife in their living room. He sat puffing at his pipe peacefully and in a pleasant, companionable manner discussed with them the sermon which has been preached in church that day.

Then, without at all hinting of his true condition to Van Spyck, he sent a message to his friend Lewis Meyer at Amsterdam, advising him that he felt worse and stood badly in need of his medical services. Spinoza retired early that night, but was up again in the morning and chatted cheerfully with the painter and his wife. Finally, when Lewis Meyer arrived post-haste from Amsterdam, he found Spinoza in a desperate condition, and so weakened did he appear to be, that he ordered for him immediately a strong chicken broth.

The philosopher drank the soup with some relish and even began to nibble at the chicken. Van Spyck and his good wife took heart when they saw their lodger so much improved and they went to church again in the afternoon.

Spinoza was now left alone with the physician, and they both must have known full well that death had already arrived with its stern summons. What could the dying philosopher have said in parting to his disciple? What he said to him no one knows to this day, but about three o'clock in the afternoon on the 21st of February 1677 he died, Meyer being the only person present at his death.

He was buried on the 25th February in what is called a "huirgraft" of the New Church. His property was sold by auction and fetched four hundred and thirty florins and thirteen pence.

Spinoza was extremely frugal and temperate, not to say abstemious. His conversation was "very sweet and easy." He was no lover of money. After the death of his father, he handed over

to his sisters his own legal share in the estate, with the exception of a bed and its furniture, although they had done all they could, without success, to exclude him as a legatee.

As he thought so he lived and the unity of his life and writings is one reason for the permanence of his influence.

In the concluding words of his disciple Lucas: "That which we love and revere in great men, lives still and will live through all the ages. The greater part of those people who have lived in obscurity and without glory, will remain buried in darkness and in oblivion. Benedict Spinoza will live in the remembrance of true scholars and in their writings, which are the temple of Immortality."

ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING

(A DIGEST)

> This work which Spinoza wrote in 1662 and which remained unfinished, is worthy of the reader's attention for its biographical inferences, as well as for the heroic spirit that animates it from the very start.
>
> H. L.

After experience had taught me that all the usual occurrences of life are futile, and seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except insofar as my mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good which to the exclusion of all else, would affect me permanently: Whether in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme and unending happiness.

I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed unwise to lose hold on what was sure, for the sake of something yet uncertain. I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that I should abandon the quest of such objects, if I devoted myself to the search of something different and new. I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former, I should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail.

I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at a new way of life, or at any rate at a certainty of its existence, without changing my usual way of life; with this end in view I made many efforts, but in vain. For the things which are generally esteemed by people to be the highest good, may be classed under the three heads **RICHES, FAME** and the **PLEASURE OF SENSES**; and with these three one is so absorbed that one has little or no occasion at all to reflect upon any different good.

I was therefore forced to inquire which would prove the most useful to me: for, as I mentioned, I seemed to be losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. However, after some reflection on the matter, I came to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit and betaking myself to the quest of **a new way of life**, I should be leaving a good uncertain by reason of its own nature, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its

nature (for I sought for something permanent) but only in the possibility of its attainment. Further reflection convinced me, that **if** I could really go to the root of the matter, I should abandon positively an evil for a good. For **I saw that I was in a state of extreme peril and therefore compelled to seek at all cost a remedy**, however uncertain it may be; as a very sick man, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek such a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his one hope lies therein.

On the other hand, all the objects which people generally seek, not only bring no remedy in view of our self-preservation, but even act as hindrances, not seldom causing the death of those who possess them, and always of those who are possessed by them.

One's happiness or unhappiness, indeed, is made to depend entirely upon the quality of the object which one loves. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances of the spirit. All these arise from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. But **love toward the eternal and infinite reality feeds the mind wholly with joy and is unmingled with any sadness**; wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our forces. Yet it was not at random that I used the words, "If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment and fame.

One thing was evident: While my mind was employed with these thoughts, it turned away from the former objects of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new way of life. This fact was a great comfort to me, for I perceived that the evil was not such as to resist all remedies. Although these intervals of lucidity were at first rare and of very short duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance as long as they are sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint and, far from being hindrances, will further not a little our purposes, as I will show in due time I will here briefly state what I mean by true good, and also what is the nature of the highest good. In order that this may rightly be understood, we must bear in mind that the terms good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing may be called both good and bad, according to the relations in view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.

Nothing regarded in itself can be called perfect or imperfect; especially when one is aware that all things which come to pass, proceed according to the eternal order and to the fixed laws of Nature. When man in his weakness does not attain to this order in his own thoughts, he

nevertheless conceives of a human nature superior and more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he himself should not acquire such a nature.

Thus he is led to search for means which will bring him to the peak of perfection and calls everything which will serve as such means, a true good. The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other people, if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid superior nature. What that nature is, we shall show in due time, namely that it is the awareness of one's belonging to the whole of Nature.

This, then, is the end for which I strive, to acquire that superior nature myself, and to endeavor that others attain it with me. In other words, it is part of my happiness to help others understand even as I do, so that their own understanding and desire may be in tune with my own.

In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of Nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid perfection, and also **to form a social order** such as is most conducive to the attainment of this goal by the greatest number of people with the least difficulty and danger. **Sociology as well as Education should be studied**; further, as health is no insignificant means for attaining our end, **Medicine should be placed under particular scrutiny**. Also, as many complex tasks are rendered less difficult by the adequate contrivances, allowing us to gain much time and convenience, **technology must in no way be disregarded.** But **before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding and clarifying it, so that it may apprehend things without error and in the best possible way.**

Thus it is apparent to everyone that **I wish to direct all sciences to <u>one</u> end and aim, so that we may attain the supreme human perfection** which we have named; therefore, **whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our objective, will have to be rejected as useless.** In short, **all our actions and thoughts** must be directed to this one end.

Yet, as it is necessary to carry on our life while we endeavor to attain our purpose and direct our understanding along the right path, we are first compelled to lay down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the following:

1) To speak in a manner intelligible to everyone and to comply with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose. For we can gain no small advantages by accommodating ourselves to the people's understanding. Moreover, **we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the dissemination of truth.**

2) To indulge in pleasures only insofar as they are necessary for preserving good health.

3) To endeavor to obtain money or other possessions only to the strict extent as is necessary for preserving life and health and to follow such social habits as are consistent with our purpose.

Having laid down these preliminary rules, we will apply ourselves to the first and most important task, namely the improvement of our understanding and our becoming capable of knowing things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. We will have to indicate also the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge. But we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search going back to infinity. Indeed, in order to discover the best method for finding out the truth, there is no need of yet another method to discover it; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. By such proceedings we should never arrive at the knowledge of truth or, strictly speaking, at any knowledge at all. But in like manner as happens in technology, **our intellect by its self-power** creates intellectual tools for itself, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual tasks, and from these tasks receives fresh instruments, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom.

Thus, if we proceed with our investigations **in due order,** inquiring first about those things which should be inquired about, never passing a link in the chain of association, and **knowing how to define the problems before trying to answer them,** we will never have any ideas save such as are very certain or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a suspension of judgment concerning some affirmation or negation, which would be pronounced unhesitatingly if one were not in ignorance of something without which the knowledge of the matter involved must needs be imperfect. We may therefore conclude that **doubt always proceeds from want of due order of investigation**.

In order not to omit anything which can contribute to the knowledge of our understanding and its capabilities, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness. The point most worthy of attention is that **memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the intellect.**

The more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it is remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we forget it. For instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a narration. But memory is also strengthened without the aid of the intellect, by means of the power wherewith the imagination, or the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical objects. I say particular, for our imagination is only affected by particular objects. If we read, for instance, a single love story, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in our memory. If, however, we read several others, of the same kind, we shall think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another. I say also, physical, for our

imagination is only affected by physical objects. As, then, our memory is such that it can be strengthened both with and without the aid of the intellect, we may conclude that it is different from the understanding and that **in our intellect, as such, there is neither memory nor forgetfulness.**

Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is, since we form many ideas in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily dispositions, there is no doubt that **words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors**, unless we keep strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed according to people's fancy and opinion and are, therefore, signs for things as they exist in the imagination and not as they exist in the understanding. It is for that reason that **to all such things that exist only in the intellect, negative names are generally given,** as for example: incorporeal, infinite, etc. So also, many concepts really affirmative, are expressed negatively, and vice-versa, such as: uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal, etc. , inasmuch as their opposites are much more easily imagined and, therefore, occurred first to men and usurped positive names.

We also affirm and deny many things simply because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. **While we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth.**

Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion which prevents our intellect from reflecting on itself. Sometimes, while making no distinction between what we imagine and what we understand, we come to believe that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us and that we therefore know it. Thus we place first that which should be last; the true order of inquiry is reversed, and a legitimate conclusion is no longer obtainable.

It is good to recall that the object aimed at by our method is **the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas**, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by random physical motions. Furthermore, in order that all our ideas converge toward unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them, that our mind may as far as possible, reflect objectively all the specifications of things encountered in Nature, both as a whole and as parts.

While we are concerned with inquiries into actual things, we shall avoid drawing any conclusions from abstractions and **be extremely careful not to confound the objects of our thoughts with the objects of reality.** The best conclusion will always be drawn either from the beingness of a particular thing, or from a true and legitimate definition. For we cannot proceed from the generalities of universal axioms to the consideration of particular things, since axioms are of infinite extent and do not determine us to contemplate one particular thing more than another. Thus, the surest way of scientific inquiry is to derive conclusions from some given

definition; this process will be the more fruitful and easy, in proportion as the thing given is better defined.

The cardinal point of this part of our method consists in the knowledge of the conditions of good definitions, and in the means of finding them. A **definition**, if it is to be called perfect, must express the proper beingness of the thing and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties. In order to keep free from this fault, the following rules should be observed in definition:

If we deal with created objects:

1) The definition must include its proximate cause. For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be defined as follows: the figure described in a plane by any segment of line whereof one end is fixed and the other free. This definition clearly includes the proximate cause.

2) The concept or definition of the thing should **be such that all its properties derive therefrom**, **without need of relying on other concepts**; as may be seen in the definition just given of a circle.

If we deal with an uncreated object:

1) The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the object must not need explanation by anything else outside itself.

2) Once its definition has been given, there should be no room for the question: does it exist?

3) In respect to our mind, the definition should not contain any substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other words, **the object defined must not be explained through abstractions.**

4) Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be possible to derive from the definition all the properties of the thing defined.

Finally, I am going to enumerate the properties of the intellect which I have chiefly remarked and which I clearly understand:

I. Our understanding involves certainty--in other words, we know that the things are specifically such as they are contained in our intellect.

II. Our understanding perceives things, in forming some ideas absolutely and some ideas through derivation from others. Thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, but it could not form ideas of motion without reference to the idea of quantity.

III. Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely, express infinity; particular (relative) ideas are derived from other ideas.

IV. Our understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas.

V. Our understanding perceives things not so much from the point of view of duration, as from a certain view of eternity and infinity. For in perceiving things it disregards their number and their duration; whereas in imagining things, it perceives them in a determined number, duration, and quantity.

VI. The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem so to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend on our sole self-power. With the confused ideas the opposite is true: they are often formed against our will.

VII. We can determine in many ways the ideas of things which we derive from other ideas; thus for instance, we may define the plane of an ellipse in different ways.

VIII. The more ideas express the perfection of any object, the more perfect are the ideas themselves; we do not admire the architect who has planned a cabin, as much as the one who has planned a splendid temple or a palace.

ADVICE TO THE READER

If you happen to be reading the Ethics for the very first time, go once through the whole treatise lightly skimming the proofs and demonstrations but **taking abundant reading notes**. Then come back to all the places which had motivated your notes and follow completely your personal preferences as to the sequence of your further studies. You will probably experience, as I did, that no matter where one opens this book, one finds himself at the very core of the subject.

For group readings at the initial stage, I recommend: I. /Appendix, II. /49. sc. , III/Preface, IV/Preface & Appendix, and V. /Preface.

At a more advanced stage, one may start with the definitions and axioms of part one and proceed either to part two if the emphasis in the group is on psychology, or directly to part three if the major interest of the group lies in the study of human affectivity.

If you are already a Spinoza connoisseur, you may find that my presentation is helpful in many respects to bridge the gap between the original scholastic terminology and the real meanings of the author's definitions.

Perhaps you will think that I have gone too far with my disregard of what is believed to be the most elementary obligation of a dependable translator, namely to retain as closely as possible the original wording. I must confess that I have ignored throughout my long career any reverence for traditional renderings, since I was taught at an early age that nothing manmade is sacred. But I have always tried to be faithful in presenting as clearly and as distinctly as possible those great and eternally true ideas, which have been formulated by the wise men, the Espritals, of all times and, in particular, by Benedict Spinoza in these immortal Ethics.

THE ETHICS

Benedict Spinoza
1632-1677

Voorburg, Netherlands

PART ONE: ABOUT GOD

DEFINITIONS

d. 1 **SELF-CAUSED: THAT FOR WHICH BEINGNESS IMPLIES EXISTENCE, OR THAT WHICH, BY ITS VERY NATURE, IS THINKABLE ONLY AS EXISTENT.**

d. 2 FINITE IN ITS KIND: WHAT CAN BE LIMITED BY ANOTHER OF THE SAME NATURE; for instance, a body is finite because we can always think of another which is greater. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

d. 3 **SUBSTANCE: THAT WHICH IS IN ITSELF AND IS SELF-EVIDENT; in other words: THAT WHEREOF THE CONCEPT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY OTHER CONCEPT TO BE DERIVED FROM.**

d. 4 **ATTRIBUTE: THAT WHICH AN INTELLECT PERCEIVES OF SUBSTANCE AS CONSTITUTING ITS VERY BEINGNESS.**

d. 5 **MODE: STATES OF SUBSTANCE, OR WHICH IS IN SOMETHING ELSE AND IS ALSO EXPLAINED THROUGH IT.**

d. 6 **GOD: THE ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING; in other words: SUBSTANCE CONSISTING IN INFINITE ATTRIBUTES, EACH ONE OF WHICH EXPRESSES ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEINGNESS. Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind; for of whatever is infinite only in its kind, an infinity of attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in itself whatever expresses beingness and implies no negation.**

d. 7 **FREE: THAT WHICH EXISTS SOLELY BY THE NECESSITY OF ITS OWN NATURE AND ACTS SOLELY BY ITS OWN DETERMINATION. NECESSARY OR CONSTRAINED: THAT WHICH IS DETERMINED BY SOMETHING ELSE TO EXIST AND TO OPERATE IN A FIXED AND PRESCRIBED MANNER.**

d. 8 **ETERNITY: EXISTENCE ITSELF, INSOFAR AS VIEWED TO FOLLOW NECESSARILY FROM THE SOLE DEFINITION OF THE ETERNAL REALITY.** Explanation: Existence of this kind is thought of as an eternal truth like beingness itself and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance and time, even though continuance may be thought of as being without a beginning and end.

AXIOMS

a. 1 **ALL WHICH IS, IS EITHER IN ITSELF OR IN ANOTHER.**

a. 2 **THAT WHICH IS NOT EXPLAINABLE THROUGH ANOTHER MUST BE SELF-EVIDENT.**

a. 3 **FROM ANY DEFINITE CAUSE AN EFFECT NECESSARILY FOLLOWS AND, VICE VERSA, WITHOUT SOME DEFINITE CAUSE AN EFFECT IS IMPOSSIBLE.**

a. 4 **THE KNOWLEDGE OF AN EFFECT DEPENDS ON AND IMPLIES THE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CAUSE.**

a. 5 **THINGS WHICH HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON ARE NOT UNDERSTANDABLE THE ONE BY THE MEANS OF THE OTHER. i.e. THE CONCEPT OF ONE DOES NOT IMPLY THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER.**

a. 6 **A TRUE IDEA MUST AGREE WITH ITS OBJECT (IDEATUM).**

a. 7 **IF A THING IS CONCEIVABLE AS NON-EXISTING, ITS BEINGNESS DOES NOT IMPLY EXISTENCE.**

PROPOSITIONS

p. 1 **SUBSTANCE IS BY NATURE PRIOR TO ITS STATES.** Dem.: Evident from d. 3 and d. 5.

p. 2 **TWO SUBSTANCES WITH DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTES HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON.** Dem.: Also evident from d. 3 for each must exist in itself and be self-evident; i.e. the concept of one does not imply the concept of the other.

p. 3 **THINGS WHICH HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON CANNOT BE ONE THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER.** Dem.: If they have nothing in common, it follows that the one is not understandable by the means of the other (a. 5) and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (a. 4); qed.

p. 4 **TWO OR MORE DISTINCT THINGS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE EITHER BY THE DIFFERENCE OF THEIR ATTRIBUTES OR BY THAT OF THE STATES OF SUBSTANCES.** Dem.: All which is, is either in itself or in another (a. 1) i.e. (d. 3 & d. 5) the intellect faces nothing but substances and their states. Therefore nothing exists for the intellect by which things may be distinguished one from the other, except substances, i.e. (d. 4) their attributes and states; qed.

p. 5 **THERE CANNOT EXIST IN REALITY TWO OR MORE SUBSTANCES OF THE SAME NATURE OR ATTRIBUTE.** Dem.: If there were two or more distinct substances they should be distinguished either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their states (p. 4). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one of the same attribute. If by the difference of their states--as substance is prior to its states (p. 1)-- it follows that setting the states aside and considering substance in itself, that is (d. 3 & a. 6) truly, there is no way to distinguish one substance from another, hence (p. 4) there could not exist several substances, but one substance only; qed.

p. 6 **ONE SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY ANOTHER SUBSTANCE.** Dem.: It is impossible that there be in reality two substances of the same attribute i.e. which have something in common (p. 2) and therefore (p. 3) one cannot be the cause of another; neither can one be produced by the other; qed. Hence it follows that:

cor. **A SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY SOMETHING ELSE.** In reality we find nothing but substances and their states (a. 1 + d. 3 &d. 5). Now (p. 6) substance cannot be produced by another substance. Therefore it cannot be produced by something else; qed.

This corollary is demonstrated more easily by the ***reductio ad absurdum.*** For, if substance were produced by something else, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (a. 4) and (d. 3) it would not be a substance.

p. 7 **IT BELONGS TO THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCE TO EXIST.** Dem.: Substance cannot be produced by something else (cor. /p. 6) it must therefore be its own cause i.e. (d. 1) its beingness necessarily implies existence, or existence belongs to its nature; qed.

p. 8 **SUBSTANCE IS NECESSARILY INFINITE.** Dem.: Of the same attribute there is but one substance (p. 5) and existence belongs to its nature (p. 7); hence its nature implies existence, either as finite or as

infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (d. 2)it would be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (p. 7) and there would be two substances of the same attribute. which (p. 5) is absurd. It therefore exists as infinite" qed.

sc. 1 As finite existence involves a partial negation and as infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of anything's nature, it follows from the sole p. 7 that substance as such is necessarily infinite.

sc. 2 No doubt that for those who judge about things confusedly and are not accustomed to know them by their first causes, it will be difficult to grasp the dem. of p. 7. For, such people make no distinction between the states and the substances themselves and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they invent a beginning to substance, in the same way as they observe it in natural objects. Indeed, those who are ignorant of the true causes, confound everything: they imagine that trees might talk as well as men, that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed, and in general, that any species might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the divine with the human nature, readily attribute human affectivity to God, especially so long as they do not know how affective states originate in the mind.

But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of p. 7. In fact this proposition would be universally accepted as some axiom and reckoned amongst common notions, For, by **substance would be understood that which is in itself and is self evident**, i.e. something of which the concept does not require the concept of anything else to be derived from; whereas **modifications** (states) exist in something else and their concept is formed by means of that of the thing in which they exist. Therefore we may have true ideas of nonexistent modifications; for, although they may have no actual existence, such as conceived, yet their beingness partakes of another and is conceivable through it. But **the truth of substance, such as conceived, lies in herself as being self-evident**. If therefore somebody says that he has a clear and distinct idea of substance that is true, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, it would be the same as if he had said that although he has a true idea, he was not sure whether or not it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or, if he affirms that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea has become true, in short: the height of absurdity!

It must then be taken for granted that the existence of substance, as indeed its beingness, is an eternal truth. We can hence conclude by another way of reasoning that there is but one such substance. I think that this may be done at once and, in order to proceed correctly with the

demonstration, let us state that: 1) A true definition neither implies nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From it follows: 2) No definition implies or expresses a limited quantity of individuals inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the proper nature of the triangle and does not imply a fixed number of triangles. 3) For each existing thing there is necessarily a cause why it should exist. 4) This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined (if its nature implies existence), or must be sought elsewhere.

It follows therefore that if a certain number of individuals exists in Nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the world (for simplicity's sake I will suppose them existing simultaneously and to have had no predecessors) and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: since a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual (3); now this cause cannot be contained in the proper nature of man (2 & 3) and the true definition of man does not imply any consideration of the number "20". Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men and (by 4) of each of them, must be sought elsewhere. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule that **everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause for their existence**. And, as it has been shown already that it belongs to the nature of substance to exist, existence must necessarily be included in its definition, and, from its sole definition its existence must be concluded. But from its definition (as shown in p.2 & p.3) we cannot infer the existence of several substances, therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature.

p. 9 **THE MORE REALITY OR BEING SOMETHING HAS, THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF ITS ATTRIBUTES.** Dem.: Obvious by d. 4.

p. 10 **EACH ATTRIBUTE OF SUBSTANCE MUST BE SELF-EVIDENT** (i.e. evident by and through itself). Dem.: An attribute is that which an intellect perceives of substance as constituting its very beingness (d. 4) and therefore (d. 3) must be self-evident; qed.

sc. It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct--i.e. one without the help of the other--yet we cannot conclude therefrom that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes be self-evident, inasmuch as all attributes have always existed in it simultaneously, and none of them

could be produced by any other; but each of them expresses the reality or being of substance. Thus it is not absurd at all to ascribe several attributes to substance: nothing is clearer indeed than that each being must be conceived under some attributes, and, that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of attributes expressing its necessity or eternity, and its infinity. Therefore nothing is clearer than that the absolutely infinite Being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes (d. 6), each of which expresses the eternal and infinite beingness. If somebody now asks by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions which show that there is but one substance in reality and that it is absolutely infinite; wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.

p. 11 GOD, OR SUBSTANCE CONSISTING IN INFINITE ATTRIBUTES, OF WHICH EACH EXPRESSES THE ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEINGNESS, EXISTS NECESSARILY. Dem.: If this be denied, conceive if possible, that God does not exist: then (a. 7). his beingness does not imply existence. But this (p. 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Another dem.: Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence; e.g. if a triangle exists, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause or reason must also be granted which prevents it from existing, or which abolishes its existence, This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its very nature, namely because it implies a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also from its very nature, inasmuch as it implies existence (p. 7). But the reason for the existence (or non-existence) of a triangle or a circle, does not follow from the nature of these figures, but from the universal order of the physical world. From the latter must follow either that a particular triangle already necessarily exists, or an impossibility that it should already exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that if there be no cause nor reason which prevents something from existing the thing necessarily exists. Thus, if no cause nor reason can be given which prevents the existence of God, or which abolishes his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him--i.e. drawn from another substance, of another nature. For, if it were of the same nature, by that very fact God would be admitted to exist. But a substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (p. 2) and therefore would be unable to cause or to abolish his existence. Since a reason or cause which would abolish the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce--if God did not exist--be drawn from God's own nature, which would imply contradiction. But to make such an affirmation about the absolutely infinite and supremely perfect Being, is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would abolish his existence, Thus, God necessarily exists; qed.

Another dem.: Inability to exist is impotence and, vice versa, ability to exist is obviously a power. If then that, which already and necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings would be more powerful than the absolutely infinite Being, and this is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else the absolutely infinite Being also necessarily exists. Now, we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (a. 1 & p. 7). Therefore the absolutely infinite Being, God, (d. 6) necessarily exists; qed.

sc. In this last proof I have, purposely, shown God's existence ***a posteriori,*** so that the proof might be more easily followed, and not at all because God's existence would not follow *a priori* from the same premises. For since ability to exist is power, it follows that in proportion as the nature of a thing possesses more reality, so will it possess also more strength for existence. Therefore the absolutely infinite Being, God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist There will be many, I suppose, who will overlook the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed to consider only those things which flow from external causes. Of such things they see that those which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment--that is, , not so easily brought into existence--the things which they consider as more complicated. To do away with this misconception, I do not need here to show in what respect this saying "What comes quickly, goes quickly" is true, nor to inquire whether in Nature taken as a whole, all things are or are not equally easy. I need only remark that I am not speaking here of things which arise from external causes, but only of substances which (p. 6) cannot be produced by any external cause. For whatever perfection or reality those things may have which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, they owe it all to the virtue of an external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must follow from its very nature, which is nothing else but its beingness. Thus the perfection of a thing does not abolish its existence, but on the contrary asserts it. Imperfection does abolish it; therefore **we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of the existence of the absolutely perfect and infinite Being**--that is of God. For, as his beingness excludes all imperfection and implies absolute perfection, all cause of doubt concerning his existence is done away and ours is the utmost certainty. This I think, will be evident to every attentive reader.

p. 12 NO ATTRIBUTE OF SUBSTANCE IS TRULY CONCEIVABLE FROM WHICH IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT SUBSTANCE CAN BE DIVIDED. Dem.: The parts into which substance thus conceived would be divided, either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (p. 8) each part will necessarily be infinite and (p. 6) self-caused and (p. 5) will perforce consist of a different attribute and so, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (p. 6) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (p. 2) would have nothing in common with their whole. and the whole (d. 4 & p. 10) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. But if the second case be supposed, namely that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then, since the whole substance might be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and cease to exist, which (p. 7) is absurd.

p. 13 **SUBSTANCE ABSOLUTELY INFINITE IS INDIVISIBLE.** Dem.: If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided, would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature, which (p. 5) is absurd. If the latter, then (p. 7) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (p. 11) is also absurd. It follows that:

cor. **NO SUBSTANCE AND CONSEQUENTLY NO CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE AS SUCH IS DIVISIBLE**.

sc. This indivisibility will be more easily understood if we recall that the nature of substance is conceivable only as infinite; while, by a part of substance nothing else can be understood than finite substance which (p. 8) involves a manifest contradiction.

p. 14 **BESIDES GOD NO OTHER SUBSTANCE IS THINKABLE**. Dem.: As God is the absolutely infinite Being, of whom no attribute that expresses the beingness of substance can be denied (d. 6) and as he necessarily exists (p. 11): if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist which (p. 5) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no other substance is thinkable; qed. Clearly, therefore:

cor. 1 **GOD IS ONE.** That is to say (d. 6) in the thinghood there is but one absolutely infinite substance, as we have already shown, It follows secondly.

cor. 2 **THE EXTENDED REALITY AND THE THINKING REALITY ARE EITHER GOD's ATTRIBUTES OR (a. 1) STATES OF GOD's ATTRIBUTES.**

p. 15 **WHATEVER IS, IS IN GOD, AND A THING IS NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR THINKABLE WITHOUT GOD.** Dem.: Besides God no other substance is thinkable (p. 14), that is(d. 3) nothing which is in itself and is self-evident. But modes (d. 5) can neither be nor be conceived without substance; thus, they can only be in the divine nature. And as there is nothing besides substance and modes (a. 1) a thing is neither possible nor thinkable without God; qed.

sc. There are people who out of the blue assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what we have already shown. But these people a pass over. Indeed, all those who pay somehow attention to the divine nature, deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of

God, the absolutely infinite Being. But yet at the same time, from other arguments with which they try to prove their point, they clearly show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, in affirming that it was created by God. But, by virtue of what divine power such creation may have been operated, they are completely ignorant; thus it is clear that they do not know the meaning of their own words. As for myself, I have proved sufficiently clearly, at least in my own judgment, (cor. /p. 6 & sc. /p. 8) that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than by itself. Further I showed (p. 14) that besides God no other substance is thinkable. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute my adversaries" arguments, which all come down to this:

First, they believe that extended substance as such, consists in parts; wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be divided into two parts: each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the former, the infinite substance will be composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.
If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite, which is also absurd. Further if an infinite quantum be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would equally be so if each part measured only an inch; therefore one infinity would be 12 times as great as the other. Lastly, if from a point, situated in any infinite quantum we let be drawn two diverging lines AB and AC, as shown: when they are produced to infinity, the distance between B and C will be continually increased and from definite will at length become indefinable. And since all these absurdities follow, as they think. from supposing an infinite quantum, they conclude that extended substance must be finite and consequently cannot pertain to the beingness of God.

The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. God, they say. inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot suffer: but extended substance, insofar as it is divisible, suffers and, hence, cannot pertain to the beingness of God. Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers who, by them, try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot possibly pertain thereto. However, I think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their arguments; for they all pend on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and, such hypothesis I have shown (p. 12 & cor. /p. 13) to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities from which my adversaries try to conclude at the finitude of the extended substance, do not so much arise from the concept of an infinite quantum, as rather from assuming that an infinite quantum be

measurable and composed of finite parts; the only fair conclusion to be drawn therefrom is that infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be composed of finite parts; this is precisely what we have already proved (p. 12). And so, the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves.

But if they persist, it will be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance--which is thinkable only as infinite, one, and indivisible (p. 8, p. 5 & p. 12)--in order to prove its finitude, they assert that it is composed of finite parts and that it can be multiplied and divided. So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be divided *ad infinitum*. Indeed, it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points. All those who know clear reason to be infallible, and in particular those who deny the possibility of a vacuum, will share our views. For, if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as before? And why should all be fitted into one another as to leave no empty space? Surely, if things were really distinct one from the other, one could exist without the other and remain as before. But, **as there is no vacuum in Nature** (as will be shown later)all parts are bound to come together to prevent a void and, consequently, are not really distinguishable, and hence extended substance as such cannot be divided,

If, nevertheless one should now ask, why we are naturally so prone to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: superficially, as we imagine it, or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So, if we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination--which we often and more easily do--we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it with our intellect and think it as substance--which is extremely difficult to do--we shall then find(as I have sufficiently proved) that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be evident to those who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it is remembered that matter is everywhere the same and that its parts are not distinguishable, except insofar as we think matter as diversely modified: whence, its parts are not really distinguished, but only modally. For instance, water, in so far as it is water, we conceive it divided and its parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is corporeal substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water as such is produced and corrupted, but as substance it is neither produced nor corrupted.

I think I have now answered the second argument; in fact, it is based on the same assumption as the first--namely that matter, in so far as it is substance, be divisible and composed of parts. But, even if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (p. 14) no other substance is thinkable which may be for him a source of suffering. All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass through the laws of the infinite nature of God and (as I will shortly show) follow from the necessity of his beingness. Therefore it can in nowise be said that God is suffering from whatsoever, or that extended substance be unworthy of the divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the moment.

p. 16 FROM THE NECESSITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE MUST FOLLOW AN INFINITY OF THINGS IN AN INFINITE WAY (IN SHORT: ALL WHICH IS THINKABLE BY AN INFINITE INTELLECT). Dem.: This should be evident to anyone who remembers that from the definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties which necessarily follow therefrom (i.e. from the very beingness of the defined thing); and we infer more properties in proportion as the definition expresses more reality, i.e. in proportion as the very beingness of the defined thing involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has, absolutely, an infinity of attributes (d. 6) of which each expresses, in its own way, the infinite Beingness, it follows that from the necessity etc. ; qed. Hence it follows;

cor. 1 GOD IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF ALL THINGS CONCEIVABLE BY AN INFINITE INTELLECT.

cor. 2 GOD IS CAUSE *PER SE* (BY HIMSELF) AND NOT *PER ACCIDENS* (OCCASIONALLY).

cor. 3 GOD IS ABSOLUTELY THE FIRST CAUSE.

p. 17 GOD ACTS SOLELY BY THE LAWS OF HIS OWN NATURE AND COMPELLED BY NOBODY. Dem.: We have just shown (p. 16) that from the sole necessity of the divine nature, i.e. from the laws of God's very nature, an infinity of things in infinite ways absolutely follow; and we proved (p. 15) that without God a thing is neither possible nor thinkable, and, that all things are in God. Nothing therefore exists, outside God, which could condition or compel him to act; qed. It follows therefrom:

cor. 1 THERE CAN BE NO CAUSE--EXTRINSICALLY OR INTRINSICALLY--WHICH MOVES GOD TO ACT, BESIDES THE PERFECTION OF HIS OWN NATURE.

cor. 2 **GOD IS THE ONLY FREE CAUSE**. Dem.: Indeed, God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (p. 11 & cor. /p. 14) and acts by the sole necessity of his nature (p. 17), wherefore (d. 7) God is the only free cause; qed.

sc. Others think that God is a free cause for, in their opinion, he can do that those things which follow from his nature i.e. , which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they pretended that God could do that it should not follow from the nature of a plane triangle that the sum of its three interior angles be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause ne effect should follow, which is absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of p. 17 that neither intellect not will pertain to God's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do belong to God's nature; for, they say, they know of nothing more perfect, which they could attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that God's power would thus be destroyed. If God had created everything which is in his intellect, they say, he could not be able to create anything more. and this, they pretend, would clash with God's omnipotence. Therefore they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all things and that he creates only certain things which he has decided to create by some absolute exercise of his will.

However, I think I have shown clearly enough (p. 15) that from God's supreme power, or from his infinite nature, an infinity of things, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, and will always follow with the same necessity: exactly as from the nature of a plane triangle it follows for all eternity that its three interior angles equal two right angles. **Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been and will remain for all eternity the permanent f a c t.**

I think that this manner of treating the question, attributes to God an omnipotence far more perfect. Moreover, to say it frankly, my adversaries rather deny the omnipotence of God. For, are they not compelled to confess that although God understands an infinity of feasible things, he will never be able to create them? If he created all that he understands, so they say, he would exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect! In order to establish the perfection of God they are thus compelled to make him incapable of doing all those things over which his power extends; no doubt, this is the most absurd hypothesis and the most repugnant to God's omnipotence!

Further--to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will commonly attributed to God--if "intellect" and "will" belong to God's eternal beingness, these attributes should be taken in some significations quite different from those they usually bear. For "intellect" and "will" which should constitute the divine nature, would perforce differ by all the heavens from our human intellect and will: in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, heavenly constellation, and our barking pet. This I will prove as follows.

If "intellect" belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is causally prior to all things (cor. /p. 16). On the contrary, the truth and specificity of things is what it is, because it exists objectively as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute his beingness, is the very cause of things, both of their beingness and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted that God's intellect, God's will, and God's power are one and the same. Since God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their beingness and existence, it must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its beingness and existence. For a caused thing differs from its cause precisely by what it gets from the latter. For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his beingness--for the latter is an eternal truth--and, while the two men may perfectly agree in beingness, they must be different in existence; and hence, if the existence of one of them ceases, the other's will not necessarily cease in the same way. But if the beingness of one could be destroyed and rendered false, the beingness of the other would be destroyed also.

Wherefore a thing which is the cause both of the beingness and of the existence of any object or effect, must differ from that effect both in respect to its beingness, and also in respect to its existence. Now, God's intellect is the cause both of the beingness and existence of our intellect. ; therefore God's intellect--so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine beingness--differs from our intellect both in beingness and existence and cannot agree therewith in anywise, save in name, as we said before. Our reasoning would be the same in the case of the "will", as anyone can easily see.

p. 18 GOD IS THE IMMANENT CAUSE OF ALL THINGS AND NOT THEIR TRANSIENT CAUSE. Dem.: All things are in God and must be thinkable; e through God (p. 15); therefore (cor. 1/p. 16) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God no other substance is thinkable (p. 14) i.e. , nothing external to God. This is our second point. Hence, God is etc; qed.

p. 19 GOD i.e. , ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD ARE ETERNAL. Dem.: God (d. 6) is substance which (p. 11) necessarily exists, that is (p. 7) existence belongs to its nature or--what is the same--follows from its definition; therefore God is eternal (d. 8). Further by the attributes of God we understand that which (d. 4) expresses the beingness of the divine substance i.e. , belongs to it. Now, eternity belongs to the nature of substance (p. 7), therefore God, that is, all the attributes of God are eternal; qed.

sc. This proposition is also evident from the way I demonstrated (p. 11) the existence of God; by that proof it becomes evident that God's existence, like his beingness is an eternal truth. Moreover (in p. 19 of my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy") I have proved also God's eternity in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

p. 20 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS BEINGNESS ARE ONE AND THE SAME. Dem.: God and all his attributes are eternal (p. 19) i.e. , each of his attributes expresses existence (d. 8). Therefore the same attributes which explain God's eternal beingness, explain at the same time his eternal existence; in other words: that which constitutes God's beingness constitutes at the same time his existence; in other words: that which constitutes God's beingness at the same time constitutes his existence; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. 1 GOD's EXISTENCE, LIKE HIS BEINGNESS, IS AN ETERNAL TRUTH.

cor. 2 GOD, THAT IS, ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, ARE IMMUTABLE. For, if they could be changed in respect to existence, this would imply also a change in their beingness i.e. , a change from true to false, which is absurd.

p. 21 WHATEVER FOLLOWS FROM THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF ANY ATTRIBUTE OF GOD, MUST HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED AND BE INFINITE, in other words: IS ETERNAL AND INFINITE THROUGH THAT ATTRIBUTE. Dem.: If this be denied, suppose that something in some attribute of God follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute and that, at the same time, it be finite with a limited existence or duration, e.g. , the idea of God in thought. Now Thought, considered an attribute of God (p. 11) is necessarily infinite in its nature. But, insofar as it possess the idea of God, it is (here) supposed finite. However, it cannot be conceived as finite unless (d. 2) it be limited by another thought; but not by (another) Thought which has the idea of God (and is supposed here to be finite); hence, it must be limited by (another) thought, in so far as it does not constitute the idea of God, but which, nevertheless (p. 11) necessarily exists. Thus we have now granted a Thought which does not possess the idea of God and wherefrom, considered as absolute Thought, the idea of God would not naturally follow--for it is supposed as constituting and also as not constituting the idea of God--which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute Thought, or generally speaking. whatever else in any attribute of God (for our proof is universal) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, must necessarily be infinite; which was our first point. Furthermore, that which follows from the necessity of the

nature of any attribute, cannot have a limited duration. For, suppose anything existing in some attribute of God and by the necessity of the nature of that attribute, for instance: the idea of God in Thought, and let it be supposed not to have existed at some time, or to be about not to exist. Now, Thought being God's attribute, must necessarily exist immutable (p. 11 & cor. 2/p. 20) and beyond the limits of the assumed duration of the idea of God, and, would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which is contrary to our hypothesis; for we supposed that Thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom. Thus, the idea of God in Thought, or whatever necessarily follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration but is eternal through the said attribute; which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition applies to whatever, in any attribute, follows from God's absolute nature.

p. 22 WHATSOEVER FOLLOWS FROM AN ATTRIBUTE OF GOD, AS STATE OF A MODIFICATION WHICH NECESSARILY AND INFINITELY EXISTS THROUGH THAT ATTRIBUTE, MUST ALSO EXIST NECESSARILY AND INFINITELY. Dem.: Similar to that of the preceding proposition.:

p. 23 EVERY MODE WHICH EXISTS NECESSARILY AND INFINITELY, MUST HAVE FOLLOWED. EITHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF ANY ATTRIBUTE OF GOD, OR FROM A MODIFICATION (OF THAT ATTRIBUTE) WHICH EXISTS BOTH NECESSARILY AND INFINITELY. Dem.: A mode exists in something else, through which it must be explained (d. 5) that is (p. 15) it exists in God and is thinkable only through God. If therefore a mode is conceived as existing necessarily and infinitely, it must be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, that is (d. 8) eternity, or in other words (d. 6 & p. 19) in so far as it is considered absolutely. Therefore a mode which etc. ; qed.

p. 24 THE BEINGNESS OF THINGS PRODUCED BY GOD DOES NOT IMPLY EXISTENCE. Dem.: Evident from d. 1 For, that which is self-caused and exists by the sole necessity of its nature, is such that its beingness-- considered in itself--implies existence. Hence;

cor. GOD IS NOT ONLY THE CAUSE OF THINGS COMING INTO EXISTENCE, BUT ALSO OF THEIR CONTINUING IN EXISTENCE. That is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the essence of things (***causa essendi rerum***). For, whether things exist or not, whenever we consider their beingness, we find that it implies neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be cause of either the one or the other. Therefore God must be the only cause, inasmuch as to him alone existence pertains (cor. 1/p. 14); qed.

p. 25 **GOD IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE NOT ONLY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS, BUT ALSO OF THEIR BEINGNESS.** Dem.: If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the beingness of things; and thus the beingness of things (a. 4) would be thinkable without God, which (p. 15)is absurd. Therefore God is etc.: qed.

sc. This proposition follows more clearly from p. 16. For, it is evident that, given the divine nature, the beingness of things must be inferred from it, as well as their existence; in a word: God must be called the cause of all things, in the same way as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary:

cor. **PARTICULAR THINGS ARE MERELY STATES OF GOD's ATTRIBUTES, OR MODES BY WHICH THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD ARE EXPRESSED IN SOME FIXED AND DEFINITE WAY**. Proved by p. 15 and d. 5.

p. 26 **WHATEVER IS CONDITIONED TO DO SOMETHING, HAS NECESSARILY BEEN CONDITIONED SO BY GOD; AND THAT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONDITIONED BY GOD, CANNOT CONDITION ITSELF TO DO SO.** Dem.: That by which things are said to be conditioned to do something, is necessarily something positive (as should be obvious) and God, by the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause (p. 25 & p. 16) both of its beingness and of its existence; this is the first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For, if that what has not been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false and this, as I have shown, is absurd. Hence, whatever etc. ; qed.

p. 27 **WHAT HAS BEEN CONDITIONED BY GOD TO DO SOMETHING, CANNOT RENDER ITSELF UNCONDITIONED.** Dem.: Evident from a. 3.

p. 28 **EVERY INDIVIDUAL, OR EVERYTHING WHICH IS FINITE AND HAS A CONDITIONED EXISTENCE, CANNOT EXIST OR BE DETERMINED TO DO SOMETHING, UNLESS IT BE CONDITIONED THERETO BY A CAUSE OTHER THAN ITSELF, WHICH ALSO IS FINITE AND HAS A CONDITIONED EXISTENCE; AND LIKEWISE. THIS CAUSE IN ITS TURN CANNOT EXIST OR BE DETERMINED TO DO SOMETHING, UNLESS IT BE CONDITIONED THERETO BY ANOTHER CAUSE, ALSO FINITE AND CONDITIONED TO EXIST, AND SO ON TO INFINITY.** Dem.: Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and to do something, has been conditioned so by God (p. 26 & cor. /p. 24) But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for, whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (p. 21) It must therefore follow from some attribute

of God, insofar as it is considered as modified in some way; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (a. 1; d. 3 & d. 5), while modes are merely states of the attributes of God. But an individual thing cannot follow from any of God's attributes as an infinite and eternal state of that attribute. Therefore it must follow from one of the attributes, in so far as that attribute has been modified by some state which is finite and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or state (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be determined by another cause, which also is finite and has a limited existence; and so on (for the same reason) to infinity; qed.

sc. As certain (primordiaL) things must have been produced immediately by God, namely those which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, and, through them those other things which are neither possible nor thinkable without God, it follows: 1) That God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things immediately produced by him, and not(as usually stated)their cause ***in suo genere*** (in their own kind). For the effects of God are neither possible nor thinkable without him as cause(p. 15 & cor. /p. 24) 2) That God cannot be termed properly the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these things from what he immediately produces, as following from his absolute nature. For, by "remote cause" we understand a cause which in no way is conjoined to the effect. But all things are in God and so depend on God that without him they are neither possible nor thinkable.

p. 29 IN NATURE NOTHING IS CONTINGENT, BUT FROM THE NECESSITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE ALL THINGS ARE DETERMINED TO EXIST AND TO OPERATE IN A CERTAIN MANNER. Dem.: Whatsoever is, is in God (p. 15) But God cannot be called contingent. For (p. 11) he exists necessarily and not contingently. Further, the modes or states, follow from the divine nature necessarily and not contingently (p. 16); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as determined to operate (p. 27) Further, God is not only the cause of the existence of these modes but (cor. /p.24) also of their determination to operate in a certain manner (p. 26); if they be not determined by God, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render themselves determined and, vice versa, that they should render themselves undetermined. Wherefore in nature etc. , ; qed.

sc. Before going any further, I wish here to explain, or rather to restate, what we should understand by ***natura naturans***, creative nature, and by ***natura naturata,*** created nature. I think that from what has been said it is sufficiently clear that **by natura naturans we should understand that which is in itself and is self-evident**, or the attributes of substance which express the eternal and infinite beingness, in other words (cor. 1/p. 14 & cor. 2/p. 17) God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. **By natura naturata** we have to understand **all that which follows from the necessity of the divine nature,** or of any of God's attributes, that is all the modes, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and which, without God, are neither possible nor thinkable.

p. 30 **REAL INTELLECT, BE IT FINITE OR INFINITE, MUST COMPREHEND GOD's ATTRIBUTES AND MODIFICATIONS AND NOTHING ELSE.** Dem.: A true idea must agree with its object. (a. 6); in other words (and obviously) whatever is contained objectively in the intellect, must necessarily be found in Nature. But in Nature (cor. 1/p. 14) there is no substance save God, nor any modifications save those (p. 15) which are in God and which, without him, are neither possible nor thinkable. Therefore a real intellect etc. , ; qed.

p. 31 **REAL INTELLECT, WHETHER FINITE OR INFINITE, AS WELL AS WILL, DESIRE, LOVE etc. SHOULD BE REFERRED TO *NATURA NATURATA* AND NOT TO *NATURA NATURANS.*** Dem.: It is obvious that by intellect we do not understand absolute Thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, different from other modes of thinking, such as love, desire etc. and which therefore (d. 5) is explainable through absolute Thought; it is indeed (p. 15 & d. 6) explainable through that of God's attributes which expresses the eternal and infinite beingness of Thought, without which it is neither possible nor thinkable. It must therefore be referred to created nature rather than to creative nature, as need also the other modes of thinking; qed.

sc. In speaking of real intellect, I do not at all admit that there be such a thing as a potential intellect; but wishing to avoid all confusion, I intend to speak of what is most clearly perceived by us: **of the very fact of our understanding**. For we cannot understand anything without enriching at the same time our knowledge about our faculty of understanding.

p. 32 **WILL CANNOT BE CALLED A FREE CAUSE, BUT ONLY A NECESSARY CAUSE.** Dem.: Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect; therefore (p. 28) no volition can exist nor be determined to operate, unless it be determined by another cause and this again by another, and so on to infinity. But even if will is supposed infinite, it must nonetheless be determined by God, not by virtue of God's being the absolutely infinite substance, but by God's virtue of possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal beingness of Thought (p. 23) Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be determined to exist and to operate. Thus (d. 7), it cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary cause. Hence:

cor. 1 **GOD DOES NOT OPERATE OUT OF HIS FREE WILL.**

cor. 2 **WILL AND INTELLECT STAND IN THE SAME RELATION TO GOD's NATURE AS DO MOTION AND REST, AND THE NATURAL PHENOMENA IN GENERAL, WHICH ALL MUST BE DETERMINED BY GOD TO EXIST AND TO OPERATE IN A CERTAIN MANNER.** (p. 29). For "will", like all the other phenomena, stands in need of a cause, by which it is determined to exist and to operate in a certain manner. And although

from any will or intellect an infinite number of consequences may result, yet on that account God cannot be said to operate out of free will, any more than the infinite number of consequences resulting from any motion or rest, would justify us in saying that God operates out of his free movement or rest. Wherefore, " will "pertains no more to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature and to be determined thereby to exist and to operate un a certain manner.

p. 33 THE THINGS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BY GOD IN ANY OTHER WAY OR IN ANY OTHER ORDER, THAN THEY HAVE BEEN PRODUCED IN FACT. Dem.: All things necessarily follow from God's nature (p. 16) and are determined thereby to exist and to operate in a certain manner(p. 29). Therefore, if things could have been of a different nature, or could have been conditioned to operate in some different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature also would have been able to become different from what it is now; and therefore (p. 11) that different nature, also, would have perforce existed, and consequently there would have been two or more Gods. This (cor. 1/p. 14) is absurd. Therefore the things etc, ; qed.

sc. 1 As I have thus shown more clearly than the noonday light, that there is absolutely nothing to justify people in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we should attach to the word "contingent". but at first, let us explain the concepts of "necessary" and "impossible". A thing is called **necessary** either in respect to its beingness or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from its beingness and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be **impossible** inasmuch as its beingness or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause exists which could produce such an effect; but we can call **contingent** a thing only inasmuch our knowledge is deficient. Indeed, a thing whereof we do not know whether its nature does or does not involve contradiction, or knowing that it does not involve contradiction, whereof existence we are still in doubt, as we ignore the order of causes. Such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible: wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

sc. 2 It clearly follows from what we have said, that the things have been produced by God with the highest perfection inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from the most perfect nature. Now, this fact does not imply any imperfection in God, for we have been compelled to conclude it out of his perfection. But if the contrary be assumed, it would clearly imply--as I have just shown--that God be not supremely perfect; for if the things could have been produced in any other way, we would have to assign to God a nature different from that which the consideration of the absolutely perfect Being compels us to assign to him. No doubt that many people will reject this way of thinking as ridiculous, and will refuse to give their minds up to

contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom totally different from that which we (d. 7) have deduced; they indeed assign to him an absolute Will. However, I am also convinced that if they reflect on the matter and duly weigh in their minds the whole sequence of our demonstrations, they will reject such "freedom" as they now attribute to God, not only as childish, but also as a great impediment to science. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the scholium to proposition 17. But for the sake of my opponents, I intend to show hereafter that even in supposing that Will does belong to God's nature, it nevertheless follows from his perfection that the things could not have been created other than they are, nor in a different order.

This is easily proved if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely: "that it depends only on the decree and will of God that each thing is what it is." If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. They have to admit further that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection, or inconstancy. For, in eternity there is no such thing as when, before or after; hence it follows from the very perfection of God that he never can decree, or never could have decreed anything else; also: that God did not exist before his decrees and could not exist without them.

But here they will argue: Suppose, they say, that God had made a different reality, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity, concerning Nature and her order, we could not conclude therefrom any imperfection in God. But in saying so, they implicitly admit the possibility for God to change his decrees. For, if God had ordained any decrees, different from those which he has ordained concerning Nature and her order--in other words, if he had willed and thought differently about Nature--he would perforce have had a different intellect and also a different will from what he actually has. Now, if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a different will, without any change in his beingness and perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning the things he created, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and his will regarding the created things and their order, are the same in respect to his beingness and perfection, in whatever manner one may view them. Further, all the philosophers whom I have read, admit that God's intellect is wholly real, and not at all potential; as they also admit that his intellect and his will are not distinguishable from his beingness, it follows: That if in fact God had another intellect and another will, his beingness would have been necessarily different. And thus, as I concluded at first, my opponents must admit that: If things had been created by God in a different way from what they are, his intellect, will and beingness would perforce have been different, which is absurd. Thus, as the things could not have been created by God in any but the actual way and

order, and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God, there is no valid reason to make us believe that God was unwilling to create all things which are in his intellect, with the same perfection as he understands everything

But my opponents will say: There is no perfection nor imperfection in the beings themselves; that which is in them and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the Will of God, and therefore, if he had willed, he could have effected that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versa. Now, I ask you: What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, might bring it about by his "Will", that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them? This, as I have just shown, is the height of absurdity! Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its holders: All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's will cannot change (as we have just most clearly proven by virtue of God's perfection). Therefore neither can things be different from what they are. I confess that this opinion which subjects all things to the will of some indifferent deity and makes them depend on its good pleasure, is less far from the truth than the opinion of those who pretend that God always acts in view of promoting what is good. For these latter people seem to place something outside of God which is independent of him, to which he looks while he is at work as to a model, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is indeed nothing else than to subject God to destiny, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of him whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the beingness of all things as well as of their existence, Therefore it is not worthwhile that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity.

p. 34 GOD's POWER IS IDENTICAL WITH HIS BEINGNESS. Dem.: From the sole necessity of God's beingness it follows that he is cause of himself(p. 11) and of all things (cor. /p. 16). Wherefore God's power by which he himself and all things are and act, is identical with his beingness; qed.

p. 35 WHATEVER WE UNDERSTAND TO BE IN GOD's POWER, NECESSARILY IS IN HIS POWER. Dem.: Whatever is in God's power, must (p. 34) pertain to his beingness, so that it necessarily follows therefrom; hence, whatever we understand etc. ; qed.

p. 36 NOTHING EXISTS WHEREFROM NATURE SOME EFFECT DOES NOT FOLLOW. Dem.: Whatever exists, expresses God's nature or beingness in some well determined manner (cor. /p. 25), that is (p. 34) whatever exists, expresses in some well determined manner God's power, which is the cause of all things. Therefore (p. 16) from anything an effect must necessarily follow; qed.

APPENDIX

In the foregoing part I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is unique, that he is and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature, that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God and so depend on him, that without him they are neither possible nor thinkable; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not by his free will, nor through his absolute good pleasure, but from his absolute nature or infinite power. Further, wherever an opportunity was offered, I have taken care to remove the prejudices which might impede the comprehension of my proofs. Yet, misconceptions still remain, which might and may prevent people from understanding the connection of things in the manner in which I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worthwhile to bring those misconceptions before the bar of reason. **All such prejudices spring from the assumption commonly entertained, that all things in Nature act, like men, with an end in view; and indeed it is taken for granted that even God directs himself with an end in view, and directs all things to some definite goal**--for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him. I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence and **why all are naturally so prone to adopt it?** Secondly, I will show its falsity and, lastly, I will indicate how it has given rise to many other misconceptions about **good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness,** and the like.

However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind. But it will suffice here to assume as a starting point what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that **people are born ignorant of the causes of things**, that all, instinctively, seek for what is useful to them, and, that they are aware of such a tendency. So it follows, first, that **people think themselves free,** inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that **people do all things for an end,** namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it is no wonder if they tend to look out only for the final causes and, when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt about the event. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn their attention back to themselves and to reflect on what would have induced them personally to bring about the

given event, and thus, **they necessarily judge other natures by their own.** Further, as they find in themselves and outside, many means which assist them in their search for what is useful, for example, the eyes for seeing, the teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish etc. , they come to look at the whole of Nature as a means for getting such conveniences.

Now, as they are aware that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they had a cause for believing that some other being has made them for their use. For, having considered the things as means, it was impossible to believe that they had created themselves; but judging from the means they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, people were induced to believe in some ruler, or rulers of Nature, endowed with human freedom and taking care to arrange and to adapt everything for human use. **As to the specific nature of such rulers**, having no information on the subject, **they were bound to judge it by analogy to their own nature** and to assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest recognition of honor. Hence it also followed that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, some particular way of worshiping God, so that God might love him more than his fellowmen, and direct the whole course of Nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus **the prejudice developed into superstition and took deep root in the human mind; and** for this reason **everyone strove most zealously to understand and to explain the final causes of things;** but in their endeavor to show that Nature does nothing in vain i.e. , nothing which is useless to man, **they only have demonstrated that Nature, the gods, and men, are all together in a state of madness.** Consider, please, the results: among the many helps of Nature, they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases etc.; so they declared that such thing happen because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship.

Experience, day by day, protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate superstition. For it was easier for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things, of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to continue their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole construction and replace it by a new one.

They therefore laid down as an axiom that the judgments of the gods far transcend human understanding, and, such a dogma might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics, which considers only the essentials and the properties of figures, without regard to their final causes, had not disclosed us another standard of verity. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here)

besides mathematics, which caused some men to become aware of all these prejudices and led them to the true knowledge of things.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length that Nature has no particular goal in view and that **final causes are mere human fictions.** This I think is already evident enough, both from the causes and assumptions on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from p. 16 and cor. /p. 32, and in fact from all the propositions in which I have shown that **everything in Nature proceeds from an eternal necessity and with the utmost perfection.**

I will add only that their teleological doctrine upsets completely the natural order. Indeed, that which is really a cause, it considers as an effect, and vice versa; that which is by nature first, it makes to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect, it makes to be most imperfect. But, passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is plain from p. 21, 22 & 23 that the most perfect effect is that which is produced by God immediately; on the other hand, the more intermediate causes an effect requires for its production, the more it is imperfect. Also, if the things immediately created by God, were simply made to enable him to attain his goal, then the things which come after, for the sake of which (as they pretend) the first were made, should be necessarily the most excellent of all. Further, **the said teleological doctrine does away with the perfection of God**: for, if God acts in view of a goal, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Our theologians and metaphysicians draw here a distinction between an object of want and an object of assimilation, but they still confess that God made all things for the sake of himself and not for the sake of creation. Unable as they are to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself as an object for which he should act, they are driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked and desired those things for whose attainment he created means. Notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have started a new method of argumentation to prove their theory. namely a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance: thus showing that they had no other way of exhibiting their credo.

For example, if a stone falls from the roof on to someone's head and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that purpose, how could so many circumstances (and there is often a great number of such concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by mere chance? Perhaps you will answer, that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the

man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?" **So, they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God-- in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance**. So again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art, they conclude that it has been formed not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been put together in such a way that one part shall not hurt another.

Hence, anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those whom the masses adore as the interpreters of Nature and of the gods. **For these potentates know that with the removal of ignorance, the stupor which forms their only available means for sustaining and preserving their authority, would vanish also**. But I now quit that subject and pass on to my third point. After men persuaded themselves that everything which is created, is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all, which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further they were bound to form some general notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and as they take for granted their own freedom arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit. I will speak of these latter later, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain now.

Men have called **good** everything which conduces to health and the worship of God, and they have styled **bad** everything which hinders these objectives. And as those who do not understand the nature of things, are deprived of any positive judgment, **they merely represent things as it suits them and mistake their imagination for understanding;** hence, being really ignorant, both of things and their own nature they firmly believe that there is an **order** in things. When phenomena are of such kind that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can therefore be easily remembered, we say that the things are **well-ordered;** if the contrary, that they are **ill-ordered** or **confused.** Further, as things which are easily imagined, are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion --as though there were any order in Nature, independent from our imagination--and say that God has created all things in a perfect order; thus, unwittingly, they attribute imagination to God, unless indeed they would have it that God foresaw human imagination and arranged everything so that it should be easier imagined by man. Whatever be the twist of their mind, I scarcely believe you could doubt them in pointing to the fact that there is an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing man's

imagination, and very many others which confound man's weakness. But enough has been said on that subject.

The other general notions, too, are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected; nevertheless, ignorant men consider them as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for their sake; and, according as they are affected thereby, they style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion communicated to our optical nerves by some represented objects, be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled **beautiful;** if a contrary impression be excited, they are styled **ugly.** Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled **fragrant** or **fetid;** if through our taste, **sweet** or **bitter, full-flavored** or **insipid;** if through our touch, **hard** or **soft, rough** or **smooth** etc. Whatever affects our ears is said to give raise to **noise, sound** or **harmony.** In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and some philosophers have persuaded themselves that the motion of heavenly bodies gives raise to harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his mind, or rather, mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.

We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed, conducing to skepticism; for, although human bodies agree in many respects, yet in many other respects they differ; so that what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems well-ordered to one, seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one, displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates." All of which show that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and, rather imagine than in truth understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would as mathematics attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have demonstrated. We see by now. that all the explanations commonly given of Nature are mere modes of imagining and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only a state of imagination; and also they have names, as though they were entities existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities of imagination and not entities of reason; and therefore, all arguments drawn against us from such common notions may be easily refuted.

Many argue in this way. "If all things follow with necessity from the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in Nature? Such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin etc." But these reasoners, as I have said, are easily refuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only

from their own nature and power; things are more or less perfect i.e. are said to be more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend the senses of the common man, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to him. As to those who ask why God did not create all men in such a way that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection, from the highest to the lowest; or more strictly: because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of every thing which is thinkable by an infinite intellect, as I have shown in p. 16. Such are the misconceptions and prejudices I have undertaken to analyze; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily refute them with the aid of some reflection.

PART TWO: ABOUT THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE

I now pass on to explain those things which must have necessarily followed from the beingness of God, or of the eternal and infinite Being: not, indeed, all of them, for we have proved (I. /16) that an infinity must follow therefrom in an infinite number of ways, but only those which may lead us, as though by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its supreme happiness.

DEFINITIONS

d. 1 **BODY: A MODE WHICH EXPRESSES IN A CERTAIN MANNER THE BEINGNESS OF GOD, VIEWED AS THE EXTENDED REALITY** (I/25 cor.)

d. 2 **TO THE BEINGNESS OF A THING BELONGS THAT WHICH BY ITS PRESENCE NECESSARILY ESTABLISHES THE THING, AND, BY ITS ABSENCE NECESSARILY ABOLISHES THE THING; in other words: THAT, WITHOUT WHICH THE THING AND, VICE VERSA, WHICH ITSELF WITHOUT THE THING, IS NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR THINKABLE.**

d. 3 **IDEA: A CONCEPT WHICH THE MIND FORMS BECAUSE IT IS THINKING.**

Explanation: I say concept rather than perception, because the term perception seems to suggest a passiveness of the mind due to the object, whereas concept seems to express an activity of the mind.

d. 4 **ADEQUATE IDEA: AN IDEA WHICH, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, WITHOUT RELATION TO THE OBJECT, HAS ALL THE PROPERTIES AND INTRINSIC MARKS OF A TRUE IDEA.** Explanation: I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely the agreement between the idea and its object.

d. 5 **DURATION: THE INDEFINITE CONTINUANCE OF EXISTING.** Explanation: I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined by the very nature of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily establishes but never abolishes the thing's existence.

d. 6 **REALITY AND PERFECTION ARE ONE AND THE SAME.**

d. 7 **PARTICULAR THINGS: THINGS WHICH ARE FINITE AND HAVE A LIMITED EXISTENCE. ; HENCE, IF SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CONCUR IN ONE ACTION, SO AS TO BE ALL TOGETHER THE CAUSE OF ONE EFFECT, I CONSIDER THEM ALL, SO FAR, AS ONE PARTICULAR THING.**

AXIOMS

a. 1 **THE BEINGNESS OF MAN DOES NOT IMPLY NECESSARY EXISTENCE, THAT IS: IN THE ORDER OF NATURE, IT MAY COME TO PASS AS WELL THAT A MAN EXISTS OR NOT.**

a. 2 **MAN THINKS.**

a. 3 **WAYS OF THINKING, SUCH AS LOVE, DESIRE, OR ANY OTHER OF THE SO CALLED STATES OF MIND, DO NOT OCCUR UNLESS ONE HAS SIMULTANEOUSLY THE IDEA OF A THING LOVED, DESIRED etc. BUT ONE CAN HAVE THE IDEA ALSO IN ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER WAY OF THINKING.**

a. 4 **WE FEEL THAT OUR BODY IS AFFECTED IN MANY WAYS.**

a. 5 **WE FEEL AND PERCEIVE NO OTHER PARTICULAR THINGS THAN BODIES AND WAYS OF THINKING.** The postulates will be found after p. 13.

PROPOSITIONS

p. 1 **THOUGHT IS GOD's ATTRIBUTE, OR GOD IS THE THINKING REALITY.**

Dem.: Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which in some fixed and definite way express God's nature (I. /25 cor.) God therefore has an attribute (I. /d. 5) of which the concept is implied in all particular thoughts and through which they are also explained. Hence Thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, which expresses his eternal and infinite beingness (I. /d. 6) In other words , God is the thinking reality; qed.

sc. This proposition is also evident from the fact that we are able to conceive the thinking being as infinite. For in proportion as a thinking being is capable of more thoughts, it is assumed to have more reality or perfection. A being, therefore, which can think an infinity of things in infinite ways is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. Hence, Thought is necessarily (I. /d. 4 & 5) one of the infinite attributes of God.

p. 2 **EXTENSION IS GOD's ATTRIBUTE, OR GOD IS THE EXTENDED REALITY.**

Dem.: Similar to that of p. 1.

p. 3 **THERE IS NECESSARILY IN GOD AN IDEA OF HIS BEINGNESS AND OF ALL THINGS WHICH NECESSARILY FOLLOW FROM HIS BEINGNESS.** Dem.: God (p. 1) can think an infinity of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same) can form the idea of his beingness and of all things which follow therefrom (I. /16). Now, that which is in God's power, necessarily is (I. /35). Hence, such an idea necessarily is and, only, in God (I. /15); qed.

sc. People commonly understand by God's power, the free will of God and his right over all things that exist, which latter they accordingly consider as contingent. They say indeed that God has the power to destroy all things and to reduce them to nothing. Further God's power is often linked to the power of kings. But we have already refuted this misconception (I. /32 cor. 1 & 2) and we have shown (I. /16) that God acts and understands himself with the same necessity; in other words, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as they all admit) that God understands himself, so also does it follow from the same necessity that he acts infinitely in

infinite ways. We further showed (I. /34) that God's power is nothing but his acting beingness; therefore it is as impossible for us to think God as non active, as to think him as non existent. If I might pursue the subject further, I could show that the power which is commonly attributed to God is not only an anthropomorphism, (inasmuch as people look upon God as a man, or in the likeness of a man) but amounts to powerlessness. However, we cannot afford here to talk so much upon the same subject. I would only beg the reader again and again, to reconsider what is said upon this subject in the first part, from p. 16 to the end. For, **no one will be able to understand me correctly, unless he is very careful not to confound God's power with the human power or with the right of kings.**

p. 4 **GOD's IDEA, WHEREFROM INFINITIES FOLLOW IN INFINITE WAYS, CAN ONLY BE UNIQUE.** Dem.: Infinite intellect comprehends nothing but God's attributes and states (I. /30). Now God is unique(I. /14 cor.) Hence, God's idea &c. ; qed.

p. 5 **THE SPECIFIC BEING OF IDEAS ADMITS GOD AS ITS CAUSE ONLY INSOFAR AS HE IS VIEWED AS THE THINKING REALITY, BUT NOT AS EXPLAINED THROUGH ANY OTHER ATTRIBUTE; THAT IS, THE IDEAS BOTH OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND OF PARTICULAR THINGS, DO NOT ADMIT AS THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE THEIR OBJECTS (*IDEATA*) OR THINGS PERCEIVED, BUT GOD HIMSELF INSOFAR AS HE IS THE THINKING REALITY.** Dem.: Evident from p. 3 There we drew the conclusion that God can form the idea of his beingness and of all things which follow therefrom, solely because he is the thinking reality, and not because he is the object of his own ideas. Wherefore the specific being of ideas admits for cause God viewed as the thinking reality. We may prove it also in this way: The specific being of ideas is (as obvious) a mode of thinking, that is (I. /25 cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain way God's nature, namely as thinking reality, and therefore (I. /10) implies the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (I. /a. 4) is not the effect of any attribute save Thought. Hence, the specific being &c. ; qed.

p. 6 **THE MODES OF ANY ATTRIBUTE ARE CAUSED BY GOD, INSOFAR AS HE IS VIEWED THROUGH THE ATTRIBUTE OF WHICH THEY ARE MODES, AND NOT AS VIEWED THROUGH ANY OTHER ATTRIBUTE.** Dem.: Each attribute is self-evident (I. /10) wherefore the modes of each attribute imply the concept of their attribute, but not of any other. Thus, (I. /a, 4) the modes of any attribute &c. ; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. **THE SPECIFIC BEING OF THINGS WHICH ARE NOT MODES OF THINKING, DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THE DIVINE NATURE BECAUSE**

HE HAS A PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINGS; BUT THE IDEATED THINGS FOLLOW AND ARE DERIVED FROM THEIR PARTICULAR ATTRIBUTE, IN THE SAME WAY AND WITH THE SAME NECESSITY AS IDEAS FOLLOW (as we have shown) FROM THE ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT.

p. 7 **THE ORDER AND CONNECTION OF IDEAS IS THE SAME AS THE ORDER AND CONNECTION OF THINGS.** Dem.: Evident from I. /a. 4 For the idea of everything which is caused, depends on the knowledge of the cause whereof it is an effect. Hence it follows:

cor. **GOD's POWER OF THINKING IS EQUAL TO HIS VERY POWER OF ACTION; THAT IS, WHATSOEVER FOLLOWS SPECIFICALLY FROM GOD's INFINITE NATURE, FOLLOWS ALSO OBJECTIVELY FROM GOD's IDEA, IN THE SAME ORDER AND CONNECTION.**

sc. Before going any further, let us recall to our mind what has been just established, namely that whatever an infinite intellect perceives as constituting the beingness of substance, belongs altogether to the unique substance; consequently, **thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same** substance comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. Thus, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Hebrews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by him, are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature and the idea of that circle, which is also in God. are one and the same thing, viewed through different attributes. Thus, whether we think of Nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes--that is the same things following in either case. I said that God is the cause of an idea--say, of the idea of a circle--insofar as he is the thinking reality; but I said so simply because the specific being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that mode again through another. and so on to infinity. Thus, so long we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole Nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of Thought only. And, insofar as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole Nature through the attribute of Extension only; and so on, in the case of other attributes. Wherefore God, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes, is the very cause of things as they are in themselves. I cannot for the present explain the matter more clearly.

p. 8 **THE IDEAS OF NONEXISTENT PARTICULAR THINGS OR MODES MUST BE COMPREHENDED IN GODS INFINITE IDEA, IN THE SAME WAY AS THE SPECIFICITIES OF PARTICULAR THINGS OR MODES ARE CONTAINED IN GOD's ATTRIBUTES.** Dem.: Evident from p. 7 + sc. 1; Hence it follows:

cor. **SO LONG AS PARTICULAR THINGS DO NOT EXIST, EXCEPT INSOFAR AS THEY ARE COMPREHENDED IN GOD's ATTRIBUTES, THEIR ABSTRACTIONS OR IDEAS DO NOT EXIST, EXCEPT INSOFAR AS GOD's INFINITE IDEA EXISTS; AND WHEN PARTICULAR THINGS ARE SAID TO EXIST, NOT ONLY AS COMPREHENDED IN GOD's ATTRIBUTES, BUT ALSO INSOFAR AS THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE A DURATION, THEIR IDEAS WILL ALSO IMPLY EXISTENCE, THROUGH WHICH THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE A DURATION.**

sc. If you desire an example to throw more light on this question, I shall not be able to give you any which adequately explains **the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique**. I will try however to illustrate it the best I can. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of chords intersect within it, at a given point, the rectangles formed by their respective segments will all be equivalent; thus an infinity of equivalent rectangles (i.e. having equal area) is contained in a circle. Yet, no one of these rectangles can be said to exist, except insofar as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except insofar as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant now that from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist, say E and D. The ideas of these two rectangles presently not only exist insofar as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they imply the existence of the said rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of all the remaining rectangles.

p. 9 **THE IDEA OF A PARTICULAR THING, EXISTING IN FACT, HAS GOD FOR ITS CAUSE, NOT INSOFAR HE IS INFINITE. BUT INSOFAR HE IS CONSIDERED HAVING ANOTHER IDEA OF A (SECOND) THING EXISTING IN FACT, OF WHICH HE IS THE CAUSE INSOFAR AS HE HAS A THIRD IDEA, AND SO ON TO INFINITY.** Dem.: The idea of a particular thing existing in fact, is a mode

of thinking and is distinct from other modes (cor. & sc. /p. 8); thus (p. 6) it has God for its cause only insofar as he is the thinking reality; but not (I. /28) insofar as he is the absolutely thinking reality, but only insofar as he is considered having another mode of thinking; and he is cause of the latter as having a third idea, and so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas(p. 7) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore, the cause of a given particular idea is another particular idea--or God, insofar as he is considered as modified by that idea; and of this second idea God is the cause insofar as he is modified by another idea, and so on to infinity; qed.

cor. **WHATSOEVER TAKES PLACE IN THE PARTICULAR OBJECT OF AN IDEA, THE KNOWLEDGE THEREOF IS IN GOD, INSOFAR ONLY AS HE HAS THE IDEA OF THE OBJECT.** Dem.: Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in God (p. 3) not insofar as he is infinite, but as having another idea of a particular thing (p. 9) and (p. 7) the order and connection of the ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore, the knowledge thereof is in God &c. ; qed.

p. 10 **THE BEING OF SUBSTANCE DOES NOT PERTAIN TO THE BEINGNESS OF MAN; IN OTHER WORDS, SUBSTANCE DOES NOT MAKE UP MAN's KIND.** Dem.: The being of substance implies necessary existence(I. /7). If therefore the being of substance pertained to the beingness of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (d. 2) and consequently man would necessarily exist, which (a. 1) is absurd. Hence the being of substance &c; qed.

sc. 1 This proposition may be proved also from I. /5 where it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for, as many men may exist, that which makes up man's species or kind, is not the being of substance. Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance, namely, that by its nature substance is infinite, immutable, indivisible &c. , as anyone may see for himself. Hence it follows:

cor. **THE BEINGNESS OF MAN CONSISTS IN CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS OF GOD's ATTRIBUTES.** For (p. 10) the being of substance does not belong to the beingness of man. Man's beingness, therefore (I. /15) is something which is in God and which without God is neither possible nor thinkable, whether it be a state (I. /25 cor,) or mode which expresses God's Nature in a well determined manner.

sc. 2 Everyone must surely admit that nothing is possible nor thinkable without God. All agree that God is the one and only cause of all things, both of their beingness and of their existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in respect of creation, as they say, but also in respect of being. But at the same time most of them assert that an element without which a thing is neither possible nor thinkable, belongs to the "essence" of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God belongs to the "essence" of created things, or else that a created thing

could be possible or thinkable without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent speech.

I think that the cause for such confusion is mainly in their not keeping to the proper order of philosophizing. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and in the order of nature, they have believed to be last in the order of knowledge and have put into the first place what they call objects of the senses. Hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses (purely fictional) wherewith they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such fictions are of no help towards understanding the divine nature. No wonder that they contradict themselves again and again. But enough about that. My intention here was only to justify why I did not say "that without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived belongs to the essence of that thing." Particular things are neither possible nor thinkable without God, and yet God does not pertain to their beingness. I said (d. 2): To the beingness of a thing belongs that which by its presence necessarily establishes the thing, and by its absence necessarily abolishes the thing; in other words: that, without which the thing and, vice versa, which itself without the thing is neither possible nor thinkable.

p. 11 WHAT FIRSTLY CONSTITUTES THE PRESENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND IS SIMPLY THE IDEA OF SOME PARTICULAR THING EXISTING IN FACT. Dem.: Man's beingness (cor. /p. 10) consists in certain modifications of God's attributes, namely (a. 2) some modes of thinking, the idea of which (a, 3) is prior in nature, and when the idea is given, the other modes--in respect to which the idea is prior--must also be in the same individual. Thus, what firstly constitutes the presence of the human mind, is an idea. But not the idea of some nonexisting thing, for then (cor. /p. 8) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something existing in fact. But not the idea of an infinite thing. For, an infinite thing (I. /21 & 22) must necessarily exist and this (a. 1) would imply an absurdity. Therefore, what firstly; qed. Hence;

cor. THE HUMAN MIND IS PART OF THE INFINITE INTELLECT OF GOD. Thus, when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we assert that God, has this or that idea, not indeed insofar as he is infinite, but as viewed through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the beingness of the human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the beingness of the human mind, but also as he has, simultaneously with the human mind, the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.

sc. Here I am quite sure, readers will come to a stand and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate: I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.

p. 12 **WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE OBJECT OF THE IDEA CONSTITUTING THE HUMAN MIND, MUST BE PERCEIVED BY THE HUMAN MIND, OR THERE WILL BE NECESSARILY AN IDEA OF THE SAID OCCURRENCE IN THE HUMAN MIND. THAT IS, IF THE OBJECT OF THE IDEA CONSTITUTING THE HUMAN MIND BE A BODY, NOTHING CAN HAPPEN IN THAT BODY WHICH IS NOT PERCEIVED BY THE MIND.** Dem.: Whatever happens in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (cor. /p. 9) viewed as having the idea of the said object i.e. , (p. 11) insofar as God constitutes its mind Thus, whatsoever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; i.e. , (cor. /p. 11) the knowledge of the said thing will be necessarily in the mind, in other words, the mind perceives it; qed.

sc. This proposition is also evident from p. 7 to which refer for clearer understanding.

p. 13 **THE OBJECT OF THE IDEA CONSTITUTING THE HUMAN MIND IS THE BODY, IN OTHER WORDS, A CERTAIN MODE OF EXTENSION WHICH EXISTS IN FACT, AND NOTHING ELSE.** Dem.: Indeed, if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the dispositions of the body would not be in God (cor. /p. 9) viewed as constituting our mind, but viewed as constituting the mind of something else; in other words, (cor. /p. 11) the ideas of the body's dispositions would not be in our mind. Now (a. 4) we do possess the ideas of our body's dispositions. Thus, the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body as it exists in fact (p. 11). Further, if there were any other objects, besides the body, then as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I. /36) there would have to be necessarily in our mind an idea due to that other object (p. 11); but (a. 5) there is no such idea; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. **WE ARE MIND AND BODY AND OUR BODY EXISTS SUCH AS WE EXPERIENCE IT IN OUR FEELINGS.**

sc. We thus understand, not only that our mind is united to our body, but also how the unity of body and mind should be understood. No one, however, will be able to grasp this adequately and distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of our body's nature. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been general, applying **not more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animated *(omnia,***

quamvis diversis gradibus animata). For, of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which he is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus, whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body, must also be asserted of the idea of anything else. On the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea and contains more reality. Thus, in order to determine wherein the human mind differs from others and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance. It will be sufficient for me to state, in a general way, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing or enduring many things at once, so also is its mind more fitted than others for perceiving many things at once; and the more a given body's actions depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is its own mind for distinct understanding. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions which, in the following propositions, I will deduce from what has been stated. Wherefore I have thought it worthwhile to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, **let us first establish a few propositions concerning the NATURE OF BODIES:**

axiom 1 **ALL BODIES ARE EITHER IN MOTION OR AT REST.**

axiom 2 **EACH BODY MOVES, SOMETIMES MORE SLOWLY, SOMETIMES MORE QUICKLY**.

lemma 1 **BODIES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER IN RESPECT OF MOTION AND REST, QUICKNESS AND SLOWNESS, AND NOT IN RESPECT OF SUBSTANCE.** Dem.: The first part is self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance is plain both from I. /5 and I. /8; still more clearly from I. /15 sc.

lemma 2 **ALL BODIES AGREE IN CERTAIN RESPECTS.** Dem.: All bodies agree in the fact that they all imply the concept of one and the same attribute (d. 1), further in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and in general, that they may be in motion or at rest.

lemma 3 **A BODY IN MOTION OR AT REST MUST BE DETERMINED TO MOTION OR REST BY ANOTHER BODY, WHICH OTHER BODY HAS BEEN**

DETERMINED TO MOTION OR REST BY A THIRD BODY, AND THAT THIRD AGAIN BY A FOURTH, AND SO ON TO INFINITY. Dem.: Bodies are (d. 1) particular things which (lem.1) are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest; thus (I. /28) each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another particular thing, namely (p. 6) by another body, which other body is (ax. 1) also in motion or rest, and so on to infinity; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. **A BODY IN MOTION KEEPS MOVING UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED TO A STATE OF REST BY SOME OTHER BODY; AND A BODY AT REST REMAINS SO, UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED TO MOTION BY SOME OTHER BODY.** This is indeed self-evident. For, when I suppose that a body, say A. is at rest and without referring to other bodies, I cannot affirm anything concerning A. except that it is at rest. If afterwards it happens that A. should move, this could not have resulted from its having been at rest. If on the other hand A. be given in motion, so long as we consider A. only, we shall be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it moves. If subsequently A. is found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A's previous motion, for such motion could only have led to continued motion; the state of rest, therefore, must have resulted from something which was not A. namely from an external cause determining A. to a state of rest.

axiom 1 **ALL WAYS WHEREIN ONE BODY IS DISPOSED BY ANOTHER BODY FOLLOW SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM THE NATURE OF THE BODY DISPOSED AND THE BODY DISPOSING; SO THAT ONE AND THE SAME BODY MAY BE MOVED IN DIFFERENT WAYS, ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NATURE OF THE BODIES MOVING IT AND, VICE VERSA, DIFFERENT BODIES MAY BE MOVED IN DIFFERENT WAYS BY ONE AND THE SAME BODY.**

axiom 2 **WHEN A BODY IN MOTION IMPINGES ON ANOTHER BODY AT REST, WHICH IT IS UNABLE TO MOVE, IT RECOILS IN ORDER TO CONTINUE ITS MOTION AND ITS MOTION WITH THE PLANE OF THE BODY AT REST (WHEREON THE MOVING BODY HAS IMPINGED) WILL BE EQUAL TO THE ANGLE FORMED BY THE DIRECTION OF THE IMPINGING MOTION WITH THE SAME PLANE.**

So far we have been speaking only of the simplest bodies which are distinguished from one another by motion and rest, speed and slowness alone. We now pass on to **compound bodies.**

definition: WHEN A SET OF BODIES OF THE SAME OR DIFFERENT SIZE ARE COMPELLED BY OTHER BODIES TO REMAIN IN CONTACT, OR, IF THEY MOVE AT THE SAME OR DIFFERENT SPEEDS, TO COMMUNICATE THEIR MUTUAL MOVEMENTS AT SOME FIXED PROPORTION, WE SAY THAT SUCH BODIES ARE *UNITED* AND THAT ALL TOGETHER, THEY COMPOSE *ONE* BODY OR *INDIVIDUAL*, WHICH IS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER BODIES BY THE FACT OF THIS UNION.

axiom 3 **SINCE THE PARTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. OR A COMPOUND BODY REMAIN IN CONTACT OVER MORE OR LESS EXTENDED SURFACES, IT WILL BE MORE OR LESS DIFFICULT TO MAKE THEM CHANGE THEIR POSITION; CONSEQUENTLY THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE BROUGHT WITH MORE OR LESS DIFFICULTY INTO ANOTHER FORM, I WILL CALL *HARD* THOSE BODIES WHOSE PARTS REMAIN IN CONTACT OVER LARGE SURFACES; *SOFT* THOSE WHOSE PARTS REMAIN IN CONTACT OVER SMALL SURFACES, AND FINALLY *FLUID* THOSE WHOSE PARTS MOVE AMONG ONE ANOTHER.**

lemma 4 **IF FROM A BODY OR INDIVIDUAL, COMPOUNDED OF SEVERAL BODIES, SOME BODIES BE ELIMINATED AND IF, AT THE SAME TIME, AN EQUAL NUMBER OF OTHER BODIES OF THE SAME NATURE TAKE THEIR PLACE, THE INDIVIDUAL WILL PRESERVE ITS NATURE AS BEFORE, WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN ITS SPECIES OR KIND.** Dem.: Bodies (lem. 1) are not distinguished in respect of substance and (by the last definition) that which constitutes the species of an individual consists in the union of the bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will be maintained (by our hypothesis). Therefore, the individual will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and of mode; qed.

lemma 5 **IF THE PARTS COMPOSING AN INDIVIDUAL EXPAND OR SHRINK, BUT IN SUCH WAY THAT THEY ALL PRESERVE THE SAME MUTUAL**

RATIOS OF MOTION AND REST, THE INDIVIDUAL WILL STILL PRESERVE ITS ORIGINAL NATURE, WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN ITS SPECIES OR KIND. Dem.: The same as for lemma 4.

lemma 6 **IF SOME OF THE BODIES COMPOSING AN INDIVIDUAL, BE COMPELLED TO CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF THEIR MOTION, BUT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR MOTIONS AND TO COMMUNICATE THEM MUTUALLY AT THE SAME RATE AS BEFORE, THE INDIVIDUAL WILL STILL PRESERVE ITS NATURE, WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN ITS SPECIES OR KIND.** Dem.: This is self-evident, for the individual is supposed to retain all that which, in its definition, we spoke of as its species.

lemma 7 **FURTHERMORE, THE INDIVIDUAL THUS COMPOSED WILL PRESERVE ITS NATURE, WHETHER IT BE, AS A WHOLE, IN MOTION OR AT REST, WHETHER IT BE MOVED IN THIS OR THAT DIRECTION; SO LONG AS EACH PART RETAINS IT OWN MOTION AND COMMUNICATES IT TO THE OTHER PARTS AS BEFORE.** Dem.: Evident from the definition of the individual preceding lemma 4.

sc. We thus see how a composite individual may be disposed in many ways and yet preserve its nature. But up to now we have considered only individuals composed of bodies of the most simple character i.e. , distinguished only in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness. If we consider now an individual of another type, composed of several individuals of diverse nature, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be disposed without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies and, therefore, would admit (lem. 6) without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would consequently be able to communicate more quickly or more slowly its motions to the remaining parts.

Further, if we conceive a third kind of individuals, composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be disposed in a still greater number of ways without any change in their species. Thus, we may easily proceed to infinity and conceive the whole of Nature as o n e individual, whose parts--that is all bodies of the thinghood--vary in infinite ways without any change in the whole individual. I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a special treatise on the human body. But I have already

said that such is not my subject, and, I have touched on the question only because it enables me to prove easier that which I have in view.

POSTULATES

po. 1 OUR BODY IS COMPOSED OF MANY INDIVIDUALS (OF DIVERSE NATURE), EACH OF WHICH IS IN ITSELF EXTREMELY COMPLEX.

po. 2 OF THE INDIVIDUALS COMPOSING OUR BODY, SOME ARE FLUID, SOME ARE SOFT, AND SOME ARE HARD.

po. 3 THE INDIVIDUALS COMPOSING OUR BODY, AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT BODY ITSELF, ARE DISPOSED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS BY EXTERNAL BODIES.

po. 4 OUR BODY REQUIRES FOR ITS PRESERVATION A VARIETY OF OTHER BODIES, BY WHICH IT IS CONTINUALLY, SO TO SPEAK REGENERATED.

po. 5 WHEN A FLUID PART OF OUR BODY IS DETERMINED BY AN EXTERNAL BODY TO IMPINGE OFTEN ON ANOTHER PART WHICH IS SOFT, IT CHANGES THE SURFACE OF THE LATTER AND PRINTS ON IT, SO TO SPEAK, TRACES OF THE IMPELLING BODY.

po. 6 OUR BODY CAN MOVE EXTERNAL BODIES AND DISPOSE THEM IN MANY WAYS.

p. 14 OUR MIND IS CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING MANY THINGS, AND IS SO IN PROPORTION AS OUR BODY IS CAPABLE OF BEING DISPOSED IN MANY WAYS. Dem.: Our body (po. 3 & 6) is disposed in very many ways by external bodies and is capable of disposing them in very many ways. But, (p. 12) our mind must perceive all that takes place in our body; therefore, our mind &c. , ; qed.

p. 15 THE IDEA WHICH CONSTITUTES THE SPECIFIC BEING OF OUR MIND IS NOT SIMPLE, BUT COMPOSED OF VERY MANY IDEAS. Dem.: The idea which constitutes the specific being of our mind is the idea of the body (p. 13) which (po. 1) is composed of very many complex individuals. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual whereof the body is composed (cor. /p. 8); therefore (p. 7) the idea of our body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts; qed.

p. 16 THE IDEA OF EVERY MODIFICATION OF OUR BODY THROUGH EXTERNAL BODIES, MUST IMPLY THE NATURE OF OUR BODY AND, ALSO, THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL BODY. Dem.: All manners wherein one body is disposed by another body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body disposed and the disposing (ax. 1/lem. 3), wherefore their idea also (I. /a. 4) necessarily involves the nature of both bodies; qed. Hence it follows;

cor. 1 WE PERCEIVE THE NATURE OF MANY BODIES TOGETHER WITH THE NATURE OF OUR OWN BODY.

cor. 2 THE IDEAS WHICH WE HAVE OF EXTERNAL BODIES, INDICATE RATHER THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR OWN BODY THAN THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL BODIES. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to part I.

p. 17 IF OUR BODY IS DISPOSED IN A WAY WHICH IMPLIES THE NATURE OF SOME EXTERNAL BODY, WE WILL REGARD THE SAID EXTERNAL BODY AS REALLY EXISTING, OR AS PRESENT TO US, UNTIL OUR BODY BE DISPOSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO EXCLUDE THE EXISTENCE OR PRESENCE OF THE SAID EXTERNAL BODY. Dem.: This is self-evident. For, so long as our body continues to be thus disposed, so long will our mind (p. 12) regard this modification of the body--that is (p. 16) we will have the idea of a really existing modification, and that idea implies the nature of the external body; therefore (cor. 1/p. 16) we will regard the said etc.; qed. Hence it follows;

cor. ONCE OUR BODY HAS BEEN DISPOSED BY EXTERNAL BODIES, WE MAY (STILL) REGARD THEM AS PRESENT, EVEN THOUGH THEY BE NO LONGER IN EXISTENCE OR PRESENT. Dem.: When external bodies determine fluid parts of our body to impinge often on some of its softer parts, the surface of the latter will be altered (po. 5) hence (ax. 2/lem. 3): the fluid parts will recoil therefrom in a different way as before; and when afterwards they impinge by their spontaneous movement on such altered surfaces, they will recoil in the same way as though they had been impelled thereto by external bodies; consequently, while continuing their recoiling, they will dispose our body in the same way, whereof our mind (p. 12) will again take cognizance, that is (p. 17) will again regard the said external bodies as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts repeat their spontaneous recoiling motion.

Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which our body has once been disposed, be no longer in existence, we will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this motion in the body is repeated. qed.

sc. We thus see. how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is of course possible that the same result be due to some other causes; but I think it suffices here for me to have shown one which enables a plausible explanation of the said fact, just as well as if I had pointed out its true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates which rest, almost without exception, on experience that cannot be denied, after we have shown (cor. /p. 13) that our body exists such as we experience it in our feelings.

Furthermore, (cor. /p. 17&cor. 2/p. 16) we clearly understand the difference between the idea, say of Peter which constitutes the beingness of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter which is in another man, say Paul. The former corresponds directly to the beingness of Peter's own body and implies existence only as long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual terminology, we will call **images of things** the modifications of our body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, even though they do not render the forms of things; and when we contemplate bodies in this way, we will say that **we imagine**. And to start here with our inquiry into the nature of **error,** let us draw attention to the fact that imagination as such does not contain any error, in other words: our mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only insofar as we are deprived of the idea which excludes the existence of the things imagined as being present to us. Indeed, if, while imagining as present some nonexistent things, we were at the same time aware of the fact that they do not really exist, this power of imagination would be accounted for us as a virtue of our nature, and not as a vice, especially if this faculty of imagination depends solely upon our own nature, that is to say (I. /d. 7) if this faculty of our mind were free.

p. 18 IF OUR BODY HAS ONCE BEEN DISPOSED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY TWO OR MORE BODIES, WHEN WE AFTERWARDS IMAGINE ONE OF THEM, WE WILL STRAIGHTWAY REMEMBER THE OTHERS ALSO. Dem.: We imagine (cor. /p. 17) because our body is affected and disposed by the traces of an external body in the same way as it was affected when certain of its (softer)parts received an impulse from the external body itself; but, by hypothesis, our body was then so disposed that we imagined two (external) bodies at once; therefore we will also

in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and when imagining one, we will straightway remember the other; qed.

sc. We now clearly see what **memory** is. It is simply a certain association of ideas, implying the nature of things outside our body, which association arises in our mind according to the order and association of the dispositions of our body, or sensations. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only which imply the nature of things outside our body; but I do not say "of ideas which explain the nature of the said things"; the ideas of our sensations are strictly speaking (p. 16) those which imply the nature both of our body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and concatenation of our body's sensations, that I may distinguish it from the association of ideas which arise from the order of the intellect, whereby we perceive things through their primary causes, and which order is the same in all human beings, And hence we can clearly understand why from the thought of one thing we arrive straightway at the thought of another thing which has no similarity with the first. For instance, from the thought of the word ***pomum*** a Roman immediately turned to the thought of the fruit, which has no resemblance to the articulated sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of that man has often been affected by the thing and the sound: that is to say, he often heard the word *pomum* when he saw an apple. Similarly everybody will go from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. A soldier for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war etc. , ; while a farmer will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough. , a field etc. , Thus, everyone will follow this or that train of thought, according to the manner in which he used to associate and to connect the mental images of things.

p. 19 WE DO NOT KNOW OUR OWN BODY, NOR DO WE KNOW THAT IT EXISTS, SAVE THROUGH THE IDEAS OF OUR SENSATIONS. Dem.: Our mind is the very idea or awareness of our body (p. 13), which is in God insofar as he is viewed as disposed by another idea of a really existing particular thing; or, inasmuch as (po. 4) our body requires for its preservation many other bodies whereby it is, so to speak, continually regenerated; and further, as the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (p. 7)--this idea will therefore be in God, insofar as he is viewed as disposed by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus, God has the idea of our body, or knows our body, inasmuch as he is disposed by very many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of our mind; that is to say (cor. /p. 11) we do not know our own body. But the ideas of the dispositions (sensations) of our body are in God, as he constitutes the nature of our mind, or (p. 12) we perceive these sensations and consequently (p. 16) our body as really existing; qed.

p. 20 **THERE IS ALSO IN GOD AN IDEA OR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR MIND, WHICH FOLLOWS IN GOD AND IS REFERRED TO HIM IN THE SAME WAY AS THE IDEA OR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR BODY.** Dem.: Thought is an attribute of God (p. 1); therefore (p. 3) there must be necessarily in God the idea of Thought itself and of all its states, consequently also of our mind (p. 11). Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God viewed as infinite, but only as he is disposed by another idea of a particular thing (p. 9). Also (p. 7) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore, this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to him in the same way etc.; qed.

p. 21 **THIS IDEA OF OUR MIND IS UNITED TO THE MIND IN THE SAME WAY AS THE MIND IS UNITED TO THE BODY.** Dem.: That the mind is united to the body, we have shown from the fact that the body is the very object of the mind (p. 12 & 13) and for the same reason the idea of our mind must be united with its object, which is the mind, and in the same way.

sc. This will be understood more clearly from what we have said in sc. /p. 7; there we showed that the idea of body and body, i.e. mind and body (p. 13) are one and the same individual, now considered under the attribute Thought, now under the attribute Extension. Wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same, considered under the same attribute, Thought. I repeat, the idea of the mind and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from the same thinking power. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind (that it to say. the idea of an idea) is nothing but the idea in its kind, considered as a mode of thinking without reference to the object; for, he who knows anything, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows, and so on to infinity. But more of this subject afterwards.

p. 22 **WE PERCEIVE NOT ONLY THE SENSATIONS (OF OUR BODY) BUT ALSO THE IDEAS OF OUR SENSATIONS.** Dem.: The ideas of ideas of dispositions follow in God and are referred to him in the same way as the ideas of the said dispositions. This is proved in the same manner as p. 20; but the ideas of the dispositions of the body are in our mind(p. 12), i.e. , in God insofar as he constitutes the beingness of our mind; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, insofar as he has the knowledge or idea of our mind i.e. , (p. 21) they will be in the mind itself and, hence, we, etc.

p. 23 **WE DO NOT KNOW OURSELVES, EXCEPT INSOFAR AS WE PERCEIVE THE IDEAS OF OUR SENSATIONS.** Dem.: The idea or knowledge of our mind (p. 20) follows in God in the same way and is referred to him in the same way as the idea or knowledge of our body. But since (p. 19) we do not know our own body, or since (cor. /p. 11) the knowledge of our body is not referred to God viewed as constituting the nature of our mind, neither is the knowledge of ourselves referred to God insofar as he constitutes the beingness of our mind; therefore (ibid.) we do not know ourselves thus far. Further. the ideas of

our sensations imply the nature of our body (p. 16) i.e. , (p. 13) they agree with the nature of our mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily implies knowledge of our mind; but (p. 22) we have that knowledge. Thus, we do not know ourselves etc.; qed.

p. 24 WE DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTS COMPOSING OUR BODY. Dem.: The parts composing our body do not, as such, belong to the beingness of that body, except insofar as they communicate their motions to one another at some fixed proportion (def. /lem. 3) and not insofar as they be regarded as individuals, without relation to our body. Now, the parts of our body are highly complex individuals (po. 1) whose parts (lem. 4) can be eliminated, while nature and species of the body are preserved, and they can communicate their motions to other bodies (ax. 1/lem. 3) at another ratio; therefore (p. 3) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch as (p. 9) he is viewed as disposed by another idea of some particular thing, prior in the order of Nature(p. 7) to the aforesaid part. And the same applies to each part of each individual composing the body; therefore, the knowledge of each composing part is in God, insofar as he is disposed by very many ideas constituting the nature of our mind; thus (cor. /p. 11) we do not have an adequate knowledge etc.; qed.

p. 25 THE IDEA OF A SENSATION DOES NOT IMPLY AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF AN EXTERNAL BODY. Dem.: We have shown that the idea of a sensation implies the nature of an external body, insofar as it determinates our body in a certain manner. But insofar as the external body is an individual which has no reference to our body, the knowledge or ideas thereof is in God (p. 9) viewed as disposed by the idea of a further thing which (p. 7) is prior by nature to the said external body. Wherefore, an adequate knowledge of this external body is not in God, insofar as he has the idea of a sensation of our body; in other words, the idea of a sensation etc.; qed.

p. 26 ONLY THROUGH THE IDEAS OF OUR SENSATIONS DO WE PERCEIVE EXTERNAL BODIES AS REALLY EXISTING. Dem.: If our body is in no way affected by a given external body, then (p. 7) neither is the idea of our body i.e. our mind, in any way affected by the idea of existence of the said external body, nor do we perceive in any way its existence. But, insofar as our body is in any way effected by a given external body, thus far (p. 16 + cor.) it perceives that external body; qed. Hence it follows;

cor. INSOFAR AS WE IMAGINE AN EXTERNAL BODY WE DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. Dem.: When our mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the dispositions of our body, we say that it imagines (sc. /p. 17). Now (p. 26) we do not have any other way for perceiving external bodies as really existing. Therefore, etc. qed.

p. 27 NO IDEA OF A SENSATION IMPLIES THE ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN BODY. Dem.: Every idea of a sensation implies the nature of our body, insofar as it is

disposed in some way (p. 16). But inasmuch as our body is an individual which may be disposed in many other ways. no idea of a sensation etc. qed. (see Dem. /p. 25).

p. 28 **WITH REGARD TO OUR OWN MIND, THE IDEAS OF OUR SENSATIONS ARE NOT CLEAR AND DISTINCT, BUT CONFUSED.** Dem.: The ideas of our sensations imply the nature both of our body and of external bodies (p. 16); but, they must imply also the nature of the parts composing our body; for sensations are modes (po. 3) whereby its parts and also our body as a whole are affected. But (p. 24 & 25) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing our body, is not in God as viewed from our state of mind, but insofar as he is viewed as disposed by other ideas. Therefore, with regard to our own mind, the ideas of our sensations are mere consequences without premisses, i.e. (as obvious) confused ideas; qed.

sc. We may prove in the same way that the idea which constitutes the nature of our mind is not clear and distinct when considered in itself; as is also the case with the idea of our mind, and the ideas of the ideas of our sensations, as everyone may easily see.

p. 29 **THE IDEA OF THE IDEA OF A SENSATION DOES NOT IMPLY AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES (ie. OF OUR MIND).** Dem.: The idea of a sensation (p. 27) does not imply an adequate knowledge of our body, or else, does not adequately express its nature; or (p. 13) does not correspond adequately to our mind's nature; hence (I. /a. 6) the idea etc.; qed. Also:

cor. **WHENEVER WE PERCEIVE THINGS IN THE COMMON ORDER OF NATURE, WE DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE BUT ONLY A CONFUSED AND INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES, OF OUR BODY, AND OF THE EXTERNAL BODIES.** Dem.: For, we do not know ourselves, except insofar as we perceive the ideas of our sensations (p. 23). We perceive our body (p. 19) only through the ideas of sensations, and so, and only so, the external bodies. Thus, insofar we do not know ourselves (p. 29), nor our body (p. 27) nor the external bodies (p. 25) in an adequate way, but only in a confused and incomplete one, qed.

sc. I say expressly that we do not have an adequate but only a confused knowledge of ourselves, of our body, and of external bodies. , whenever we perceive things in the common order of Nature; that is, whenever we are determined from outward, namely by the fortuitous play of circumstances, to regard this or that; but not if we are determined from within, that is by observing several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, differences, and contrast. For, whenever we are determined from within, we view things clearly and distinctly, as we will soon find out.

p. 30 **WE CAN HAVE ONLY A VERY INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR BODY's DURATION.** Dem.: The duration of our body does not depend on its beingness (a. 1) nor on the absolute nature of God (I. /21). But the body (I. /28) is determined to exist and to operate, by causes which, in their turn, are determined by others, and so on to infinity. Hence, the duration of our body depends on the common order of Nature and on circumstances. As to how things are constituted, the adequate knowledge thereof is in God insofar as he has the ideas of all things, but not merely of our body (cor. /p. 9). Wherefore, the knowledge of our body's duration is in God very inadequate, insofar as he is viewed to constitute only the nature of our mind; i.e. (cor/p. 11)we can only have a very inadequate etc. qed.

p. 31 **WE CAN HAVE ONLY A VERY INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DURATION OF PARTICULAR THINGS, EXTERNAL TO OURSELVES.** Dem.: Every particular thing, like our body, must be determined by another particular thing to exist and to operate in some definite way; this other by a third, and so on to infinity (I. /28). As just shown (p. 30) we have only a very inadequate knowledge of our body's duration, and, we must draw a similar conclusion as to the duration of all particular things; qed. Hence it follows;

cor. **ALL PARTICULAR THINGS ARE CONTINGENT AND EPHEMERAL.** For we can have no idea, save a very inadequate one, of their duration (p. 31) and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishability of things (I. /33 sc. 1) And except in this sense (I. /29) nothing is contingent.

p. 32 **WITH REGARD TO GOD ALL IDEAS ARE TRUE.** Dem.: All ideas which are in God, agree in every respect with their ideata or objects(cor. /p. 7) therefore (I. /a. 6)they are all true; qed.

p. 33 **THERE IS NOTHING POSITIVE IN THE IDEAS WHICH MAKES THEM TO BE CALLED FALSE.** Dem.: If this be denied, suppose, if possible, a positive mode of thinking to represent falsehood. Such a mode cannot be in God insofar as he constitutes the beingness of our mind; consequently (p. 32) it is impossible and unthinkable without God (I. /15) Therefore, there is nothing positive etc. qed.

p. 34 **ANY IDEA WHICH IS IN US ABSOLUTE i.e. ADEQUATE AND PERFECT, IS TRUE.** Dem.: When we say that an idea is in us adequate and perfect, we say in other words (cor. /p. 11) that this idea is adequate and perfect in God, insofar as he constitutes the beingness of our mind; hence (p. 32) such idea is true; qed.

p. 35 **FALSITY CONSISTS IN A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE IMPLIED BY INADEQUATE i.e. INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSED IDEAS.** Dem.: There is nothing positive in ideas which makes them to be called false (p. 33); but falsity cannot consist in absolute deficiency--for minds, not bodies, are said to err or to be mistaken--neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical; hence, falsity consists; qed.

sc. In sc. /p. 17 I explained how error consists in a lack of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject, I will give an example. For instance, we are mistaken in thinking ourselves free; our opinion is made up of being conscious of our actions, and ignorant of the causes by which we are determined. **Our idea of freedom. therefore, is simply our ignorance of any cause for our actions**. As for the common saying that human actions depend on the "will", this is mere w o r d s, without any idea behind. What the "will" is, and how it moves the body, they simply do not know; those who pretend to know something about and assume some dwellings and habitats for the soul, usually provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; however, our error does not lie in the mere imagination, but only in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's distance and the cause of our imagination. For, although we afterward learn that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the Earth's diameters, , we nonetheless shall fancy it to be near, since we imagine it to be so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because our sensation involves the beingness of the sun insofar only as our body is affected thereby.

p. 36 **INADEQUATE AND CONFUSED IDEAS FOLLOW BY THE SAME NECESSITY AS ADEQUATE OR CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS.** Dem.: All ideas are in God (I. /15) and, insofar as referred to him, they are true (p. 32) and adequate (cor. /p. 7); therefore, ideas are confused and incomplete, or inadequate only in respect to a particular mind (p. 24 & 28) and all ideas (cor. /p. 6) follow by the same necessity; qed.

p. 37 **THAT WHICH IS COMMON TO ALL (lem. 2) AND WHICH IS EQUALLY IN A PART AND IN THE WHOLE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE BEINGNESS OF ANY PARTICULAR THING.** Dem.: If this be denied, suppose, if possible, that it constitutes the beingness of some particular thing, for instance of "B". Then (d. 2) it is without "B" neither possible nor thinkable; but this is against our hypothesis. Hence, it does not belong to B's beingness, nor to that of any particular thing. qed.

p. 38 **THOSE FACTORS WHICH ARE COMMON TO ALL AND WHICH ARE EQUALLY IN A PART AND IN THE WHOLE CAN ONLY BE ADEQUATELY CONCEIVED.** Dem.: Let "A" be a factor common to all bodies and equally present in a part and in the whole of any given body. I say that "A" can only be adequately conceived. For its idea will be necessarily adequate in God (cor. /p. 7) both as he has the idea of that body, and also as he has the ideas of its sensations, which (p. 16, 25 & 27) involve the nature of that body and partly also the nature of external bodies; that is--speaking of our own body--the idea in God will (p. 12 & 13) necessarily be adequate, as he constitutes the

beingness of our mind, i.e. as he has the ideas which are in our mind. Therefore (cor. /p. 11) we necessarily perceive "A" adequately, both insofar as we perceive our own body or any external body, nor can "A" be conceived in any other way. qed. Hence:

cor **THERE ARE CERTAIN IDEAS OR NOTIONS COMMON TO EVERYBODY**

For (lem. 2) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (p. 38) must be adequately, or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

p. 39 **WE WILL HAVE AN ADEQUATE IDEA OF THAT WHICH IS COMMON AND PROPER TO OUR OWN BODY AND TO SUCH EXTERNAL BODIES BY WHICH OUR BODY IS USUALLY AFFECTED, AND WHICH IS EQUALLY IN EACH PART OF EITHER OF THESE BODIES AND IN THE WHOLE.** Dem.: If "A" be that which is common to and property of our own body and of external bodies, and equally present in both, in their parts as well as in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of "A" in God (cor. /p. 7) both insofar as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted that our body is affected by an external body through "A" which it has in common therewith; the idea of this sensation will involve the property "A" (p. 16) and therefore (cor. /p. 7) the said idea will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected by the idea of our body; i. e (p. 13)insofar as he constitutes the nature of our mind; therefore, this idea is (cor. /p. 11) also adequate in us, ; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. **WE ARE FITTED TO PERCEIVE ADEQUATELY MORE THINGS, IN PROPORTION AS OUR BODY HAS MORE IN COMMON WITH OTHER BODIES.**

p. 40 **ALL IDEAS WHICH PROCEED IN US FROM ADEQUATE IDEAS, ARE ALSO ADEQUATE.** Dem.: This is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in our mind proceeds or follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words (cor. /p. 11) that there is an idea in the divine intellect whereof God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected by the idea of very many particular things, but only insofar as he constitutes the beingness of our mind. qed.

sc. I have thus set forth the causes of those notions which are called **common** and which form the basis of our reasoning. But there are other causes of certain axiomatical notions, which should be explained by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore we should see what notions are common to everybody, and what are clear and distinct only to those who are unshaken by prejudice; and finally we should detect those notions which are ill-founded. Again, we should discern whence the so called **secondary** notions derived their origin, and consequently

the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I do not wish to get involved in prolix details. But not to omit anything which is necessary for us to know, I will briefly give the causes from which are derived the so called **transcendental** terms, such as Being, Thing, Something, These terms arise from the fact that our body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained sc. /p. 17) simultaneously; if this number be exceeded, the images will start to be confused; if this number of images which we are capable of forming distinctly within ourselves, be largely exceeded, all images will become entirely confused one with the other. This being so, it is evident (cor. /p. 17 & p. 18) that we can imagine distinctly as many things simultaneously, as our body can form them at once. When the images become quite confused in our body, we will imagine all bodies confusedly without any particular distinction and comprehend them as it were under one attribute, of Being, Thing etc. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the images are not always equally vivid and from other similar causes, which there is no need to explain here; but all may be reduced to the fact, that the terms in question represent ideas which are confused in the highest degree.

From similar causes arise those other notions which we call **general or universal,** such as man, horse, dog etc. They arise to wit, from the fact that so many images, say of men, are formed at once in our mind, that the process of imagining breaks down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of our losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. color, size etc.) and their effective number, and only imagining that distinctly, in which all individuals agree, insofar as our body is affected by them; for that is the point in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected our body; this we express by the name man, and this we assert of an infinite number of individuals. But we must bear in mind that these general notions are not formed by everybody in the same way, but vary in each individual, according as their point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected, and which one most easily imagines and remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erected stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other particularities, will form a different general image of man, for instance that he is a laughing animal, a two-footer without feathers, a rational animal; thus, everybody will form general images of things, according to the disposition of his body. It is thus not surprising that among those philosophers who seek to explain natural phenomena merely by the images formed by them, so many controversies should have arisen.

sc. 2 From what has been already said, it clearly appears that we perceive many things and form universal concepts: 1) From particular things which, through our senses (cor. /p. 29) are

presented to the intellect in an incomplete, confused and disordered way; I have settled to call such perceptions **knowledge from vague experience.** 2) From symbols, e.g. from the fact of having read or heard certain words, we remember things and form about them certain ideas, similar to those through which we imagine things (sc. /p. 18), I shall call both these ways of regarding things **knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.** 3) From the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (cor. /p. 38 & p. 39 + cor. & p. 40) and I shall call it **reason or knowledge of the second kind**

_____Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge which I will call intuitive science or intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of the absolute beingness of certain attributes of God, to the adequate knowledge of the beingness of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation will multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first, either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often tried it out with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition from Euclid's seventh book, namely in virtue of the general property of proportionals. But with very simple numbers, there is no need of this. For instance, "one", "two", "three", being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is "six"; and this is much clearer because we infer the fourth number from the intuitive grasping of the ratio which the first bears to the second.

p. 41 KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST KIND IS THE ONLY SOURCE OF FALSITY, BUT THOSE OF THE SECOND AND THIRD KINDS ARE NECESSARILY TRUE. Dem.: To the knowledge of the first kind we have assigned (sc. 2/p. 40) all those ideas which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (p. 35). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (p. 34); qed.

p. 42 KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECOND AND THIRD KINDS, NOT KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST KIND, TEACHES US TO DISTINGUISH THE TRUE FROM THE FALSE. Dem.: This is self-evident. He who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (sc. 2/p. 40) he must know them by the second or third kind of knowledge.

p. 43 HE WHO HAS A TRUE IDEA, KNOWS THAT HE HAS A TRUE IDEA AND CANNOT DOUBT ABOUT ITS TRUTH. Dem.: A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in

God, insofar as he is viewed through the nature of our mind(cor. /p. 11). Let us suppose that there is in God, insofar as he is viewed through our mind, an adequate idea, say "A". The idea of this idea must also be in God and be referred to him in the same way as the idea "A" (p. 20 whereof the proof is of universal validity). But the idea "A" is supposed to be referred to God, insofar as he is viewed through our mind; hence, the idea of the idea of "A" must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (cpr. /p. 11) the adequate idea of the idea "A" will be in the mind which has the adequate idea "A"; therefore he, who has an adequate idea, or knows a thing truly (p. 34), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be certain of it; qed.

sc. I explained in sc. /p. 21 what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that p. 43 is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant of the fact that a true idea implies the highest certainty. For, to have a true idea is nothing else than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best possible way. No one indeed, can doubt of this, unless he believes that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking, namely, the very act of understanding! And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear and more certain, than a true idea, to be accepted as the norm of truth?

Indeed, **with the same evidence as light reveals both itself and darkness, so is truth the norm both of itself and of falsity.** I think I have thus answered questions like these: "If a true idea differs from a false idea only insofar as the former is said to agree with its object, a true idea would have no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are distinguished only by an extrinsic mark) and, therefore, a man who has true ideas would not have more reality or perfection than a man who has only false ideas?" Further: "How come that we have false ideas?" Lastly: "How can we be sure that we have ideas which agree with their objects?"

These questions, I repeat, I have already answered. For, the difference between a true idea and a false idea plainly results from what was shown in p. 35, namely that a true idea is to a false idea as being is to not-being. As to the causes of falsity, I have set them forth very clearly, starting with p. 19 and continuing up to p. 35 with its note. From what has there been said, one sees also clearly the difference between somebody who has true ideas, and somebody who has only false ideas. Concerning the last question--as to how we can be sure that we have ideas which agree with their objects--I have just pointed out with abundant clarity that our certainty is simply due to the fact that we have an idea which agrees with its object--in other words, that **truth is its own norm**. We may add that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of God's infinite intellect, and, that our clear and distinct ideas are as necessarily true as those of God.

p. 44 IT IS NOT IN THE NATURE OF REASON TO VIEW THINGS AS CONTINGENT, BUT AS NECESSARY. Dem.: It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (p. 41), namely as they are in themselves (I. /a. 6) i.e. (I. /29) not as contingent, but as necessary. qed. Hence it follows that:

cor. 1 ONLY OUR IMAGINATION MAKES US CONSIDER AS CONTINGENT THE THINGS OF THE PAST AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE FUTURE.

sc. Why this happens. I will briefly explain. We have shown above (p. 17+cor.)that we regard things as present to us, even if they do not exist, until some causes arise which exclude their existence in the present. Further (p. 18) we showed that if our body has once been disposed by two external bodies simultaneously, and if afterwards we imagine one of the said bodies, we will straightway remember the other i.e. we will regard both as present to us, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence in the present. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved, some more slowly than others, some more quickly and some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child, yesterday, saw Peter soon in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon late in the evening; then today, he again sees Peter soon in the morning. It is evident from p. 18 that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will go through the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon he will imagine Paul, and with evening he will imagine Simon--that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to the past, by imagining them together with past events. But, if it happens, that on some other evening the child sees Jack instead of Simon, he will on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening, sometimes Simon, sometimes Jack, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and with the image of the next evening, he will associate first one then the other, i.e. he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if referred to things past or present; hence, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to the present, to the past, or to the future.

cor. 2 IT IS IN THE NATURE OF REASON TO PERCEIVE THINGS FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY. Dem.: It is in the nature of reason to view things not as contingent but as

necessary (p. 44). Reason perceives this necessity of things truly (p. 41) i.e. (I. /a. 6) as it is in itself. But (I. /16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God's eternal nature; therefore it is in the nature of reason to perceive things from the angle of eternity. We may add that the foundations of reason are those notions (p. 38) which expound the common factors of all things, and which (p. 37) do not expound the beingness of any particular thing; which thus must be thought of without any relation to time, from the angle of eternity; qed.

p. 45 THE IDEA OF EACH AND EVERY BODY, OR OF EACH PARTICULAR THING EXISTING IN FACT, NECESSARILY IMPLIES THE ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEINGNESS OF GOD. Dem.: The idea of a particular thing existing in fact, necessarily implies both the existence and the beingness of that thing (p. 8). Now, particular things are neither possible nor thinkable without God (I. /15); but inasmuch as (p. 6) their cause is God viewed under the attribute of which the said things are modes, their ideas must necessarily imply (I. /a. 4) the concept of that attribute, i.e. (I. /d. 6) the eternal and infinite beingness of God; qed.

sc. Here, by existence I do not mean duration, i.e. existence viewed superficially and from a quantitative point of view. I am speaking here rather of the very nature of existence which is assigned to particular things, because from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I. /16) an infinity in infinite ways must follow. I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of things insofar as they are in God. For, although each particular thing be determined by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each perseveres in existing (i.e. their self-power) follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I. /24 cor.).

p. 46 THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD's ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEINGNESS WHICH EVERY IDEA IMPLIES, IS ADEQUATE AND PERFECT. Dem.: The demonstration of p. 45 is universal; and, whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, its idea will imply God's eternal and infinite beingness. Wherefore, that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite beingness of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; hence (p. 38) this knowledge will be adequate; qed.

p. 47 WE HAVE AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD's ETERNAL AND INFINITE BEINGNESS. Dem.: We have ideas (p. 22) through which (p. 23) we perceive ourselves, our own body (p. 19) and external bodies (cor. 1 & 2 /p. 16 & p. 17) as really existing; therefore (p. 45 & 46) we have etc. , ; qed.

sc. Hence we see that God's infinite beingness and eternity are known to all. Now, as all things are in God and are understood through God, we can infer from this knowledge many things in an adequate way and, thus, form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke sc. /p. 40 and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in part V. If people do

not have so clear a knowledge of God as they have of common notions, it is because they are unable to imagine God, as they do bodies, and also because they have associated God's name with images of things familiar to them, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being continually affected by external bodies. And certainly, many errors can be traced to the fact that we do not rightly apply names to things. For instance, when someone says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then obviously attaches to the word circle a meaning different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when people make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their mind, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we assume that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought the man, whom I recently heard exclaiming that his back-yard had flown into a neighbor's hen, for his meaning seemed to me clear enough. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact that people do not rightly explain their thoughts, or do not rightly interpret the thoughts of others. As a matter of fact, when they most contradict one another, they either think the same things or something different, so that those things which they suppose to be errors and absurdities in their opponents are not so.

p. 48 WE DO NOT HAVE ANY ABSOLUTE OR FREE WILL, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO WISH THIS OR THAT, BY A CAUSE WHICH HAS ALSO BE DETERMINED BY ANOTHER CAUSE, AND THIS LAST BY ANOTHER CAUSE, AND SO ON TO INFINITY. Dem.: Our mind is a certain mode of thinking (p. 11) and therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. /17 cor. 2); i.e. it cannot have an absolute faculty of wishing or refusing. but (I. /28) it must be determined by a cause etc. qed.

sc. In the same way it is proved that we do not have any absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving etc. , Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely some metaphysical or general terms, as we are accustomed to abstract from particular cases. Thus, intellect and will are to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, as lapidity is to this or that stone, or as man is to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads people to consider themselves free, has been set forth in the Appendix to part I. But, before I proceed further, it has to be pointed out that by will I mean the faculty to affirm or to deny, not the desire or the fact of desiring. I mean, I repeat, our faculty to affirm or to deny what is true or false, and not the desire wherewith we wish for or turn away from any given thing. And after we have proved that these faculties are general notions (which do not differ from the particular things from which they are formed) we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything more

than the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in our mind any affirmation or negation, beyond that which the idea, as such, implies. On which subject see the next proposition and d. 3 to avoid that our thinking be debased to a mere state of pictures. For, by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but concepts of our thinking.

p. 49 **WE DO NOT HAVE ANY VOLITION i.e. AFFIRMATION OR NEGATION, BESIDES THE VOLITION WHICH AN IDEA AS SUCH IMPLIES.** Dem.: There is no absolute faculty of wishing or refusing (p. 48), but only particular volitions i.e. this or that affirmation, or this or that negation. Let us take any particular volition e.g. the way of thinking whereby we affirm that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation implies the concept or idea of a (plane)triangle and is unthinkable without. It is the same thing to say that the concept "A" must imply the concept "B", as it is to say that "A" is unthinkable without "B". Further, this affirmation cannot be made (a. 3) without the idea of the triangle. Therefore, this affirmation is neither possible nor thinkable without the idea of the triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must imply that same affirmation, namely that the sum of its three interior angles equals two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle is neither possible nor thinkable without this affirmation; hence, this affirmation belongs to the beingness of the idea of a triangle and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any volition, namely that it is nothing besides the idea. qed.

cor. **WILL AND INTELLECT ARE ONE AND THE SAME.** Dem.: Will and intellect are nothing besides the individual volitions and ideas (p. 48 + sc.). But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same(p. 49); hence, will and intellect are one and the same. qed.

sc. We have just removed the most frequent causes of error. For, we have shown that falsity consists solely in a lack of knowledge, implied by ideas which are incomplete and confused. Wherefore, a false idea does not, as such, imply certainty. So, when we say, that somebody acquiesces in what is false and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not state that he is certain, but merely that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in falsehood, in absence of reasons which should cause his imagination to waver(sc. /p. 44). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in some falsity, we shall never say that he is certain. For, by certainty we mean something positive (p. 43)and not merely the absence of doubt. But, by absence of certainty we mean falsity. However, in order that p. 49 may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points and answer some objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worthwhile to point out some of the advantages which follow from our doctrine. I say some, for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in part V.

To begin with, I warn the reader to make an accurate distinction between an idea or concept of our mind, and the images of things which we imagine. He should further distinguish between the idea and the words whereby we signify things. Indeed, these three, images, words and ideas, are by many people either entirely confounded, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care. And though, this our doctrine of the will, invaluable both for creative thinking and for the wise conduct of life, has been generally ignored. Those who believe that ideas consist in the images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we cannot form such images, are not ideas but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel and, misled by this opinion, they do not see that an idea, as such, implies an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation implied by an idea, believe that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm or deny--while their affirmations or denials are purely verbal. But all these prejudices will easily be laid aside by one who is attentive to the very nature of Thought, which in no way implies the concept of Extension; and he will therefore clearly understand that an idea, which is a way of thinking, does not consist in images or in words. For, the nature of words and images consists exclusively in some bodily motions and does not at all imply the concept of Thought. These few words on the above subject will suffice.

I therefore pass on to the objections. The first is advanced by those who believe that will has a wider range than the intellect and, thus, differs therefrom. They justify their belief in saying that "in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, there is no need for an increase in our actual faculty of assent (i.e. to affirm or to deny), but that there would be such a need for our intellectual power." Thus, they say, the will is distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us very clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment so as not to assent to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that such a horse does exist. "Nothing, thus, seems to be taught more clearly by experience, then that <u>will</u>, or our faculty of assent, is free and different from our intellectual power."

Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; i.e. we do not seem to need any greater power for affirming that what is true is true, than for affirming that what is false is true. We have however seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another; for, as some objects are more excellent than others, so also are their

ideas, some more excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between intellect and will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if we do not act from free will, what if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If we say that he would, we will be considering an ass or the statue of a man, rather than a real man. If we say that he would not, he would then determine his own actions and would consequently possess the faculty of doing whatever he likes. Other objections might also be raised but, as I am not bound to show everything people may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

To the first objection I answer that I admit that will has a wider range than intellect, if by the latter be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that will has a wider range than the domain of our perceptions or our power of comprehension; nor do I see why our faculty of volition should be called infinite any more than our faculty of feeling; for, if we are able to affirm an infinite number of things--one after the other, indeed, for we cannot affirm an infinity simultaneously--we are also able to feel or perceive in succession an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer that to such things we cannot attain by any way of thinking, nor consequently by any faculty of volition. But it may be urged, "if God wishes to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not of volition than we already have." This is the same as to say, if God wishes to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other beings, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater intellect but not a more universal idea of being than that which we already have, in order to grasp those infinite beings. We have shown that will is a generalization or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions, i.e. that which is common to all volitions. As then our opponents maintain that this idea, common to all volitions, is a faculty, no wonder if they assert that such a faculty extends itself to infinity, beyond the limits of the intellect; for, what is predicated here of one, is also predicated of many and of an infinite number of individuals, alike, as in the case of all common or universal notions.

To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending our judgment; for, in saying that somebody suspends his judgment, we simply mean that he seems not to perceive adequately the subject. Suspension of judgment is thus, strictly speaking, a perception and not free-will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination implies the existence of the horse (cor. /p. 17) the boy will necessarily regard the horse as present; he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We experience such a state of things in our dreams, that is daily, but I do not suppose that there is anyone pretending that, while he is

dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment about the things in his dream, and to bring it about that he should not dream those things which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, even in dreams, that we suspend our judgment, namely when we dream that we are dreaming. Further I grant, that nobody is deceived, insofar as he has perceptions i.e. I grant that our imaginations, as such, do not imply any error (sc. /p. 17), but I deny that in the very act of perception one does not make any affirmation. For, what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If we could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, we would regard the same as present to us, as we would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor show any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of the winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or, unless we perceive that our idea of a winged horse is inadequate; in which case we will necessarily either deny the existence of such a horse, or be in doubt on the subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection, i.e. that "will" is a generalization predicated of all ideas and signifying that which is common to all ideas, namely an affirmation which, as an abstraction, is adequate and the same in all ideas; but not if considered a property of some particular idea; for particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which implies the idea of a circle differs from that which implies the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Further, I absolutely deny that we are in need of an equal power of thinking to affirm the truth of what is true and to affirm the truth of what is false. For these two affirmations, as referred to our mind, behave like being to nothingness; indeed, there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes falsehood (sc. /p. 35 & sc. /p. 47). Thus one may see how easily we are mistaken when we confound universals with singulars, and the beings of reason and abstractions, with the facts of reality.

As for the fourth objection, I am quite ready to admit that a man placed in the equilibrium described, namely as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him, would die of hunger and thirst. But if I am asked whether such a man should not rather be considered an ass, I answer that I do not know; nor do I know what ought to be thought of a man who hangs himself, or of children, fools, madmen etc.

It remains to point out the advantages which the knowledge of our doctrine bears on the conduct of life; this may be easily gathered from what has been said: 1) It teaches that we act solely according to God's decrees and partake in the divine nature, and so much the more as we act more perfectly and understand God more and more. Such a doctrine not only tranquilizes our spirit, but shows us also where **our supreme happiness is,** namely**, in the sole awareness of God**, whereby we are led to act as love and devotedness shall bid us. We may thus see how far

astray from true virtue are those who expect to be richly rewarded by God for their good actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and devotion to God, as such, were not supreme happiness and freedom. 2) It teaches how we ought to comport ourselves towards chance, or things which are not in our power and do not follow from our own nature. For it shows us that we await and endure fortune's smiles and frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God with the same necessity, as it follows from the nature of a plane triangle that the sum of its three interior angles equals two right angles. 3) This doctrine protects social life, inasmuch as it teaches to hate nobody, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own and helpful to his neighbor, not from any womanish pity, favor or superstition, but solely under the guidance of reason, according as time and occasion demand, as I will show in part IV. 4) Lastly, **this doctrine confers no small advantage to the nation, for it teaches how citizens should be led and governed, not though as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best**. I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this scholium, and I thus bring part II. of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained at sufficient length, the nature and properties of our mind and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clarity.

I have laid here a foundation whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will be partly made plain in what follows.

PART THREE: ABOUT THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF AFFECTIVITY

PREFACE

Most writers on affectivity and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside Nature, than of natural phenomena following Nature's general laws. They appear to view man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows the natural order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human weakness and inconstancy not to the very power of Nature, but to some mysterious flaw in man's nature, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or even more frequently abuse. And he who succeeds in blaming the weakness of our mind with great eloquence and acuteness, is looked upon as a prophet. Still there has been no lack of pre-eminent men (to whose work and industry we confess ourselves much indebted), who have written many excellent things concerning the right way of life, and have given sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has yet defined the nature and strength of affectivity, and the power we have to check it.

I do not forget that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human passions by their primary causes and, at the same time, to point out a way by which we might dominate them completely. However, in my opinion, he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I shall prove in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human affectivity than to understand it. Such people will think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly ***more geometrico*** and that I should wish to set forth with sound reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, as frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. Indeed, following my line of reasoning, nothing comes to pass in Nature, which might be imputed to any vice therein; for **Nature is always and everywhere one and the same, in her perfection and acting power.** That is, Nature's laws and rules, whereby all things come to pass

and change from one kind to another, are everywhere and always the same; thus, one and the same has to be also the method of understanding the nature of all things, without exception, namely, through Nature's universal laws and rules. Thus, the affective states of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, proceed from the same necessity and excellence of Nature; they follow from certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of anything else, whereof the simple aspect affords us delight. I shall therefore treat of the nature and strength of affectivity with the same method as I employed in my investigations concerning God and our mind, and I will consider human actions and tendencies in exactly the same manner as though I were concerned with lines, planes or volumes.

DEFINITIONS

d. 1 **ADEQUATE CAUSE: THAT THROUGH WHICH ITS EFFECT CAN BE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY PERCEIVED; INADEQUATE or PARTIAL CAUSE: THAT THROUGH WHICH ALONE ITS EFFECT CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD**.

d. 2 **WE ACT: WHEN ANYTHING TAKES PLACE, EITHER WITHIN US OR EXTERNALLY TO US, WHEREOF WE ARE THE ADEQUATE CAUSE i.e. (by d. 1) when from our nature anything results, which by that our nature alone can be clearly and distinctly understood; WE ARE PASSIVE (SUFFERING): WHEN SOMETHING TAKES PLACE WITHIN US, OR FOLLOWS FROM OUR NATURE, WHEREOF WE ARE ONLY A PARTIAL CAUSE.**

d. 3 **AFFECTIVE STATES: THE DISPOSITIONS OF OUR BODY WHEREBY ITS SELF-POWER IS INCREASED, OR DIMINISHED, AIDED OR CONSTRAINED, AS WELL AS THE IDEAS OF THE SAME DISPOSITIONS.**

Explanation: If we can be the adequate cause of any of these dispositions, I then call such an affective state an action, otherwise a suffering or passiveness.

POSTULATES

po. 1 **OUR BODY CAN BE AFFECTED IN MANY WAYS, WHEREBY ITS SELF-POWER IS INCREASED OR DIMINISHED, AND ALSO IN OTHER WAYS WHICH DO NEITHER INCREASE NOR DIMINISH IT.** This postulate or axiom is based upon II. /po. 1 + lem.5 & 7 after p. 13.

po. 2 **OUR BODY CAN UNDERGO MANY CHANGES AND, NEVERTHELESS, RETAIN THE IMPRESSIONS OR TRACES OF OBJECTS (II. /po. 5) AND CONSEQUENTLY THE IMAGES OF THOSE THINGS (II. /17 sc.).**

PROPOSITIONS

p. 1 **OUR MIND IS ACTIVE IN MANY CASES AND IS PASSIVE IN MANY OTHER CASES; INSOFAR AS WE HAVE ADEQUATE IDEAS, WE ARE NECESSARILY ACTIVE, AND INSOFAR AS WE HAVE INADEQUATE IDEAS, WE ARE NECESSARILY PASSIVE or SUFFERING.** Dem.: Each of us has some adequate ideas, and some ideas which are distorted and confused (II. /40 sc. 2). Those ideas which are adequate in us, are adequate also in God, inasmuch as he constitutes the beingness of our mind (II. /11 cor.) and those ideas which are inadequate in us (ibid,) are likewise adequate in God, but not inasmuch as he constitutes only our beingness, but as he, at the same time, contains also the minds of other things. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. /36); of this effect God is the adequate cause (d. 1) not inasmuch as he is infinite, but viewed as affected by the given idea (II. /9). But of that effect whereof God is the cause--as affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind--our mind is the adequate cause (II. /11 cor.). Therefore our mind, insofar as it has adequate ideas (d. 2) is necessarily active in many cases; this was our first point. Again, whatsoever follows from an idea which is adequate in God, insofar as he contains, together with our mind, the minds of other things also, of such an effect our mind is only a partial cause; thus (ibid.) insofar as we have inadequate ideas we are in many cases necessarily passive; this was the second point. qed. Hence it follows.

cor. WE ARE THE MORE SUBJECTED TO SUFFERINGS, THE MORE WE HAVE INADEQUATE IDEAS, AND ON THE CONTRARY, WE ACT, THE MORE WE HAVE ADEQUATE IDEAS.

p. 2 BODY CANNOT DETERMINE MIND TO THINK, NEITHER CAN MIND DETERMINE BODY TO MOTION OR REST OR ANYTHING ELSE, IF SUCH THERE BE. Dem.: All modes of thinking have for their cause God, inasmuch as he is the thinking reality, and not inasmuch as he is viewed through any other attribute (II. /6). Thus, that which determines mind to think is a mode of Thought and not a mode of Extension; therefore (II. /d. 1) it is not the body. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body which, in its turn, has been determined by a third body, and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God, viewed as affected by some mode of Extension, and not by some mode of Thought; i.e. it cannot spring from the mind which is a mode of thinking. Therefore, body cannot etc. ; qed.

sc. This will be better understood from what has been said II. /7 sc. namely that mind and body are one and the same thing, viewed now under the attribute of Thought, and now under the attribute of Extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether Nature be viewed under one attribute or under the other; consequently, the order of our body's activities and passivities is, by nature, simultaneous with the order of activities and passivities in our mind. The same conclusion is also evident from the proof of II. /12.

Although such is the case and no ground for doubting remains, I can hardly believe, unless the fact be confirmed by experience, that people could ever be induced to ponder all this with impartiality, so firmly are they persuaded that the body is set in motion or at rest on the mere invitation of the mind, and performs a variety of actions which solely depend on the mind's will or cleverness.

However, no one has as yet determined the capabilities of the body, i.e. no one as yet has been taught by experience what the body can accomplish by the only laws of its extended nature, and what it cannot accomplish unless it be activated by the mind. For no one as yet, has gained such an accurate knowledge of the body's powerhouse, that he can explain all its functions; not to mention that we see animals doing things which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do in their sleep many things which they would not dare when awake. These instances are enough to show that the body, by the sole laws of its nature, can do many things which stun with amazement its own mind. Besides, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how quickly it can move it.

Thus, when people say that this or that bodily action has its origin in the mind, since the mind governs the body, they are using words bare of any meaning and, besides their amazement,

show their complete ignorance about the true causes of such an action. But they will say, "whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body, at any rate, we have experience of the fact that, unless our mind is in a fit state to think, our body remains inert." Moreover, they say, "we have experience that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of singular states which, according to them, depend on the mind's decree."

As to the first point. I simply ask whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inert, the mind is also unfitted for thinking? For, when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind is also in a state of torpor and has no power of thinking such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everybody's experience will confirm the fact that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. But, will say my objectors, "It is impossible that from the sole laws of Nature, considered as bodily, we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body--they say-- be capable of building a single temple, unless it were determined and led by the mind." However, I have just shown that my objectors do not know the body's power, nor what can be deduced from its nature alone, whereas they have experience of many things accomplished by the only laws of the bodily nature which they would never have believed possible without the direction of the mind, such as the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. And, once more, let us recall the constitution of that powerhouse called the human body, which far surpasses in ingenuity all that has ever been produced by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely that from Nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results necessarily follow. As for the second objection, I agree that our world would be happier, if people were as fully able to keep silence, as they are to speak. But experience abundantly shows that nothing becomes more difficult to men than to govern their tongues (cf. James III, 8) and to restrain their appetites; for that very reason they generally believe that we are only free in respect to what we seek moderately, because our desires for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek passionately, for then, no remembrance of something else could stop us.

Indeed, if people had not learned by experience that we do many things which we afterwards regret, and again, when assailed by conflicting feelings, that we often "see the better and still follow the worse" (cf. Ovide, Metam. 7. 20.), there would be nothing to prevent us from believing that we do everything with an absolute freedom. Thus an infant believes that it desires

milk of its own free will, an angry child believes that it freely desires revenge, and the coward, that he freely desires to run away. A drunken man, too, believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would have willingly left unsaid. Thus, too, a madman, a talkative person, a child, and others of the same kind, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when in reality they are unable to restrain their impulse to talk.

Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason that people believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their deeds, but ignore the causes whereby they are determined to act; further, because the decisions of the mind are nothing but the corresponding desires, they vary according to the varying state of the body. For everyone makes up his mind after the tidings of his affectivity, and those who are emotionally disturbed do not know what they want, whilst those who happen to be emotionally neutral are readily driven this way or that. All these facts show clearly that the mind's decision, with its desire, and the body's determination, are simultaneous by nature, or rather are one and the same disposition, which we call **decision** when it is viewed and explained through the attribute of Thought, and which we call **determination** when it is viewed through the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another fact, namely, that we could do nothing by decision of the mind without having it present in our memory. For instance, we could not say a word without having it present in our memory. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or to forget a thing at will. Therefore it is believed that the freedom of the mind, which makes that we speak or keep our tongue by our free decision, is limited to things which we remember. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something to people, from the same decision of the mind whereby we keep silence when awake. Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something which we should not dare to do when awake. Now, I should like to know, whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusory and the other sort free?

If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from imagination or memory, and is nothing more that the affirmation which an idea as such necessarily implies (II. /49). Wherefore these decisions arise in us by the same necessity as the ideas of really existing things. Therefore, those who believe that they speak, or keep silent, or do something from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open.

p. 3 **OUR MIND's ACTIONS ARISE SOLELY FROM ADEQUATE IDEAS, BUT ITS SUFFERINGS DEPEND SOLELY ON INADEQUATE IDEAS.** Dem.: What firstly constitutes the presence of our mind is simply the idea of a body existing in fact (II. /11 & 13), which is compounded of many other ideas (II. /15) whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II. /29 cor. & 38 cor,). Thus, whatsoever follows from the mind's nature and has mind as its proximate cause, must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea, But (p. 1), insofar the mind has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive; hence our mind's actions etc. ; qed.

sc. Thus we see that sufferings are referred to the mind only insofar as it contains something implying a negation, or insofar as the mind is a part of Nature which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself, without other parts. I could also show that sufferings are referred to all particular things in the same way as they are referred to our mind, and without exception, But my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

p. 4 **A THING CAN BE DESTROYED ONLY BY AN EXTERNAL CAUSE.** Dem.: This is self-evident, for the definition affirms the beingness of a thing, but does not deny it; i.e. it establishes the thing's beingness, but does not abolish it. Therefore, so long as we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it. qed.

p. 5 **THINGS ARE OF CONTRARY NATURE i.e. CANNOT EXIST IN THE SAME SUBJECT, INSOFAR AS ONE IS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING THE OTHER.** Dem.: If they could agree together, or co-exist in the same subject, there would then be in the said subject something which could destroy it; but this (p. 4) is absurd. Therefore things are etc. ; qed.

p. 6 **EVERYTHING STRIVES AS MUCH AS IT CAN TO PERSIST IN ITS OWN BEING.** Dem.: Particular things are modes whereby God's attributes are expressed in some determined way (I. /25 cor.); i.e. (I. /34) they are things which express God's power whereby he is and acts, in some determined way; now, no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its existence (p. 4); on the contrary, it is opposed to all that could abolish its existence (p. 5); etc. qed.

p. 7 **THE EFFORT WHEREWITH EVERYTHING STRIVES TO PERSIST IN ITS BEING, IS NOTHING ELSE BUT THAT THING's ACTUAL BEINGNESS.** Dem.: From the given beingness of everything, certain consequences must follow (I. /36), nor have things any other power besides that which necessarily follows from their given nature (I. /29); hence, the power of any given thing, or the effort whereby, either alone or with others, it acts, or strives to act, i.e. (p. 6)the power or effort wherewith it strives to persist in its being, is nothing else than the thing's actual beingness. qed.

p. 8 **THE EFFORT WHEREWITH EVERYTHING STRIVES TO PERSIST IN ITS BEING, IMPLIES NO FINITE TIME, BUT AN INDEFINITE TIME.** Dem.: If it implied a limited time, which should determine the duration of the thing, it would then follow from the very power whereby the thing exists, that it could not exist beyond. the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but this (p. 4) is absurd. Hence, the effort wherewith a thing exists, implies no definite time; on the contrary, by the same power whereby it already exists, it will always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external cause, and thus this effort implies an indefinite time. qed

p. 9 **BE OUR THINKING CLEAR AND DISTINCT, OR BE IT CONFUSED, WE ALWAYS STRIVE TO PERSIST IN OUR BEING FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THAT EFFORT.** Dem.: The mind's beingness consists in adequate as well as in inadequate ideas (p. 3), hence (p. 7) in both alternatives it strives to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite time (p. 8). Now, as the mind. (II. /23) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the body's dispositions (sensations), we are (p. 7)conscious of that effort. qed.

sc This effort, when referred only to the mind is called **will**, but when referred to both, mind and body, it is called **instinct. which in fact is nothing else than man's beingness therefrom necessarily follow all those effects which tend to his self-preservation,** and which he therefore is determined to accomplish. Further, between desire and instinct there is no difference, except that desire is generally applied to men insofar as they are conscious of their instinct, and may thus be defined as follows: **Desire is instinct with consciousness thereof**. It is also plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything because we deem it to be good, but vice versa, we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

p. 10 **AN IDEA WHICH EXCLUDES THE EXISTENCE OF OUR BODY CAN NOT ARISE IN OUR MIND BUT IS CONTRARY THERETO.** Dem. ; Whatsoever can destroy our body cannot be part thereof (p. 5). Hence, neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (II. /9 cor,); i.e. (II. /11& 13) the idea of that thing cannot occur in our mind; but as that which firstly constitutes the presence of our mind is simply the idea of our own body existing in fact, it follows that the first and chief effort of our mind is the effort to affirm our body's existence; thus, an idea which excludes etc. ; qed.

p. 11 **WHAT INCREASES OR DIMINISHES, HELPS OR HINDERS THE SELF-POWER OF OUR BODY, THE IDEA THEREOF INCREASES OR DIMINISHES, HELPS OR HINDERS OUR THINKING POWER.** Dem.: Evident from II. /7 or from II. /14.

sc. Thus we see that our mind can undergo many changes and pass, now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passive states explain to us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By **joy** I mean a passiveness whereby our mind passes to a greater perfection. By **sorrow** I mean a passiveness whereby our mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of joy referred to body and mind together, I shall call **pleasure** or **gaiety**; and the emotion of sorrow referred to body and mind together, I shall call **pain** or **affliction.** But we must bear in mind that pleasure and pain are referred to us when one of our body parts is more affected than the rest, whereas we speak of gaiety and affliction when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in sc. /p. 9 and besides these three: **joy, sorrow and desire,** I recognize no other primary affective states; for, as I proceed, I will show that **all other affective states arise from these three.**

But, before going further, I should like here to explain at greater length p. 10 in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. In II. /17 sc. we showed that the idea which constitutes the beingness of our mind implies the existence of our body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from II. /8 cor, +sc. that the presence of mind depends solely on the fact that it implies the actuality of the body. Now, the cause why our mind ceases to affirm the existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (p. 4) nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (p. 6) the cause why our mind affirms the existence of the body, is not because the body began to exist; hence, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body because the body ceases to exist; but (II. /17) this result is due to another idea which excludes the present existence of the body and, consequently, of our mind, and which idea is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the beingness of our mind.

p. 12 **WE STRIVE AS MUCH AS WE CAN TO IMAGINE THOSE THINGS WHICH INCREASE OR HELP OUR BODY's SELF-POWER.** Dem.: So long as our body is disposed in a way which implies the nature of any external body, we will regard that external body as present (II. /17) and consequently (II. /7) so long as we regard an external body as present or imagine it (II. /17 sc,), our body is disposed in a way which implies the nature of the said external body; thus, so long as we imagine things which increase or help our body's self-power, such will be also (po. 1) its sensation and consequently (p. 11) our thinking power will also be increased or helped. Thus, we strive etc. ; qed.

p. 13 **WHEN WE IMAGINE THINGS WHICH DIMINISH OR HINDER OUR BODY'S SELF-POWER, WE TRY, AS MUCH AS WE CAN, TO REMEMBER WHAT EXCLUDES THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE THINGS.** Dem. ; So long as we imagine such things, our self-power, of both mind and body, is diminished or restrained (p. 12) and nevertheless we will continue imagine them, until we imagine something else which excludes the present existence of those things;

i.e. as I have just shown, our self-power will be diminished or hindered until we imagine something else excluding the existence of the former things; hence, (p. 9) when we imagine things etc. ; qed. It follows that:

cor. WE DISLIKE IMAGINING THINGS WHICH DIMINISH OR RESTRAIN OUR SELF-POWER.

sc From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of love and hate. Indeed, **love is nothing else but joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause**, and **hate is nothing else but sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause**. We further see that he who loves necessarily strives to have and to keep present to him the object of his love; while he who hates strives to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of all this at more length hereafter

p. 14 IF WE HAVE ONCE EXPERIENCED TWO AFFECTIVE STATES AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL, WHENEVER AFTERWARDS WE ARE EXPOSED TO ONE, ALSO EXPERIENCE THE OTHER. Dem.: If our body has once been disposed. by two external objects at the same time, whenever we imagine afterwards one of them, we will straightway remember the other also (II. /18). But our imaginations indicate rather the affective state of our body than the nature of external bodies (II. /16 cor. 2); therefore, if our body, and consequently our mind, (d. 3) has once experienced two affective states at the same time etc. ; qed.

p. 15 ANYTHING MAY BE INCIDENTALLY THE CAUSE OF JOY, SORROW OR DESIRE. Dem.: Let it be granted that we are experiencing at the same time two affective states, of which one neither increases nor diminishes our self-power, while the other either increases or diminishes it (po. 1). It is evident (p. 14) that whenever afterwards we are exposed to the former, through its true causes--which by hypothesis neither increase nor diminish our self-power--we will also experience the latter, which either increases or diminishes our self-power; i.e. (sc. /p. 11), we will experience joy or sorrow. Thus, the former of the two affective states will. not through itself, but incidentally, be cause of joy or sorrow. In the same way also it can be easily shown that a thing may be incidentally cause of desire. qed. Hence it follows:

cor. SIMPLY FROM THE FACT THAT WE HAVE REGARDED A THING WITH A FEELING OF JOY OR SORROW, WE CAN LOVE OR HATE IT, EVEN THOUGH IT BE NOT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF OUR FEELING. Dem.: For, through that simple fact (p. 14)when afterwards we imagine that thing, we will feel joy or sorrow, i.e. (sc. /p. 11) according as our self-power is increased or diminished; and thus, (p. 12) as we desire or dislike imagining it (cor. /p. 13) in other words (sc. /p. 13) according as we love or hate that thing. qed.

sc. Hence we understand how it may happen that we love or hate a thing without any known cause for our feeling, merely, as they say, from **sympathy** or **antipathy**. We should refer to the same category those objects which affect us with joy or sorrow, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next proposition. I am aware that certain authors, who were first to introduce the said terms of sympathy and antipathy, wished to signify thereby some occult qualities of things; nevertheless, I think we may be permitted to use the same words to designate known or manifest qualities.

p. 16 JUST BY IMAGINING THAT AN OBJECT SOMEHOW RESEMBLES ANOTHER, WHICH USUALLY AFFECTS US WITH JOY OR SORROW, WE SHALL LOVE OR HATE THAT OBJECT, EVEN THOUGH ITS POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE BE NOT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF OUR FEELING. Dem.: The points of resemblance were viewed by us (by hypothesis) with a feeling of joy or sorrow; thus (p. 14) when afterwards we imagine those points, we will straightway experience one or the other feeling and, consequently, through its resemblance, an object (p. 15) will be incidentally a cause of joy or sorrow. Hence, (cor. /p. 15) just by imagining etc. ; qed.

p. 17 IF WE IMAGINE THAT AN OBJECT WHICH USUALLY AFFECTS US WITH SORROW, SOMEHOW RESEMBLES A THING WHICH USUALLY AFFECTS US STRONGLY WITH JOY, WE SHALL HATE AND LOVE AT ONCE THE (FIRST) OBJECT. Dem.: The object (by hypothesis) is through itself a cause of sorrow and (p. 14) we shall hate it, inasmuch as we imagine it in this way; further, inasmuch as we figure that it somehow resembles a thing which usually affects us strongly with joy, we shall love it under that compulsion (p. 16); thus, if we imagine etc. ; qed.

sc. This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary feelings is called **wavering;** it stands to feeling as doubt stands to imagination (II. /44. sc.). Wavering and doubt, further, do not differ one from the other, except for intensity. It is to be noted that wavering has been derived here from causes which give raise directly to one of the feelings and incidentally to the other. I have proceeded in that way because the previous proposition made that deduction easier, but I am perfectly aware of the fact that wavering generally arises from the same object, which is the efficient cause of both feelings. For, the human body is composed (II. /po. 1) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, which may therefore (II. /ax. 1 after lem. 3/p. 13) be disposed in many different ways by one and the same object; and, vice versa, as one and the same object can be disposed in many ways, it can also dispose in many ways one and the same part of our

body. Hence we can easily see that one and the same object may be cause of many and conflicting feelings.

p. 18 **OUR FEELING OF JOY OR SORROW IS EXACTLY THE SAME, BE IT REFERRED TO A THING PAST, FUTURE, OR PRESENT.** Dem.: So long as we are affected by the image of a thing, we will regard it as present, even though it be nonexistent (II. /17. +cor.) and we will not imagine it as past or future, except insofar as its image is joined to the image of a time past or future (II. /44 sc.); hence, regard in itself, the image of a thing is identical, whether it be referred to a time past, future, or present; i.e. the body's state, or its feeling (II. /16 cor. 2) is identical. qed.

sc. 1 I call here a thing **past** or **future,** according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it or are about to see it, according as it has rejoiced us, or will rejoice us, as it has pained us or will pain us. For, by the mere fact of imagining it, we also affirm its existence; i.e. we are not affected by anything which excludes its existence, and hence (II. /17) our body is disposed by the image of a thing in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had much experience, remain irresolute so long as they regard a thing as past or future. and are usually in doubt about its issue (II. /44 sc.) it follows that the feelings which arise from such images are not steady, and are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until people become assured of the issue.

sc. 2 From what has just been said, we understand what is **hope, fear, confidence, despair, exultation,** & **disappointment.** Hope is an unsteady joy arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an unsteady sorrow arising from the image of something about which we are still in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these feelings, hope becomes a state of confidence, and fear a state of despair, i.e. joy or sorrow arising from the image of something whereof the issue we have hoped or feared. Again. exultation, is joy arising from the image of something past, whereof we doubted the issue, Disappointment is the sorrow opposed to exultation.

p. 19 **HE WHO IMAGINES THAT THE OBJECT OF HIS LOVE IS DESTROYED, WILL BE SAD; IF HE IMAGINES THAT IT IS PRESERVED, HE WILL BE GLAD.** Dem.: We strive as much as we can to imagine those things which increase or help our body's self-power (p. 12) i.e. (sc. /p. 13) we strive to imagine those things which we like. But our imagination is aided by those things which establish the existence of the beloved, and is hindered by things which exclude its existence

(II. /17); thus the former will affect us with joy (sc. /p. 11) and the latter with sorrow. Therefore, he who imagines etc. ; qed.

p. 20 HE WHO IMAGINES THAT THE OBJECT OF HIS HATE IS DESTROYED, WILL BE GLAD. Dem.: We tend (p. 13) to imagine those things which exclude the existence of objects whereby our body's self-power is diminished or restrained; i.e. (sc. /p. 13) we try to imagine things which exclude the existence of what we hate; hence the image of something which excludes the existence of the hated object, helps our aforesaid effort and thus (sc. /p. 11) affects us with joy. Therefore he who etc. ; qed.

p. 21 HE WHO IMAGINES THAT HIS BELOVED IS JOYFUL OR SORROWFUL, WILL HIMSELF BECOME SO; AND THE INTENSITY OF THE LOVER's FEELINGS WILL DEPEND ON THAT OF THE BELOVED. Dem.: The images of things which establish (p. 19) the existence of the beloved, help our effort to imagine the object of our love. But joy, in proportion to its intensity, establishes the existence of the joyful; for (sc. /p.11) joy is transition to a greater perfection, and the image of a joyful beloved helps the mental effort of the lover, i.e. it affects him with joy; and the intensity of his feeling will depend on that of the beloved. This was our first point. Again, insofar as anything is affected with sorrow, so far it is destroyed, and the destruction is greater as the sorrow with which it is affected is greater (sc. /p. 11). Therefore (p. 19) he who imagines that his beloved is affected with sorrow, will also be affected with sorrow, in proportion to the intensity of his sad feelings. qed.

p. 22 IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY MAKES FEEL GLAD OUR BELOVED, WE SHALL LOVE HIM. ON THE CONTRARY, IF WE IMAGINE THAT HE MAKES FEEL SAD OUR BELOVED, WE SHALL HATE HIM. Dem.: He who makes feel glad or sad the object of our love, affects us in the same way when we imagine it. (p. 21). But this joy or sorrow is supposed to arise in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; hence (sc. /p. 13) if we imagine that somebody etc. ; qed.

sc. P. 21 explains to us the nature of **compassion,** which we may define as sorrow arising from another's damage. What term we can use for joy arising from another's prosperity, I know not. We will call **favor** the love toward him who helped out another; and we will call **indignation** the hatred toward him who damaged another. We must further remark that we feel compassion not only for our beloved (p. 21), but also for one whom we have hitherto regarded without any particular feeling, provided that we deem him resembling ourselves, as I will show soon. Thus, we bestow favor on one who has helped out anybody resembling ourselves and, on the contrary, we are indignant with him who has damaged anybody resembling ourselves.

p. 23 HE WHO IMAGINES THE OBJECT OF HIS HATE TO BE SAD, WILL REJOICE. IF HE IMAGINES IT TO BE GLAD, HE WILL FEEL SORRY, AND

THE INTENSITY OF HIS FEELINGS WILL DEPEND ON THE INTENSITY OF THEIR CONTRARIES IN THE HATED PERSON. Dem.: As the hated object is sad, it is to a certain extent destroyed (sc. /p. 11). Therefore(p. 20), he who imagines the object of his hate to be sad, will rejoice in proportion to the opposite feeling in the hated person. This was the first point. Again, joy establishes the existence of the joyful (sc. /p. 11); hence, if he imagines the hated person to be glad, the imagination (p. 13), will hinder his own effort (of hating) i.e. the hater will feel sorry, qed.

sc. This rejoicing (of the hater) can scarcely be genuine and without some mental conflict. For, as I am about to show in p. 27: insofar as we imagine that somebody like ourselves is sorrowful, we will ourselves get a similar feeling of sorrow; and the same hold for the opposite case of joy, But here we are concerned only with hatred.

p. 24 IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY MAKES HAPPY THE OBJECT OF OUR HATE, WE SHALL HATE HIM ALSO. IF WE IMAGINE THAT HE SADDENS THE PERSON WE HATE, WE SHALL LOVE HIM. Dem.: Is proved in the same way as p. 22, which see.

sc. These or similar feelings of hatred pertain to **envy** which is accordingly nothing else but hatred, insofar as it disposes people to rejoice in another's misfortune and to grieve at his good fortune.

p. 25 WE CLAIM FOR OURSELVES AND FOR OUR BELOVED, EVERYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE TO MAKE US HAPPY, BUT WE DISCLAIM EVERYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE TO MAKE US UNHAPPY. Dem.: That which we imagine to rejoice or to sadden our beloved, affects us in the same way (p. 21). But we strive as much as we can (p. 12) to imagine those things which rejoice us, i.e. (II. /17 + cor.) we endeavor to regard them as present. On the contrary, (p. 13) we try to exclude the existence of things which we dislike. Hence, we claim etc. ; qed.

p. 26 WE CLAIM FOR THE PERSON WE HATE, EVERYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE TO MAKE HER UNHAPPY, BUT WE DISCLAIM EVERYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE TO MAKE HER HAPPY. Dem.: Follows from p. 23 in the same way as p. 25 follows from p. 21.

sc. Thus we see how easily it happens that people rate themselves and those they love, higher, and whom they dislike, lower than it is fair. This imagination is called **pride,** as referring to one who rates himself higher than it is fair, and is a kind of madness, wherein the proud

dreams with his eyes open, that he can accomplish everything which falls within the scope of his imagination, and thereupon accounts it for real and exults in it, so long as he does not imagine something else which excludes it and restrains his self-power. Pride, therefore, is joy due to the fact that we rate ourselves higher than it is fair. Again, the joy due to the fact that we rate another person higher than it is fair, is called **over-esteem**. Whereas the joy due to the fact that we rate somebody lower than it is fair, is called **disesteem.**

p. 27 **SIMPLY IN IMAGINING THAT SOMEBODY**--LIKE US AND TOWARDS WHOM WE HAD NO PARTICULAR FEELINGS--**EXPERIENCES AN AFFECTIVE STATE, BY THAT VERY FACT WE WILL EXPERIENCE A SIMILAR AFFECTIVE STATE.** Dem.: The images of things are dispositions of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II. /17), i.e. (II. /10) whereof the ideas imply the nature of our body, together with the actual nature of external bodies. If therefore the nature of an external body be like the nature of our body, then the idea which we form from the external body will imply a disposition of our own body, similar to the disposition of the external body. Hence, if we imagine somebody like us, as experiencing an affective state, this very imagination will express a disposition of our body similar to the said affective state. Thus, if we imagine that a person like us experiences any feeling, by that very fact we will experience a similar feeling. If, however, we hate the said person, we shall to that extent, experience a contrary, and not a similar affective state. qed.

sc. This imitation of affective states when referred to feelings of sorrow is called **compassion** (sc. /p. 22) and when referred to desires is called **emulation,** which is thus simply the desire of something, engendered in us by the fact that we imagine others to have the like desire.

cor. 1 **IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY AFFECTS OUR FELLOW MEN WITH JOY, WE SHALL LOVE HIM, BUT IF WE IMAGINE THAT HE AFFECTS THEM WITH SORROW, WE SHALL HATE HIM.** Dem.: Follows from p. 27 in the same way as p. 22 follows from p. 21.

cor. 2 **WHOM WE PITY WE CANNOT HATE, EVEN THOUGH HIS MISERY AFFECTS US PAINFULLY**. Dem.: If we could hate him for this reason, we should rejoice in imagining his pain (p. 23) which is contrary to the hypothesis.

cor. 3 **WHOM WE PITY WE WILL TRY, AS MUCH AS WE CAN, TO FREE FROM HIS MISERY.** Dem.: What affects with sorrow whom we pity, affects us with a similar feeling (p. 27).

Hence we shall try to remember everything which removes or destroys (p. 13) that cause of sorrow; i.e. (sc. /p. 9) we shall desire to destroy that cause; thus, whom we pity etc. ; qed.

sc. 2 The will or tendency for charity, arising from our compassion towards whom we intend to help, is called **benevolence** and is simply a desire arising from compassion. About our feelings towards somebody who has done good or harm to our fellow-men, see sc. /p. 22.

p. 28 WE TRY TO PROMOTE AND BRING ABOUT EVERYTHING WHICH SEEMS TO BE CONDUCIVE TO JOY, BUT WE TRY TO REMOVE OR DESTROY EVERYTHING WHICH SEEMS OPPOSED THERETO, AS CONDUCING TO SORROW. Dem.: We try to imagine as much as we can, things which seem to be conducive to joy (p. 12), i.e. (II. /17) we shall try to imagine them as present or as really existing. But the attempt of the mind, or its thinking power, is equal to and simultaneous with the attempt of the body or its self-power (II. /7 cor. & II. /11 cor.). Hence, we absolutely try to make it exist, i.e. (sc. /p. 9) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point. Again, if we imagine that something we believed to be a cause of sorrow, and which we hated (sc. /p. 13) is destroyed, we shall rejoice (p. 20). Hence by the first part of our proof, we shall try to destroy that thing, or (p. 13) to remove it, so as we may not regard is as present; this was our second point. qed.

p. 29 WE SHALL ALSO TRY TO DO EVERYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE PEOPLE WILL LIKE IT, AND WE SHALL AVOID DOING ANYTHING WHICH WE IMAGINE PEOPLE WILL DISLIKE IT. (by people I mean here and in what follows, persons towards whom we have no particular feelings) Dem.: Simply in imagining that people love or hate something, we shall love or hate the same thing (p. 27), i.e. (sc. /p. 13) from this mere fact we shall rejoice or be saddened by the thing's presence. Hence, we shall also etc. ; qed.

sc. This effort to do things or leave them undone, solely in order to please people, we call **ambition,** especially when we so eagerly try to please the multitude, that we do or omit doing certain things, to our own or to another's damage. ; otherwise it is generally called **civility.** Furthermore, I call **praise** the pleasure in imagining somebody's action whereby he tried to please us; on the other hand I call **blame** the pain we experience when his action displeases us.

p. 30 IF WE HAVE DONE SOMETHING WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE LIKE IT, WE WILL EXPERIENCE JOY ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF OURSELVES AS CAUSE, i. e WE WILL REGARD OURSELVES WITH PLEASURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE DID SOMETHING WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE DISLIKE IT, WE WILL REGARD OURSELVES WITH SADNESS. Dem.: He who imagines that he affects others with pleasure. or pain, will be, by that

very fact experiencing similar feelings (p. 27). But as (II. /19 & II. /23) we know ourselves through our sensations, whereby we are determined to some action, it follows that he who believes that he affects others with pleasure, will be himself affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. etc. qed.

sc. As love (p. 13) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hate is sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause, the pleasure and pain whereof we have just spoken, will be kinds of love and hate. But, as love and hate are used in reference to external objects, we will use other names for the feelings under discussion. We will call **glory** that joy which is accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, and **shame** the feeling which is contrary thereto; I mean in such cases as where our feelings arise from the belief that we have been praised or blamed. Otherwise, the joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause is generally called **self-contentment**, and its contrary sorrow is called **repentance.** Again, as it may happen (II. /17 cor.) that what we believe about people's likes and dislikes, may exist solely in our imagination, and as (p. 25) we claim for ourselves everything which we imagine to make us happy, it may easily happen that he who praises himself, becomes **arrogant** and while believing that he is welcome everywhere, he be an annoyance to all.

p. 31 IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY LOVES, DESIRES, OR HATES SOMETHING WHICH WE OURSELVES LOVE, DESIRE, OR HATE, BY THAT VERY FACT WE SHALL LOVE, DESIRE, OR HATE THAT THING MORE STEADILY. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE IMAGINE THAT HE DISDAINS WHAT WE LOVE, OR VICE VERSA, WE SHALL EXPERIENCE WAVERING.

Dem.: Simply in imagining that people love something, we shall also love that thing (p. 27); but we are assumed to love it already. ; hence, there is now cause whereby our former feeling is fostered and we shall love that thing more steadily than before. Again, simply be imagining that people dislike a think, we shall also dislike it (p. 27). But, as we are assumed to love it already, we shall then, at the same time, love it and dislike it; i.e. (sc/p. 17) we shall waver. qed. From p. 31 and also from p. 28 it follows that:

cor. EVERYONE TRIES AS MUCH AS HE CAN TO CAUSE OTHERS TO LOVE WHAT HE HIMSELF LOVES, AND TO HATE WHAT HE HIMSELF HATES, AS THE POET SAYS (Ovidius, Amores, II. XIX. 4, 5):

LOVERS! YE SHALL HOPE AND YE SHALL FEAR ALIKE!
FOR, WHO WOULD LOVE, WHAT NOBODY WANTS?

sc. This effort to bring it about that our own likes and dislikes be met with general approval, is precisely what we call **ambition** (sc. /p. 29). Thus we see that, by nature, everybody instinctively strives to make his fellow-men share his own ways of living and thinking; and

while they all try the same, they hinder each other; and while they all desire to be loved and praised by all, they hate one another.

p. 32 IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY TAKES DELIGHT IN A THING WHICH ONLY ONE CAN POSSESS, WE WILL TRY TO BRING IT ABOUT THAT HE SHALL NOT POSSESS IT. Dem.: Simply in imagining that somebody takes delight. in a thing (cor. 1/p. 27) we shall love it and desire to take delight therein. But we are prevented in doing so, by the fact that another takes delight in it; hence (p. 28) if we imagine etc.; qed.

sc. We thus see that, by nature, people generally take pity of those who are unfortunate, and envy those who are fortunate, and (p. 32) do so in proportion as they love the goods by them possessed. Further we see that from the same property of our nature, whence it follows that we are compassionate, il follows also that we are envious and ambitious. Lastly we shall find that our own experience entirely confirms what we have stated, especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is so to speak well balanced, laugh and cry simply because they see others do so; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves whatever they imagine as delighting others. Which is not surprising at all, if we remember that the images of things are our sensations, i.e. states wherein our body is disposed by external causes to act in this or that way.

p. 33 WHEN WE LOVE SOMEBODY, WE TRY, AS MUCH AS WE CAN, TO BRING ABOUT THAT HE SHOULD LOVE US IN RETURN. Dem.: That which we love, we strive as much as we can, to imagine in preference to anything else (p. 12). If it be somebody of our kind, we shall try to affect him with joy (p. 29), i.e. we shall try to bring about that the beloved feel joy accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (sc. /p. 13) that he loves us in return. qed.

p. 34 THE STRONGER WE IMAGINE OUR BELOVED's FEELINGS TOWARDS US, THE GREATER WILL BE OUR SELF-CONTENTMENT. Dem.: We try as much as we can (p. 33) to bring about that the person we love, should love us in return; i.e. our beloved should experience joy accompanied by the idea of ourselves as cause. Thus, this our effort will be aided, the more we imagine the beloved to be joyful because of us, i.e. (p. 11+ sc.) the greater will be our own joy. But in thinking that we are pleasing people (p. 30) we feel elated, hence the stronger etc. ; qed.

p. 35 IF SOMEBODY IMAGINES THAT HIS BELOVED FAVORS ANOTHER WITH CLOSER BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP THAN HE HIMSELF HAS ATTAINED TO, HE WILL HATE HER AND ENVY HIS RIVAL. Dem.: The stronger we imagine to be our beloved's feelings towards us, the greater will be our self-contentment (p. 34), i.e. (sc. /p. 30). our joy; we will

therefore strive as much as we can to imagine the beloved as most closely bound to us; this our effort or instinctive trend will be enhanced by imagining that someone else shows a similar desire (p. 31). But our intention is assumed to be checked by the imagination of our beloved joining the rival; thus (sc. /p. 11), we will experience sorrow accompanied by the idea of our beloved as cause, in association with the idea of our rival; i.e. (p. 13) we will experience hate towards our beloved and also towards our rival (cor. /p. 15) whom we will envy for his enjoying the object of our love; qed.

sc. This hatred towards an object of love, joined with envy, is called **jealousy,** which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the beloved will be greater in proportion to the enjoyment the jealous had been wont to desire from his reciprocated love, and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate his ex-beloved, because he imagines her as kindly impressed by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his beloved with the image of somebody he hates. This pattern generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman. For he who thinks that a woman whom he loves offers herself to another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but being compelled to associate the beloved's image with the intimacy of another man, he will also despise her. I must add that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also makes suffer the lover, as I will now show.

p. 36 **HE WHO REMEMBERS A THING IN WHICH HE ONCE HAS TAKEN DELIGHT, DESIRES TO POSSESS IT UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES AS WHEN HE FIRST TOOK DELIGHT THEREIN.** Dem.: Everything he has seen in conjunction with the object of his love, will be to him incidentally a cause of pleasure (p. 15); he will therefore desire to possess it in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; i.e. he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances. qed. Hence;

cor. **IF ONE OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BE MISSING, THE LOVER WILL FEEL SORRY ABOUT.** Dem.: For, insofar as he finds some circumstances to be missing, he imagines something which excludes its existence; as for love's sake he is assumed to be desirous of that thing or circumstance (p. 36) he will be sorry (p. 19) in imagining its absence. qed.

sc. This sorrow, insofar as it refers to the absence. of an object of love, is called a sense of loss, a **regret.**

p. 37 DESIRE ARISING FROM A FEELING OF SORROW OR JOY, OF HATE OR LOVE, IS STRONGER IN PROPORTION AS THE FEELING IS STRONGER. Dem.: Sorrow diminishes or hinders our self-power (sc/p. 11) i.e. (p. 7). diminishes or hinders the effort wherewith we strive to persist in our being; hence (p. 5) it is contrary to that effort. Somebody who is sorrowful will therefore try as much as he can to remove that feeling. But, by its definition, in proportion as sorrow is stronger, the more will it check our self-power, and the greater also the part of our self-power, necessary to remove it; i, e, the stronger will be our desire or impulse to remove it. Again, since joy (sc. /p. 11) increases or aids our self-power, it may be shown in the same manner and as easily, that he who is experiencing joy, has no desire further than to preserve his feeling of joy, and his desire will be in proportion to the strength of the said feeling. Lastly, as hate and love are themselves feelings, it follow in like manner, that the effort, or instinctive impulse, or desire, which arises from hate or love, will be stronger in proportion as the said feelings are stronger; qed.

p. 38 HE WHO STARTS HATING A BELOVED, TO THE POINT THAT HIS LOVE BE COMPLETELY DESTROYED, WILL HATE THAT BELOVED RELATIVELY MORE, THAN IF HE HAD NEVER LOVED IT, AND HIS HATRED WILL BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE STRENGTH OF HIS FORMER LOVE. Dem.: He who starts hating a person he had loved, will be restrained in more of his instinctive trends, than if he had never loved before. For love (sc. /p. 13) is joy which we try, as much as we can, to render permanent (p. 28); we do so by regarding the beloved as present and by making her feel happy, as much as we can; this effort will be proportionate to our love, and so also will our effort that the beloved reciprocates our affection (p. 33). Now, these trends are hindered by our hatred (cor. /p. 13 & p. 23); wherefore (sc. /p. 11) the lover will feel sorry, the more so in proportion to his former love; i.e. in addition to the sorrow which caused his hatred, he will be also sorry for having loved that person; hence, he will regard her more sorrowfully i.e. he will hate her more as he would have done so normally. Therefore, he who starts hating etc. ; qed.

p. 39 HE WHO HATES ANYONE WILL ATTEMPT TO DAMAGE HIM, UNLESS HE FEARS THAT A GREATER DAMAGE WILL ACCRUE THEREBY TO HIMSELF; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WHO LOVES ANYONE, WILL SEEK TO DO HIM GOOD, BY THE SAME RULE. Dem.: To hate somebody is (sc. /p. 13) to imagine him as a cause of sorrow; therefore, he who hates will try to remove or destroy the person he hates. But, if a greater evil should accrue thereby to the hater. , and if he thinks that he can avoid that evil by not carrying out his intentions against the hated person--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that damage (p. 28) and this desire (p. 37) will be stronger than the former desire to damage, and will prevail. The second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner. Hence, he who hates anyone etc. ; qed.

sc. By **good** I mean here every kind of enjoyment, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our needs, whatever they may be. By **evil** I mean every kind of pain, especially what frustrates our needs. For I have shown (sc. /p. 9) that in no case do we desire

something because we deem it good but, on the contrary, we deem a thing good because we desire it. Consequently we deem evil all we dislike. Everybody, therefore, according to his affective state, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, and lastly, what is best and what is worst. Thus, a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing as much as shame. To an envious person nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So everybody, according to his affectivity, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The feeling which makes one deny to himself that what he wishes, and makes him wish for that which he denies, is called **timidity**, which accordingly may be defined as the fear whereby somebody is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future, by facing a lesser evil in the present (p. 28). But if the evil he fears be shame, timidity becomes **bashfulness.**

Lastly, if the desire to avoid some future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that one knows not which to choose, fear becomes **consternation,** especially if both the evils feared be overwhelming.

p. 40 HE WHO FIGURES HIMSELF HATED BY SOMEBODY, AND BELIEVES THAT HE HAS GIVEN HIM NO CAUSE FOR HATRED, WILL HATE HIM IN RETURN. Dem.: He who imagines that somebody experiences hatred, by that very fact will experience hatred himself (p. 27) i.e. he will feel sorry accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But it is assumed that he sees no cause for that feeling except him who is his enemy; therefore, he who figures himself hated etc. ; qed.

sc. If he thinks that he has given just cause for hatred, he will (sc. /p. 30) feel ashamed; but this case rarely happens (p. 25). The reciprocation of hate may also arise from the resentment following an attempt to injure the hated person (p. 39). Thus, he who figures himself hated by another, will imagine his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain, and will experience pain and fear accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; i.e. he will hate him in return. qed

cor. 1 HE WHO IMAGINES THAT ONE WHOM HE LOVES HATES HIM, WILL BE TORN BETWEEN HATE AND LOVE. For, insofar as he figures himself hated, he is determined to hate in return. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him; wherefore, he who imagines etc.

cor. 2 HE WHO IMAGINES THAT ONE, WHOM HE HAS HITHERTO REGARDED WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR FEELING, HAS DONE HIM SOME INJURY MOTIVATED BY HATE, WILL FORTHWITH SEEK TO REPAY THE INJURY IN KIND. Dem.: He who imagines that somebody hates him, will (p. 40) hate his enemy in return and (p. 26)

will try to recall everything which can be painful to the said enemy; he will moreover try to damage him (p. 39). Now, the first thing of this sort which he imagines is the injury done to himself; he will therefore try to repay in kind. qed.

sc. The attempt to damage one whom we hate is called **anger;** the effort to repay in kind an injury done to ourselves, is called **revenge.**

p. 41 **HE WHO FIGURES HIMSELF LOVED BY SOMEBODY, AND BELIEVES THAT HE HAS GIVEN HIM NO CAUSE FOR LOVE, WILL LOVE HIM IN RETURN** (Cf. cor. /p. 15 & p. 16 showing that this may happen). Dem.: Is proved in the same way as p. 40 +sc.

sc. 1 If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein (sc. /p. 30); this is what most often happens (p. 25) and its contrary, as we said, will take place whenever one figures himself hated by somebody. This reciprocated love and consequently the desire to do good to the person who loves us, (p. 39) and who attempts to do good to us, is called **gratitude** or **thankfulness.** It thus appears that people are much more prone to revenge than to return a benefit.

cor. **HE WHO FIGURES HIMSELF LOVED BY ONE WHOM HE HATES, WILL BE TORN BETWEEN HATE AND LOVE.** This is proved in the same way as cor. 1/p. 40.

sc. 2 If hatred be the prevailing feeling, he will attempt to damage the person who loves him; this feeling is called **cruelty,** especially if the victim is believed to have given no specific cause for hatred.

p. 42 **HE WHO, FOR LOVE's OR FOR VANITY's SAKE, HAS BESTOWED BENEFITS ON A PERSON, WILL FEEL SORRY WHEN HE SEES THAT HIS BENEFITS ARE RECEIVED WITHOUT GRATITUDE.** Dem.: When we love a person, we strive as much as we can to bring it about that we should be loved in return (p. 33). Thus, he who bestowed benefits on a person, did it in view to be loved in return, i.e. (p. 34) for self-contentment, or vanity, or (sc. /p. 30) his pleasure; hence he will attempt as much as he can to imagine this cause of vainglory, i.e. to regard it as really existing. But, by the hypothesis, he imagines something else which excludes the existence of that cause of vainglory; wherefore he will feel sorry. qed.

p. 43 **HATRED IS INCREASED BY BEING RECIPROCATED, BUT CAN BE DESTROYED BY LOVE.** Dem.: He who imagines that the hated person reciprocates his hate, will thereby feel. a new hatred, while (by hypothesis) the former hate still remains (p. 40). But, if he imagines that the hated person loves him, he will to this extent (p. 38) regard himself with pleasure, and will try to please (p. 29) the cause of his joyful feeling; i.e. he will try not to hate that person and not to upset her, and try the stronger so, as is strong the feeling from which it arises. Hence, if it be stronger than that coming from hate, it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. qed.

p. 44 **HATRED WHICH IS COMPLETELY VANQUISHED BY LOVE, PASSES INTO LOVE: AND THAT LOVE WILL BE STRONGER THAN IF HATRED HAD NOT PRECEDED IT.** Dem.: This is proven in the same way as p. 38; for he who starts loving a person whom he is want to hate or to regard with dislike, will be joyful from the very fact of loving. Now, this enjoyment due to love will be amplified by the strengthening of his effort to remove the sorrow implied in hate (sc. /p. 13 & p. 37) and accompanied by the idea of that same person as cause of his present joy. qed.

sc. Though this be so, no one will attempt to hate somebody or to suffer pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure; i.e. no one will desire to be injured in the hope of compensation, nor long to get ill for the sake of a happy convalescence. For, each and everyone always strives to persist in his being and to ward off pain as much as he can. But if one could be supposed desiring to hate a person, in order that he might love her the more thereafter, he would always desire to hate her. For the strength of the love being proportionate to his former hatred, he would desire that the hatred be continually increased; for a similar reason one would also wish to become more and more ill, in order that one might take a greater pleasure in convalescence. ; that is, one would try to remain ill, which (p. 6) is absurd.

p. 45 **IF WE IMAGINE THAT SOMEBODY HATES A PERSON WHOM WE LOVE, WE WILL HATE HIM.** Dem.: Our beloved reciprocates the hate of her enemy (p. 40); hence, in imagining that somebody hates her, we will imagine her as affected by hate, i.e. (p. 13) by sorrow; thus we will also experience sorrow accompanied by the idea of the enemy; that is, we will hate him who is hating our beloved (sc. /p. 13). qed.

p. 46 **IF WE HAVE BEEN AFFECTED WITH JOY OR SORROW BY SOMEBODY BELONGING TO A CLASS OR NATION DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN, AND IF OUR FEELING IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF THIS PERSON AS ITS CAUSE, UNDER THE COMMON NAME OF HIS CLASS OR NATION, WE SHALL LOVE OR HATE NOT ONLY HIM, BUT ALSO THE CLASS OR NATION WHERETO HE BELONGS.** Dem.: Evident from p. 16.

p. 47 **OUR REJOICING ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF PEOPLE WE HATE, IS NEVER WITHOUT SOME ACCOMPANYING SORROW.** Dem.: This is evident from p. 27. For, as we imagine people (i.e. beings like ourselves) experiencing sorrow, we shall also be sad.

sc. This proposition can be proved also from II. /17. cor. Whenever we remember something, even if does not actually exist, we regard it simply as present, and our body is disposed in the same way; wherefore, as long as the remembrance (of the people we hate) is strong, we are determined to regard them with sorrow; and, while that image lasts, our determination is checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the said people, but not destroying their image; hence, we will rejoice only insofar as the determination to sorrow is checked; further, this our rejoicing about the damage done to those people, will restart each time we remember them. For, whenever their image is aroused and inasmuch as it implies their existence, we are determined to regard those people with the same sorrow as we used to do when they really did exist. However, since we have joined to their image other images which exclude their existence, our determination to sorrow is forthwith checked, and we rejoice anew, as often as the remembrance takes place. **This is why people like to recall past evils and enjoy in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.** For, when they imagine the danger, they imagine it as still to come and are determined to fear it; but this determination is checked once more by the idea of freedom which became associated with the idea of danger when they escaped therefrom, and this renders them secure again, and makes them rejoice.

p. 48 **LOVE OR HATE TOWARDS e.g. PETER IS DESTROYED, IF THE THEREBY IMPLIED FEELINGS OF JOY OR SORROW, BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE IDEA OF ANOTHER CAUSE; AND THESE AFFECTIVE STATES WILL BE WEAKENED IN PROPORTION AS WE IMAGINE THAT PETER HAS NOT BEEN THEIR ONLY CAUSE.** Dem.: This is evident from the sole definition of love and hate (p. 13). For joy is called love towards Peter, and sorrow is called hate towards him, only insofar as Peter is regarded as the cause of those feelings. When this causal implication is either wholly or partly removed, the affective state towards Peter will also vanish in the same proportion, qed.

p. 49 **LOVE OR HATE TOWARDS A THING WHICH WE IMAGINE FREE, MUST BE RELATIVELY GREATER THAN TOWARDS A NECESSARY THING.** Dem.: A thing which we imagine free, must (I. /d. 7) be perceivable by itself and independently from something else. Thus, if we imagine it as the cause of joy or sorrow, we shall (sc. /p. 13) love or hate it, and shall do so with the

utmost intensity. But if the thing which causes our feelings be imagined as necessary, we shall then (I. /d. 7) consider it not as the sole cause, but as merely one of the causes of our feelings and, hence, our love or hate towards it will be weaker. qed.

sc. Hence it follows that **since people believe themselves to be free,** they do feel more love or hatred towards one another, than towards anything else; to that fact we must add the imitation which takes place in affectivity (cf. p. 27, 34, 40, & 43).

p. 50 ANYTHING CAN BE INCIDENTALLY A CAUSE OF HOPE OR FEAR. Dem.: Proved in the same way as p. 15 which see together with sc. /p. 18.

sc. Things which are incidentally the cause of hope or fear are called **good or evil omens**. Now, insofar as such omens are cause of hope or fear, they are (sc. /p. 18) also the causes of joy or sorrow; thus, to this extent, we regard them with love or hate and we seek, either to invoke them as means towards what we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows further from p. 25 that **we naturally believe in what we hope for, and disbelieve in what we fear;** moreover, we have the tendency to consider such objects either above or below their true value, and therefrom have arisen those superstitions which make people suffer all over the world. But I do not think it worthwhile to explain here with more details the waverings and hesitations springing from hope and fear, since it follows from the very definition of these feelings that there cannot be hope without fear, nor fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, insofar as we hope for or fear something, we regard it with love or hatred; thus we may say and apply to hope and fear all we have said concerning love and hate.

p. 51 DIFFERENT PEOPLE MAY BE DIFFERENTLY AFFECTED BY THE SAME OBJECT, AND THE SAME PERSON, AT DIFFERENT TIMES, MAY BE DIFFERENTLY AFFECTED BY THE SAME OBJECT. Dem.: The human body is disposed by external bodies in a variety of ways (II. /po. 3). Two people may therefore be differently affected at the same time and (II. /ax. 1/lem. 3). may be differently affected by one and the same object. Further (II. /po. 3) the human body may be disposed sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; consequently, (II. /13 ax. 1 after lem. 3) it may be differently disposed at different times, by one and the same object. qed.

sc. We thus see that it is possible, that what one loves another may hate, and that what one fears, another may not fear; or again, that one and the same person may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his affectivity what is good, what is bad, what is better and what worse (sc. /p. 39) it follows that our

judgment may vary no less than our affectivity (that this is possible, though the human mind be part of the divine intellect, we have shown it II. /13 sc.) hence, when we compare people, we distinguish them solely by their emotional behavior, and we style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call somebody **intrepid** if he despises a danger or an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into consideration that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to secure those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which uses to restrain me, I shall call him **audacious,** Again, a man will appear **timid** to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which does not restrain me, I shall say that he is a **coward** and in a like manner will everyone pass judgment over his fellow-men. Lastly, from this inconstancy of our judgment, inasmuch as we often judge of things solely by our affective state, and inasmuch as the things which we attempt to get or to avoid (as supposed causes of pleasure or pain). are often purely imaginary--not to speak of the uncertainty of things as shown p. 28--it becomes understandable that everybody may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or his joy, i.e. experiencing sorrow or joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are repentance and self--contentment. **Repentance** is sorrow accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause**; self-contentment** is joy accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; and these feelings are extremely strong because people believe themselves to be free (p. 49).

p. 52 AN OBJECT WHICH WE HAVE FORMERLY SEEN WITH OTHERS, OR WHICH APPARENTLY DOES NOT HAVE ANYTHING WHICH WOULD NOT BE COMMON TO MANY, WE WILL NOT LOOK AT IT FOR SO LONG, AS WE WILL DO AT AN OBJECT WHICH SEEMS TO US PECULIAR. Dem.: As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with others, we at once. remember those others (sc. /p. 18) and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to that of another. And this is also the case with an object that apparently does not have anything which would not be common to many; for, we thereupon assume that there is nothing to be found therein which we have not seen before, in connection with other objects. But when we suppose that an object has something special, which we have never seen before, this means that our mind, while regarding that object, finds nothing (in the memory) which may induce us to contemplate something else and, thus, remains in the contemplation of that object alone. qed.

sc. This mental disposition or imagination of a peculiar thing, insofar as it remains alone in the mind, is called **admiration;** but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called **consternation**, because in admiring the evil we remain so engrossed in its contemplation, that we have no power to think of anything else whereby we might avoid that evil. If however the

object of our admiration be somebody's prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said person is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, this admiration is called **respect**; otherwise, if it be somebody's anger, envy etc. , which surprises us, that feeling is called **horror.** Again, if it be the prudence, industry etc of somebody we love, that we admire, our love on this account will be the greatest (p. 12) and when joined to admiration and respect is called **adoration.** We may in like manner conceive hate, hope, confidence, and the other feelings as associated with admiration, and we should thus be able to derive therefrom more affective states than those which have been given names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident that the names of the emotions are due to common usage, rather than to an accurate knowledge of their nature. To admiration (amazement) is opposed **contempt,** which generally arises from the fact that while we see people amazed and admiring, loving or fearing something, or while at first sight something seems to be one of those things which we normally admire, love, fear etc. , (cor. /p. 15 & p. 27), through its very presence or a more accurate contemplation thereof, we are compelled to deny it any right for being admired, loved, feared etc. , and rather by its presence are determined to think of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, normally, the presence of a thing would cause us to regard in preference, that which is therein. As adoration springs from the admiration of something we love, so does **derision** spring from the contempt of a thing which we hate or fear; and as respect proceeds from the admiration of prudence, so **disdain** from the contempt of folly. Lastly, we may conceive love, hope, glory etc. , associated with contempt, and can thence derive other affective states which are not distinguished one from another by any specific name.

p. 53 **WHEN WE CONTEMPLATE OURSELVES AND OUR SELF-POWER, WE REJOICE, AND THE MORE SO, AS WE PERCEIVE MORE DISTINCTLY OURSELVES AND OUR SELF-POWER.** Dem.: We do not know ourselves save through our sensations and their ideas(II. /19 & 23). Thus, when we are able to contemplate ourselves, we are thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection (sc. /p. 11) i.e. to experience joy; qed. Hence;

cor. **THIS JOY IS FOSTERED MORE AND MORE, IN PROPORTION AS WE IMAGINE OURSELVES TO BE PRAISED BY OTHERS.** For, the more we imagine ourselves as praised by others, the more we will assume them to be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of ourselves (sc. /p. 29); thus (p. 27) we will experience more joy ourselves. qed.

p. 54 **WE STRIVE TO IMAGINE THOSE THINGS ONLY WHICH POSIT OUR SELF-POWER.** Dem.: Our striving and power is our very beingness (p. 7); but obviously, beingness only affirms what we are and can do, and not what we are not, nor cannot do. Hence we strive etc. , qed.

p. 55. THE VERY FACT OF IMAGINING OUR POWERLESSNESS SADDENS US. Dem.: Our beingness only affirms what we are and can do; i.e. we naturally imagine only those things which posit our self-power(p. 54). Thus, when we are said to contemplate our powerlessness, it simply means that while we are trying to imagine something which posits our self-power, we are checked in our effort, in other words, we experience sorrow (sc. /p. 11) qed.

cor. 1 THIS SORROW IS FOSTERED MORE AND MORE, IN PROPORTION AS WE IMAGINE OURSELVES TO BE BLAMED BY OTHERS. This may be proved in the same way as cor. /p. 53.

sc. This sorrow accompanied by the idea of our powerlessness is called **humility;** whereas the joy which springs from the imagination of ourselves is called **self-esteem** or **self-contentment** and, inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as we imagine our virtues or our self-power, it follows that **everybody is fond of telling his own exploits and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and for this very reason people become an annoyance to one another**. Again, it follows that people are naturally envious (sc. /p. 24 & sc. /p. 32), pleased in the shortcomings of their peers and unhappy about their virtues. For, whenever we imagine our own actions, we rejoice (p. 53) in proportion as our actions display more perfection and we imagine them more distinctly. i.e. (II. /40 sc,) in proportion as we distinguish them from those of others and regard them as something special. Therefore, in contemplating ourselves we will take most delight when we look at some quality which we deny to others. But, if what we affirm of ourselves, belongs to the idea of man or animal in general, we will not be greatly pleased; on the contrary, we will feel sorry when we imagine that our own actions fall short in comparison with those of others. Thus, we will try (p. 28) to get rid of this sadness in misinterpreting and misrepresenting the actions of our peers, or by embellishing our own, as much as we can. It is thus apparent that **people are naturally prone to hatred and envy,** which latter is fostered by their education. For, parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spurs of honor and envy. But some will object, perhaps, that not seldom we admire men's virtues and hold in high esteem their possessors. In order to remove this objection I will add the following corollary.

cor. 2 WE ENVY ONLY THE VIRTUES OF OUR PEERS. Dem.: Envy: is a kind of hatred (sc. /p. 24) or (sc. /p. 13) sorrow, i.e. (sc. /p. 11) a disposition whereby our self-power is checked. But (sc. /p. 9) we do not strive for, nor desire anything which does not follow from our own nature; hence, we will not claim or desire any power or virtue (which is the same thing) belonging to another's nature and foreign to our own. Hence, our

desire cannot be checked, nor could we be pained by the contemplation of virtue in someone unlike ourselves, and consequently we cannot envy such a person. But we can envy our peer, our equal, who is assumed to be of the same nature as ourselves. qed.

sc. When therefore we said sc. /p. 52 that we respect a man because we admire his prudence, his heroism etc. , we do so because we view these qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we therefore no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous.

p. 56 THERE ARE AS MANY KINDS OF JOY, OF SORROW, OF DESIRE, AND ALSO OF AFFECTIVE STATES COMPOUNDED OF THESE. e.g. WAVERINGS. OR DERIVED FROM THESE, SUCH AS LOVE, HATE, HOPE, FEAR etc. , AS THERE ARE KINDS OF OBJECTS WHEREBY WE ARE AFFECTED. Dem.: Joy and sorrow, and consequently the feelings compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passivities (sc. /p. 11); now, we suffer necessarily (p. 1) insofar as we have inadequate ideas; and only insofar as we have inadequate ideas are we passive (p. 3); i.e. we are necessarily passive (II. /40 sc.) only insofar as we imagine or (II. /17 +sc,) experience some affective states implying the nature of our own body together with the nature of an external body. Wherefore, the nature of any passiveness must be explained in a way so as to express the nature of the object whereby we are affected. For instance, the joy which arises from e.g. the object A. implies the nature of A. and the joy which arises from the object B. implies the nature of B. ; wherefore these two feelings of joy differ by nature, inasmuch as are different the causes whence they arise. So again, the feeling of sorrow which arises from one object, differs by nature from the sorrow arising from another object and, similarly in the case of love, hate, hope, fear, wavering, etc. , Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of joy, sorrow, love, hate etc. , as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Now, desire is our actual beingness or nature, determined. to act in a given state (sc/p. 9); therefore, according as somebody is disposed by external causes, to this or that kind of joy, sorrow etc. , i.e. according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire be of one kind or another; and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire as widely, as differ the feelings wherefrom each desire arose, Thus, there are etc. , qed.

sc. Among the kinds of affective states, which by p. 56 must be very numerous, the chief are **gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition** Mere kinds of love or desire, they display the nature thereof according to the object they have in view, For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, sex, riches, and fame. Furthermore, as these affective states are distinguished merely by the objects they have in view, they have no contraries. For, temperance, sobriety, and chastity which we are wont to oppose to gluttony, drunkenness and lust, are not affective states or kinds of passiveness, but indicate the power of our mind which restrains the last-named affective states. All the other forms of affectivity, I do not intend to explain them here, nor do I see the necessity for it. As our purpose here is to determine the strength of affectivity and our mind's power over it, it is

sufficient for us to have provided a general definition of each affective state. It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of our affectivity and of our mind, in order to be able to determine how and how far we have the power to restrain and to check our affectivity. Thus, though there is a great difference between the various kinds of love, hatred, or desire, e.g. between the love towards children and the love towards a wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further the nature and origin of affectivity.

p. 57 THE AFFECTIVITY OF ONE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERS FROM THE AFFECTIVITY OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TO THE SAME EXTENT AS THE BEINGNESS OF ONE DIFFERS FROM THE BEINGNESS OF THE OTHER.

Dem.: This is evident from II. /13 ax. 1. / lem. 3. Nevertheless we will prove it from the nature of the three primary affective states. All our affectivity is attributable to desire, joy, or sorrow, as results clearly from their definitions already given. But desire (sc. /p. 9) is nothing else than our own nature or beingness; desire in one individual differs, thus, from desire in another individual, as much as the nature or beingness of the one differs from the nature or beingness of the other. Again, joy and sorrow are passivities, whereby the power or effort to persist in our being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (sc. /p. 11). By effort to persist in our being, as referred to mind and body simultaneously, we mean instinct and desire (sc. /p. 9); hence, joy and sorrow are nothing but desire or instinct itself, insofar as it is increased or diminished, helped or hindered by external causes, i.e. insofar as it is our own nature; wherefore, the joy and sorrow felt by one, differ from the joy and sorrow felt by another, as much as differ their respective natures, qed.

sc. Hence it follows that the affectivity of so called irrational organisms--(for, after what we have learnt about the origin of the mind, we must admit without any doubt that **animals have feelings**)--differs necessarily as much from our human affectivity, as their nature differs from our human nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by procreative lust; but the instinct of the former is equine, while the instinct of the latter is human. The same holds for the sexuality and the instincts of insects, fishes, and birds, which must obviously differ one from the other in some specific way. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in his own nature, yet the life wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea or soul of the said individual, and hence, the pleasure of one differs as much from the pleasure of another, as the beingness of one differs from the beingness of the other. Lastly, it follows from p. 57 that there is no small difference between the pleasure whereby is led e.g. a drunkard, and the pleasure enjoyed by the philosopher; a detail that I just mention here in passing. Thus far I have treated of affective states which refer to people insofar as they are passive or suffer. It remains to add a few words on behalf of those feelings which refer to somebody who acts

. **p. 58 BESIDES THE JOYS AND DESIRES WHICH ARE PASSIVITIES, THERE ARE OTHER FEELINGS OF JOY AND OTHER DESIRES WHICH REFER TO US**

INSOFAR AS WE ARE ACTIVE. Dem.: When we contemplate ourselves and our self-power, we rejoice (p. 53); now, we necessarily contemplate ourselves when we think a true and adequate idea (II. /43). And we do think some adequate ideas (II. /40 sc. 2) Therefore we rejoice insofar as we think adequate ideas; i.e. insofar as we are active (p. 1). Again, both insofar as we have clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as we have false and confused ideas, we strive to persist in our being (p. 9); but by such striving we mean the desire (sc/p. 9); therefore, desire also refers to us insofar as we understand, or (p. 1) insofar as we are active. qed.

p. 59 ALL THE AFFECTIVE STATES REFERRED TO US INSOFAR AS WE ARE ACTIVE, ARE DERIVED ONLY FROM JOY AND DESIRE. Dem.: All affective states relate to desire, joy, or sorrow, as their definitions already known show. Now, sorrow means that our thinking power is diminished or checked (sc. /p. 11); thus, insofar as we are sad, our power of understanding, i.e. our self-power is diminished or checked (p. 1); hence, all the affective states etc. ; qed.

sc. All actions derived from affective states based on our presence of mind or esprital awareness I consider as part of heroism, which I divide into wholeheartedness and generosity. By wholeheartedness I mean the desire whereby we strive for self-preservation under the exclusive guidance of reason, By generosity I mean the desire whereby we strive, under the sole guidance of reason, to help other people and to win their friendship. Thus I refer to wholeheartedness our actions having in view our own good, and I refer to generosity those of our actions which aim also to the good of others.

Thus, **temperance, sobriety and alertness in danger etc. , are varieties of wholeheartedness**; but **moderation, leniency, etc., are varieties of generosity.** I think I have thus explained and analyzed through their first causes the main affective states and the waverings, which all arise from the combination of the three primary affective states, desire, joy and sorrow. It is evident from what I have said, that we are constantly driven about by external causes in a number of ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds, we toss to and fro ignorant of our future and destiny.

But, as I have said, I have only set forth the chief mental conflicts not all which may exist. For, by proceeding in the same way as above, it would be easy to show that love unites itself to repentance, disdain, shame etc. ; but I think it has already been made clear to all, that human feelings can be combined in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.

For my purpose, however, it is enough to have pointed out the most important; the rest which I have omitted, is more curious than significant. It remains to be said concerning love that, while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for, it very often happens that the body, from the enjoyment, acquires a new disposition whereby it is determined in another way: images of other

things are aroused and we begin to figure and desire something else. For example, when we figure something which usually delights our taste, we desire to enjoy it by eating it. But, whilst we enjoy it, the stomach becomes full, and our body is otherwise disposed. If therefore, while the body is in such a changed disposition, the image of the still present food remains tempting and consequently revives our tendency or desire to eat it, the body will react with repugnance to that tendency and, thus, the presence of the formerly desired food will become odious to us. This revulsion of feeling is called **boredom** and **disgust.** For the rest, I have neglected the outward modification of the body observable in emotions, such for instance as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter etc. , for these refer to the body only, without any reference to the mind.

Lastly, the definitions of some affective states require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them here in order and interpolate here and there such observations as I think should be added.

DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTIVE STATES

af. 1 **DESIRE IS MAN's PROPER BEINGNESS AS, IN ANY GIVEN STATE WE ARE DETERMINED TO SOME ACTION.** Explanation: We have said above (sc. /p. 9) that desire is instinct with consciousness thereof; also that instinct is our proper beingness, insofar as determined to act in view of our self-preservation. But in the same place I also remarked that, strictly speaking, there is no difference between instinct and desire. For, whether we are conscious thereof or not. , it remains one and the same instinct. Thus, in order to avoid tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by instinct; but I have taken care to define it in such a manner as to comprehend, under one head, all those efforts of our nature which we designate by the name of instinct, will, desire, or impulse. I might indeed have said, that desire is man's proper beingness insofar as we are determined to some action; but from such a definition (cf. II. /28) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or instinct. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add: insofar as in any given state etc. For, by a state of our beingness we understand every disposition of it, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be viewed solely under the attribute of Thought, or solely under the attribute of Extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all efforts, impulses, instincts, and volitions, which vary according to everybody's disposition and are, thus, not seldom opposed one to another, according as people are drawn in different directions and know not where to turn.

af. 2 **JOY IS MAN's TRANSITION FROM A LESSER TO A GREATER PERFECTION.**

af. 3 **SORROW IS MAN's TRANSITION FROM A GREATER TO A LESSER PERFECTION.** Explanation: I say transition: for joy is not perfection in itself. Indeed, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same without the feeling of joy. This appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary feeling, sorrow. No one can deny that sorrow consists in the transition to a lesser perfection and not in the lesser perfection itself; for one cannot be sorrowful insofar as one partakes of some perfection. Neither can we say that sorrow consists in the absence of a greater perfection; for, absence is mere nothingness, whereas the feeling of sorrow is a fact which, thus, can only be the fact of transition from a greater to a lesser perfection; i.e. the fact whereby our self-power is lessened or restrained (sc. /p. 11). I pass over the definitions of gaiety, pleasure, affliction and pain, because they mostly refer to the body and are merely kinds of joy or sorrow.

af. 4 **ADMIRATION (AMAZEMENT) IS THE IMAGINATION OF SOMETHING WHEREIN WE REMAIN ENGROSSED BECAUSE ITS SINGULARITY OFFERS NO CONNECTION WITH OTHER IDEAS**. (cf. p. 52 + SC.) Explanation: In II. /18 sc. I have shown the reason why from the contemplation of one thing we fall straightway to the contemplation of another thing, namely because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the other. This however becomes impossible when the image of a thing is new; we will then remain engrossed in the contemplation thereof, until we are determined by other causes to think of something else. Considered in itself, the imagination of a new object is of the same nature as the other imaginations; hence I do not include admiration among the affective states, not do I see why I should, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive causes, but merely from the absence of a cause, which normally determines us to pass from the contemplation of one object to that of another. I therefore recognize only three primitive or primary affective states (cf. sc. /p. 11) namely, joy, sorrow and desire. I have spoken of admiration, simply because it is common practice to call by different names feelings derived from the three primary affective states, when they are referred to an object of our admiration. For the same reason I add here also the definition of:

af. 5 **CONTEMPT IS THE IMAGINATION OF SOMETHING WHICH TOUCHES US SO LITTLE, THAT ITS PRESENCE LEADS US TO IMAGINE THOSE QUALITIES WHICH ARE NOT IN IT, RATHER THAN SUCH AS ARE IN IT.** (cf. p. 52 +sc.)I here. pass over the definitions of respect and disdain for I am not aware that any affective states are named after them.

af. 6 **LOVE IS JOY ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF AN EXTERNAL CAUSE.** Explanation: This definitions explains clearly enough the nature of love; those authors who define love as "the lover's wish to unite himself to the beloved object" express a property but not the nature of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's nature, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties and, as a matter of fact, their definition is generally admitted to be very obscure. On the other hand, it must be noted that when I call a property of love the lover's wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not mean by wish any willingness or any pondering or any free decision of the mind (for I have shown such to be fictitious in II. /48), neither do I mean the desire of being united to the beloved when it is absent, nor of continuing in its presence when it is on hand: for love is conceivable without either of these desires; but by wish I

mean the contentment which is in the lover on account of the beloved's presence, whereby the lover's joy is strengthened, or at least maintained.

af. 7 **HATE IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF AN EXTERNAL CAUSE**. Explanation: Cf. sc. /p. 13 and the above observations for af. 6. as appropriate.

af. 8 **INCLINATION (SYMPATHY) IS JOY ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOMETHING WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, IS CAUSE OF JOY**. (cf. sc. /p. 15)

af. 9 **AVERSION (ANTIPATHY) IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOMETHING WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, IS CAUSE OF SORROW.**

af. 10 **ADORATION IS LOVE TOWARDS ONE WHOM WE ADMIRE.** Explanation: Admirative amazement (p. 52) arises from the novelty of a thing. If therefore it happens that the object be often imagined by us, we shall cease to admire it; thus we see that adoration readily degenerates into simple love.

af. 11 **DERISION IS PLEASURE DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE IMAGINE THE PRESENCE OF SOMETHING CONTEMPTIBLE IN THE OBJECT OF OUR HATRED.** Explanation: Insofar as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny its existence (sc. /p. 52) and to that extent (p. 20) we rejoice. But since we are supposed to hate the object of our derision (sc. /p. 47) that rejoicing is not stable,

af. 12 **HOPE IS AN UNSTEADY JOY ARISING FROM THE IDEA OF SOMETHING FUTURE OR PAST, ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WHICH WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS.**

af. 13 **FEAR IS AN UNSTEADY SORROW ARISING FROM THE IDEA OF SOMETHING FUTURE OR PAST, ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WHICH WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS,** (cf. sc. /p. 18). Explanation: It follows from these definitions that there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he who depends on hope and doubts somehow the issue of the event, is assumed to imagine something which excludes the existence of the expected event, and to this extent he feels sorry (p. 19); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. On the other hand, he who fears because he doubts the issue of something which he hates, also imagines things which exclude the existence of the hated object; to this extent he rejoices and thus hopes that all will turn out as he desires (p. 20).

af. 14 CONFIDENCE IS JOY ARISING FROM THE IDEA OF SOMETHING FUTURE OR PAST, FROM WHICH ALL CAUSE FOR DOUBTING IS REMOVED.

af. 15 DESPAIR IS SORROW ARISING FROM THE IDEA OF SOMETHING FUTURE OR PAST, FROM WHICH ALL CAUSE FOR DOUBTING IS REMOVED. Explanation: Thus, confidence springs from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of the event has been removed. This happens because we imagine things future or past as present and regard them as such, i.e. because we imagine other things which exclude the existence of the causes of our doubt. For, although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II. /31 cor.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have shown that to "feel no doubt" is not the same as to "be quite certain" of a thing (II. /49 sc.). Thus it may happen that at the image of things past or future we experience the same feeling of joy or sorrow as at the image of a present thing; cf. sc. /p. 18.

af. 16 EXULTATION IS JOY ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOMETHING PAST WHICH TURNED OUT UNEXPECTEDLY.

af. 17 DISAPPOINTMENT IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOMETHING PAST WHICH TURNED OUT CONTRARY TO OUR HOPE.

af. 18 COMPASSION IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF EVIL WHICH HAS BEFALLEN SOMEBODY SIMILAR TO US. (cf. sc. /p. 22 & sc. /p. 27).

af. 19 FAVOR (KINDNESS) IS LOVE TOWARDS ONE WHO HAS DONE GOOD TO PEOPLE.

af. 20 INDIGNATION IS HATRED TOWARDS ONE WHO HAS DONE EVIL TO PEOPLE. Explanation: I am aware that these names are employed here in senses somehow different from those usually assigned to them. But my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things. I therefore make use of such words as may convey my. intended meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary sense. This one statement of my method will suffice. As for the cause of the above-named feelings see cor. 1/p. 27 & sc. /p. 22.

af. 21 OVERESTEEM IS, FOR LOVE, RATING SOMEBODY HIGHER THAN IT IS FAIR.

af. 22 DISESTEEM IS, FOR HATRED, RATING SOMEBODY LOWER THAN IT IS FAIR. Explanation: Thus, overesteem is an effect of love and disesteem an effect of hate; so that overesteem may also be defined as love insofar as inducing us to rate a beloved person higher than it is fair. On the other

hand, disesteem may be defined as hate insofar as inducing us to rate a hated person lower than it is fair. Cf. sc. /p. 26.

af. 23 **ENVY IS HATE INSOFAR AS IT MAKES ONE FEEL SORRY AT ANOTHER's GOOD FORTUNE, AND REJOICE AT HIS MISFORTUNE.** Explanation: Envy is generally opposed to pity which, by doing some violence to the current meaning of the word, may be thus defined:

af. 24 **PITY IS LOVE INSOFAR AS IT MAKES ONE REJOICE AT ANOTHER's GOOD FORTUNE AND FEEL SORRY AT HIS MISFORTUNE.** Explanation: Concerning envy see sc. /p. 24 & sc. /32.

So far we have defined feelings arising from joy and sorrow and accompanied by the idea of something **external** as cause, either by itself or incidentally. **I now pass on to those feelings which are accompanied by the idea of something within us as cause.**

af. 25 **SELF-CONTENTMENT IS JOY ARISING FROM THE FACT THAT ONE REGARDS HIMSELF AND HIS SELF-POWER**.

af. 26 **HUMILITY IS SORROW ARISING FROM THE FACT THAT ONE REGARDS HIS POWERLESSNESS.** Explanation: Insofar as self-contentment (or self-esteem) arises from the contemplation of one's self-power, it is opposed to humility; but if one's joy is associated to the idea of some action he believes he has performed by a free decision of his mind, then it is opposed to repentance which we may define as follows:

af. 27 **REPENTANCE IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOME ACT WHICH WE BELIEVE HAVING ACCOMPLISHED BY A FREE DECISION OF OUR MIND.** Explanation: The causes of these feelings have been set forth sc. /p. 51, p. 53, p. 54 & p. 55 +sc. ; concerning the mind's "free decision" cf. II. /35. This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact that it is not surprising at all, if those deeds which are commonly called wrong, be always followed by sorrow, and those which are called right, be followed by joy. We can easily gather from what has been said so far, that this depends mostly on education. Parents by reprobating wrong deeds and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and also by persuading to and praising right conduct, have brought it about that wrong deeds be associated with pain, and right conduct with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same among all men, and, that which some consider sacred, others consider profane, and what some consider honorable, other consider disgraceful. Thus, according as each has been educated, he feels repentance for some action, or boasts of it.

af. 28 PRIDE (ARROGANCE) IS, FOR SELF-LOVE, RATING ONESELF HIGHER THAN IT IS FAIR. Explanation: Thus, pride is different from over-esteem, which latter term is used in reference to an external object. whereas pride applies to one who rates himself higher than it is fair. And, as over-esteem is an effect of love, so is pride an effect of self-love. We may therefore define also pride as self-love or egotism, insofar as it leads one to rate himself(or herself) higher than it is fair I say that no one, because of self-hate, rates himself lower than it is fair and, hence, there is no contrary to pride. I say that no one rates himself lower than it is fair insofar as he imagines that he is incapable of doing this or that. For, whatsoever we imagine that we are incapable of doing, we imagine it of necessity and by that imagination we are so disposed that we really cannot do it. However, if we envisage things which depend only on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man rates himself lower than it is fair. For, it may happen that somebody, sadly viewing his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may rate himself lower than it is fair. if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time, of which he is uncertain. So, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to know anything with certitude, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base etc. , We may also say that somebody rates himself lower than it is fair, when we see him, from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his peers, venture. Hence we can set down as a contrary to pride, an affective state which I will call despondence, for as from self-contentment springs pride, so from humility springs despondence.

af. 29 DESPONDENCE IS, FOR SORROW, RATING ONESELF LOWER THAN IT IS FAIR. Explanation: Nevertheless, we generally oppose humility to pride, being accustomed to pay more attention to the effects of our feelings than to their nature. We are wont to call proud somebody who boasts to much (sc. /p. 30), who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults, and who wished to be first; lastly, who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in rank, On the other hand, we call humble somebody who too often blushes, who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent in his attire. However, humility and despondence are extremely rare. For human nature, as such, strives against these feelings as much as it can (p. 13 & p. 54); hence those, who are believed to be most despondent and humble, happen to be in reality the most ambitious and envious.

af. 30 GLORY (HONOR, VANITY) IS JOY ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOME ACTION OF OUR OWN, WHICH WE IMAGINE TO BE PRAISED BY PEOPLE.

af. 31 SHAME IS SORROW ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF SOME ACTION OF OUR OWN, WHICH WE IMAGINE TO BE BLAMED BY PEOPLE. Explanation: Cf. sc. /p. 30; but we should remark here the difference which exists between shame and bashfulness. Shame is sorrow following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Bashfulness is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains people from committing a wrong deed. Bashfulness is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not a feeling, as I will duly show; however, as I have already said, the names given to affective states are matters rather of custom than indications of their nature.

I have thus explained, as intended, the affective states arising from joy and sorrow. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.

af. 32 **REGRET IS THE DESIRE OR LONGING FOR GETTING SOMETHING, KEPT ALIVE BY THE REMEMBRANCE OF IT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, RESTRAINED BY THE REMEMBRANCE OF OTHER THINGS WHICH EXCLUDE ITS EXISTENCE.** Explanation: As I have already said more than once, by the very fact that we remember a thing, we are disposed towards it with the same feeling as if it were present; but while we are awake, this disposition or tendency is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of the remembered object. Thus, when we remember something which affected us with joy, by that very fact we tend to regard it with the same feeling of joy as though it were present; but this tendency is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of that object. Wherefore, strictly speaking, regret is sorrow opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of something we hate (sc. /p. 47). But as regret is usually seen in reference to desire, I have set it down among the affective states related to desire.

af. 33 **EMULATION IS THE DESIRE OF SOMETHING, ENGENDERED IN US BY THE IMAGINATION THAT OTHERS HAVE THE SAME DESIRE.** Explanation: He who runs away because he sees others doing so, or he who fears because he sees others in fear, or again he who. on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand and moves his body as though his own hand were burnt: such an one can be said to imitate another's emotions, but not to emulate him; not because the reasons of emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only when we imitate in view of things we deem to be decent, useful or pleasant. As to the cause of emulation cf. p. 27 + sc. The reason why this affective state is generally coupled with envy, may be seen from p. 32 +sc.

af. 34 **THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE IS THE DESIRE OR ZEAL SPRINGING FROM LOVE, TO BE GOOD TO ONE WHO, OUT OF LOVE, HAS DONE US SOME GOOD**. (Cf. p. 39 & sc. /p. 41)

af. 35 **BENEVOLENCE IS THE DESIRE TO DO GOOD TO THOSE WHOM WE PITY.** (Cf. sc. /p. 37)

af. 36 **ANGER IS THE DESIRE, WHEREBY WE ARE PROMPTED BY HATE TO HARM WHOM WE HATE.** (Cf. p. 39)

af. 37 **REVENGE IS THE DESIRE, WHEREBY WE ARE PROMPTED BY MUTUAL HATE, TO HARM SOMEBODY WHO, OUT OF HATE, HAS DONE US SOME HARM.** (Cf. cor. 2 + sc. /p. 40)

af. 38 **CRUELTY OR BESTIALITY IS THE DESIRE, WHEREBY SOMEBODY IS PROMPTED TO HARM PEOPLE WE LOVE OR PITY.** Explanation: To cruelty is opposed clemency which is not a passiveness but an esprital power whereby we restrain anger and revenge.

af. 39 **TIMIDITY IS THE DESIRE TO AVOID A GREATER EVIL WHICH WE DREAD, BY UNDERGOING A LESSER EVIL**. (Cf. sc. /p. 39)

af. 40 **DARING IS THE DESIRE WHEREBY SOMEBODY IS PROMPTED TO DO SOMETHING DANGEROUS, WHICH HIS PEERS FEAR TO ATTEMPT.**

af. 41 **COWARDICE IS IMPUTED TO SOMEBODY WHOSE DESIRE IS CHECKED BY THE FEAR OF A DANGER WHICH HIS PEERS DARE TO CONFRONT.** Explanation: Cowardice is therefore nothing else but the fear of some evil which most people are wont not to fear; hence I do not reckon it among the affective states springing from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, from the point of view of desire, it is truly opposed to daring.

af. 42 **CONSTERNATION IS SAID OF SOMEBODY WHOSE DESIRE OF AVOIDING EVIL IS CHECKED BY HIS AMAZEMENT ABOUT THE EVIL WHICH HE FEARS.** Explanation: Consternation is therefore a kind of cowardice. But inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps one so bewildered and wavering, hesitating. that he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, insofar as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his amazement. I say wavering, insofar as we understand the said desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally torments him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not which he may avert of the two. On this subject see sc. /p. 39 & sc. /p. 52. Concerning cowardice and daring see sc. /p. 51.

af. 43 **SOCIABILITY OR COURTESY IS THE DESIRE OF BEHAVING IN A WAY THAT SHOULD PLEASE PEOPLE AND REFRAINING FROM DOING WHICH DISPLEASES THEM.**

af. 44 **AMBITION IS THE IMMODERATE DESIRE OF GLORY.**

Explanation. Ambition is the desire whereby our affectivity as a whole is fostered and strengthened (cf. p. 27 & p. 31); therefore this affective state is almost insurmountable. For, so long as we are taken by any desire, we are at the same time necessarily taken by this one, Says Cicero (*pro Archia cap. 11):* " Even the best men are led by glory. Even those philosophers who write books about despising glory, place their name on the title-page."

af. 45 GLUTTONY IS THE IMMODERATE DESIRE AND LOVE OF FEASTING.

af. 46 DRUNKENNESS IS THE IMMODERATE DESIRE AND LOVE OF DRINKING.

af. 48 LUST IS DESIRE AS WELL AS LOVE OF SEX.

Explanation. Whether this desire of sex be restrained or not, it is still called lust or libido. The last five affective states have no contraries (p. 56). For, courtesy or civility is a kind of ambition(sc. /p. 29). Again, I have already pointed out that temperance, sobriety and chastity indicate a firmness of mind and not a passiveness, Nevertheless, it may happen that an avaricious, an ambitious, or timorous man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking or sex, yet avarice, ambition and fear are not contraries to gluttony, drunkenness and lust. For, an avaricious man most often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another's munificence and expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, as long as he can hope to keep it secret, and, if he lives among drunkards and debauches, he will be more prone to those vices, precisely because he is ambitious. Lastly, timorous people do things which they do not like, and, so a miser, for the sake of avoiding death, should cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less really remain avaricious; so also, if lewd people are sorry because they cannot follow their bent, they do not, because of that cease to be lewd. In fact, these affective involvements are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking etc. , as with the desire and love of such. Therefore, nothing can be opposed to these addictions but generosity and wholeheartedness, as we shall see afterwards. The definitions of jealousy and of some other waverings of the spirit, I pass over in silence; first, because they arise from the compounding of affective states already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive name, which shows that for practical purposes it is sufficient to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is evident from the definitions which we have set forth, that all our affective states spring from desire, joy and sorrow, or rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names, according to its various relations and extrinsic marks.

If we now direct our attention to these primitive affective states and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define affectivity insofar as referred to our mind.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF AFFECTIVITY:

gda. **AN AFFECTIVE STATE CALLED A DISTURBANCE OF THE SPIRIT, IS A CONFUSED IDEA WHEREBY WE AFFIRM OF OUR BODY, OR ANY PART THEREOF, A VITALITY GREATER OR LESS THAN BEFORE AND BY THE PRESENCE OF WHICH WE ARE DETERMINED TO THINK OF ONE THING RATHER THAN OF ANOTHER.** Explanation. I say, first, that an affective state or a passivity of the spirit is a "confused idea". For we have shown that the mind is passive only insofar as it has inadequate or confused ideas (p. 3). I say further "whereby we affirm of our body, or any part thereof a vitality greater or less than before". For, all our ideas of bodies in the thinghood, denote rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. /16. cor. 2) than the nature of an external body. Thus the idea which specifically constitutes our affective state must denote or express the state of our body, or of some of its parts, when its self-power or vitality is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that when I say "a vitality greater or less than before", I do not mean that we compare quantitatively the present state to a previous state of our body, but only that the idea which specifically constitutes our affective state, affirms something of our body which implies more or less reality than before And, inasmuch as the beingness of our mind consists in the fact (II. /11 & 13) that it affirms the actual existence of our own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very beingness of a thing, it follows that we pass to a greater or lesser perfection when we happen to affirm of our body, or of any part thereof, something implying more or less reality than before. When therefore I said above that its self = power or vitality is increased or diminished, I merely meant that we had formed of our own body an idea implying more or less reality. For, the excellence of ideas and the thinking power are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I added "and by the presence of which we are determined to think of one thing rather than of another", so that besides the nature of joy and sorrow, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

PART FOUR: ABOUT HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE STRENGTH OF AFFECTIVITY

PREFACE

Man's incapacity to moderate and check his affectivity, I name bondage: for, when a man is prey to his affectivity, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune; so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing the better way, to follow the worse. Why this is so, and what is good or evil in our affectivity, I intend to show in this fourth part of my Ethics.

But, before I begin, it would be well to make a few remarks on **perfection** and **imperfection**, on **good** and **evil.** When a man has decided to make something and he brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or believes that he knows the intention and aim of its author.

For instance, suppose somebody sees a work (which we will assume to be not yet completed) and knows that the purpose of its author is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end which its author has decided for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention of the maker, he plainly cannot know whether the work be perfect or imperfect.

Such might have been the original meaning of these terms. But, after men had started to form general ideas, to invent various types of houses, buildings, towers etc. , and to prefer certain types to others, it came about that everybody called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, even though it had obviously been completed in accordance with the idea of its maker.

And, presumably for no other reason, one goes on calling perfect or imperfect even natural phenomena which, obviously, are not man-made: for men are wont to form general ideas

of all things, natural as well as man-made, and they hold these ideas as a kind of original patterns or models, and they believe that Nature which in their opinion "does nothing without a purpose, has these same models in view, and has set them as archetypes before herself." Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has fallen short, or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see that people are wont to call natural phenomena perfect or imperfect, rather from their prejudice than from true knowledge thereof. Now, we showed in the Appendix to part I. that Nature does not create with an end in view; for **the eternal and infinite being, which we call God, or Nature, acts and exists with the same necessity**. We have shown (I. /16) that with the same necessity of his nature, with which he exists, he also acts. The reason why God or Nature exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither beginning nor end. Wherefore, **the so called final cause is nothing else but human desire**, insofar as it is considered to be the origin or primary cause of something.

For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that somebody, conceiving the convenience of household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, to be inhabited, insofar as it is regarded as a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is really its efficient cause, it is regarded as the primary cause, because people are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. As I have already often said, people are conscious of their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that "Nature sometimes falls short or blunders, and produces imperfect things" I set down among the fictions treated in the Appendix of part I.

Perfection and imperfection, then, become mere modes of thinking or notions, which we invent, because we are accustomed to compare individuals of a same kind or species. But I said (II. /d. 6) that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For, we are wont to refer all individuals of Nature to one genus which is called the most general genus, namely to the category of being, whereto absolutely all Nature's individuals belong Thus, insofar as we refer Nature's individuals to this category and --comparing them one with the other--find that some possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect than others.

Again, insofar as we attribute to them some properties implying negation--as term, end, incapacity, etc.--we, to this extent, call them imperfect because they do not appeal to our mind so much as the things which we call perfect, and not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or

because Nature has blundered. For, nothing belongs to a thing's nature save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause, necessarily comes to pass.

As for the terms **good** and **bad,** they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but are mere modes of thinking or notions, which we form from the comparison of things one with another. Thus, one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for those who are moody, bad for those who mourn, but neither good nor bad for the deaf. Nevertheless, we shall retain these terms. For, **inasmuch as we intend to form the idea of a man exemplifying the human nature, and to be regarded as a model,** it will be useful to us to apply them in the sense I have indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall call good that which we certainly know to be a means of constant progress towards the model of human nature which we have set before ourselves; by bad, that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said model. Again, we shall say that people are "more perfect" or "more imperfect" inasmuch as they progress more or less towards the same model. However, when I say that somebody passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean that he is transformed from one beingness or kind into another--for instance, a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man, as by being changed into an insect--but only, that his self-power, insofar as referred to his own nature, is found to be increased or diminished.

And lastly (as I have said already), by perfection I shall mean, throughout, reality itself: in other words, each thing's beingness, as it exists and operates in its particular way, without any regard to its duration. For no thing can be said to be more perfect because it has remained a longer time in existence. The duration of things cannot be determined by their beingness, for we have shown that the beingness of things implies no fixed or definite time of existence; but everything, whether it be more perfect, or less perfect, will always be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist, and, in this respect all things are equal.

DEFINITIONS

d. 1 <u>GOOD</u>: THAT WHICH WE CERTAINLY KNOW TO BE USEFUL TO US.

d. 2 <u>EVIL</u>: THAT WHICH WE CERTAINLY KNOW TO BE A HINDRANCE TO US IN THE ATTAINMENT OF ANY GOOD (cf. Preface here, for these definitions)

d. 3 **CONTINGENT: PARTICULAR THINGS WHEN, CONSIDERING THEIR BEINGNESS, WE FIND NOTHING THEREIN WHICH NECESSARILY POSITS OR EXCLUDES THEIR EXISTENCE.**

d. 4 **POSSIBLE: PARTICULAR THINGS WHEN, CONSIDERING THE CAUSES WHEREBY THEY MUST BE PRODUCED, WE KNOW NOT WHETHER THESE CAUSES BE DETERMINED FOR PRODUCING THEM.** In I. /33 sc. 1 I drew no distinction between possible and contingent, because there was no need, at that point, to distinguish them accurately.

d. 5 **CONFLICTING AFFECTIVE STATES: WHICH DRAW US IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, SO THEY BE OF THE SAME KIND e.g. gluttony and avarice, which are both varieties of love and are not contrary by nature, but only incidentally.**

d. 6 **FEELING TOWARDS A THING FUTURE, PAST OR PRESENT: (III. /18)** But we have to remark here that, **exactly as of distances in space, our imagination of distances in time remains distinct only up to a certain limit.** Indeed, all objects distant from us more than 200 feet (i.e. exceeding the distance which we can distinctly imagine) seem to lie all in the same plane and at an equal distance from us; so also, **all objects which are remote in time from the present moment by a longer interval than we can distinctly figure, will seem to us equally remote from the present and we will figure them all as if they belonged to the same period.**

d. 7 **THE END IN VIEW WHEREOF WE DO SOMETHING: THE DESIRE.**

d. 8 **VIRTUE AND POWER: ONE AND THE SAME THING. In speaking of men (III. /7) virtue is man's nature or beingness, inasmuch as he has the power to accomplish things understandable only through the laws of his own nature.**

AXIOM

a. 1 **NO PARTICULAR THING IN THE WORLD CAN BE SAID TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL AND THE STRONGEST, FOR EACH THING WILL, SOONER OR**

LATER, COME UPON ANOTHER MORE POWERFUL, WHEREBY IT CAN BE DESTROYED.

PROPOSITIONS

p. 1 **WHAT IS POSITIVE IN A FALSE IDEA IS NOT ABOLISHED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE TRUE, IN SO FAR AS IT IS TRUE.** Dem.: Falsity consists only in a lack of knowledge which inadequate ideas imply (II. /35)nd there is nothing positive in them which makes them to be called false (II. /33); on the other hand, insofar as referred to God they are true (II. /32). Wherefore, if what is positive in a false idea were abolished by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, a true idea would then be abolished by itself, which (III. /4) is absurd. Therefore, what is positive etc. qed.

sc. This is more clearly understood from II. /16 cor. 2. For, imagination is an idea which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body, than the nature of the external body: indeed, not distinctly, but confusedly, and that's why our mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about 200 feet; in this respect we err so long as we ignore its true distance; now, when its true distance is known, the error is abolished, but not the imagination, i.e. the idea of the sun which explains the sun's nature only insofar as our body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on a surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein our mind is deceived--whether they indicate a normal state of our body, or a state of increased or diminished self-power--they are not contrary to what is true and do not vanish in its presence. It happens, indeed, that when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings, but the contrary also happens; namely, while we fear an evil which will certainly come, our fear vanishes by hearing some false tidings. Hence, imaginations do not vanish in the presence of truth as such, but because of other imaginations, stronger than the first, come to the foreground and exclude the present existence of what we imagined (II. /17).

p. 2 **WE SUFFER INASMUCH AS WE ARE A PART OF NATURE WHICH BY ITSELF AND WITHOUT THE OTHERS IS UNTHINKABLE.** Dem.: We suffer when

something arises in us whereof we are only a partial cause (III. /d. 2) i.e. (III. /d. 1) something which is not explainable through the laws of our nature alone. Hence, we suffer etc. , qed.

p. 3 **THE FORCE WHEREBY WE PERSIST IN EXISTENCE IS LIMITED AND INFINITELY SURPASSED BY THE FORCE OF EXTERNAL CAUSES.** Dem.: Evident from a. 1 For, whenever a man is, there is always something else e.g. "A" more powerful, and given it, "B" which surpasses it, and so on to infinity. qed.

p. 4 **IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT WE CEASE TO BE PART OF NATURE AND THAT WE UNDERGO ONLY THOSE CHANGES WHICH RESULT FROM OUR OWN NATURE AND WHEREOF WE ARE THE ADEQUATE CAUSE.** Dem.: The power whereby each particular thing, and man also, preserves his being, is the very power of God or Nature (I. /24 cor.). not insofar that power is infinite, but as explained by the actual beingness of that thing, here of ourselves (III. /7). Thus, insofar as explained through our actual beingness, our self-power is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, i.e. of God's infinite beingness (I. /34). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible that man should undergo only those changes which result from and are understandable solely through his own nature, it would follow (III. /4 & 6) that he could not die, but would always necessarily exist. Now, this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power be either finite or infinite; namely the power of man only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes i.e. the infinite power of Nature: inasmuch as all things would be so ordered that man should undergo no other changes than those tending towards his self-preservation. But the first alternative is absurd by p. 3. the proof of which is universal and applies to all particular things. Hence, if it be possible that man should undergo only those changes which result from his own nature and, consequently, that he should necessarily always exist: such a result would be assumed to follow from the infinite power of God and, consequently (I. /16) from the necessity of the divine nature, insofar as God is disposed by the idea of any particular man, the whole order of Nature, as viewed through the attributes of Extension and Thought, should be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. /21) that man be infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. qed. Hence:

cor. **WE ARE NECESSARILY ALWAYS EXPOSED TO SUFFERINGS, ALWAYS SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ORDER OF NATURE, AND ALWAYS ADAPTING OURSELVES THERETO, AS REALITY DEMANDS IT.**

p. 5 **THE POWER AND INCREMENT OF ANY SUFFERING AND ITS PERSISTENCE ARE NOT DEFINED BY THE POWER WHEREBY WE STRIVE FOR SELF-PRESERVATION, BUT BY THE POWER OF SOME EXTERNAL CAUSE IN COMPOSITION WITH OUR SELF-POWER.** Dem.: The nature of a suffering(passivity)cannot be explained through our nature alone (III. /d. 1 & 2.) i.e. (III. /7) the power of a suffering cannot be defined by the power whereby we strive for self-preservation but (II. /16) must necessarily be defined by the power of some external cause in composition with our self-power. qed.

p. 6 **THE FORCE OF ANY SUFFERING OR AFFECTIVE STATE CAN SURPASS THE REST OF ONE's ACTIVITIES AND POWER, TO THE POINT THAT IT OBSTINATELY STICKS TO HIM.** Dem.: The force and increment of any suffering, and its persistence, are defined by the power of some external cause in composition with our self-power (p. 5), therefore (p. 3)the force of any suffering etc. , qed.

p. 7 **AN AFFECTIVE STATE CAN ONLY BE RESTRAINED OR REMOVED BY ANOTHER AFFECTIVE STATE, CONTRARY THERETO AND STRONGER THAN THE ONE TO BE RESTRAINED.** Dem.: An affective state, referred to our mind, is an idea whereby we affirm of our body more or less vitality as before (III. / gda.). When therefore we are assailed by any affective state, our body is at the same time experiencing a state whereby its self-power is increased or diminished. Now, this sensation(p. 5) receives from its cause the force to persist; which force can only be restrained or abolished by a bodily cause (II. /6) disposing our body in a way (III. /5) contrary to and stronger than itself (a. 1); wherefore (II. /12) our mind will be affected by the idea of a sensation contrary to and stronger than the former sensation, i.e. (III. /gda.) we will be determined to think of that other and stronger than the former, and this new affective state will exclude or remove the existence of the former. qed. Hence:

cor. **AN AFFECTIVE STATE, AS REFERRED TO THE MIND, CAN ONLY BE RESTRAINED OR REMOVED BY THE IDEA OF A SENSATION CONTRARY TO AND STRONGER THAN THAT WHICH MAKES US SUFFER.** For, the affective states which make us suffer, can be restrained or removed only by a contrary one, and stronger than itself i.e. (III. /gda.) only by an idea of a disposition of the body (sensation) contrary to and stronger than the disposition which makes us suffer.

p. 8 **THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL IS NOTHING BUT A FEELING OF JOY OR SORROW, INSOFAR AS WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF IT.** Dem.: We call a thing good or bad, when it is useful or harmful to our self-preservation (d. 1 & 2) i.e. (III. /7) when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our self-power. Thus, insofar as we perceive that a thing disposes us with joy or sorrow (III. /11 sc,) we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the idea of joy or sorrow, which necessarily follows from the respective feeling (II. /22). But this idea is united to the feeling in the same way as mind is united to body (II. /21) i.e. there is no real distinction between this idea and the feeling or idea of the sensation, except with regard to the concept. Therefore, the knowledge of good and evil etc. , qed.

p. 9 **AN AFFECTIVE STATE WHEREOF WE IMAGINE THE CAUSE TO BE WITH US AT THE PRESENT, IS STRONGER THAN IF WE DID NOT IMAGINE THAT CAUSE TO BE WITH US.** Dem.: Imagination is the idea by which we regard a thing as present (II. /17 sc.) but which indicates a state of mind rather than the nature of the represented external thing

(II. /16 cor. 2). An affective state is therefore an imagination, inasmuch as it indicates a sensation. But, an imagination (II. /17) is stronger when we do not. figure something which excludes the existence of the external object; hence an affective state etc. , qed.

sc. When I said (III. /18) that by the image of a thing past or future we are affected with the same feeling as if the imagined thing were present, I expressly stated that this is only true in respect to the imagined thing (for its nature is unchanged, whether we imagine it or not). I did not deny that the image becomes weaker when we regard as present other things which exclude, in the present, the existence of some future object. I did not call expressly attention to that fact, because I intended to treat only in this part of the strength of affectivity.

cor. THE IMAGE OF SOMETHING PAST OR FUTURE, OR OF A THING WHICH WE REGARD IN RELATION WITH TIME PAST OR FUTURE, EXCLUDING THE PRESENT, IS RELATIVELY WEAKER THAN THE IMAGE OF SOMETHING PRESENT; CONSEQUENTLY, THE FEELING TOWARDS SOMETHING PAST OR FUTURE IS RELATIVELY LESS INTENSE THAN THE FEELING TOWARDS SOMETHING PRESENT.

p. 10 TOWARDS SOMETHING FUTURE WHICH WE IMAGINE AS CLOSE AT HAND, WE ARE MORE INTENSELY AFFECTED THAN IF WE IMAGINE ITS COMING REMOTE FROM THE PRESENT; SIMILARLY, IN REMEMBERING SOMETHING WHICH JUST CAME TO PASS, WE ARE MORE INTENSELY AFFECTED THAN IF WE IMAGINE THAT IT HAD HAPPENED LONGTIME AGO. Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing as close at hand or as just happened, we pay less attention to the things which exclude its presence, then if we regarded its coming more remote or its passing away as having taken place longtime ago(which is obvious); hence, towards something future etc.

sc. It follows from our remarks to d. 6 that if objects are remote from the present by an interval of time exceeding the limits of distinct imagining, our feelings towards all of them will be equally tuned down, though we know that their occurrences were separated by a great distance of time.

p. 11 THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING WHICH WE IMAGINE AS NECESSARY, IS RELATIVELY MORE INTENSE THAN THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING WHICH WE IMAGINE AS POSSIBLE OR CONTINGENT i.e. AS NOT NECESSARY. Dem.: To the extent as we imagine a thing as necessary, we affirm its existence; on the other

hand, we deny a thing's existence insofar as we imagine it as not necessary (I. /33 sc,); hence, (p. 9) the feeling etc. , qed.

p. 12 **THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING WHICH DOES NOT PRESENTLY EXIST AND WHICH WE IMAGINE AS POSSIBLE, IS RELATIVELY MORE INTENSE THAN THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING WHICH WE IMAGINE AS CONTINGENT.** Dem.: In considering a thing as contingent we do not imagine other things which affirm its existence(d. 3); on the contrary, by our hypothesis, we do imagine some things which exclude its present existence. But if we consider a thing to be possible in the future, we thereby imagine things which affirm its existence (p. 4) i.e. (III. /18) things which promote hope and fear; hence, the feeling towards etc.

cor. **THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING WHICH DOES NOT PRESENTLY EXIST AND WHICH WE IMAGINE AS CONTINGENT IS MUCH WEAKER THAN THE FEELING TOWARDS A THING PRESENT TO US**. Dem.: The feeling towards a thing supposed to exist, is more intense than towards one supposed to come in the future (cor. /p. 9) and far more intense if that future be supposed very remote (p. 10). Hence, the feeling towards a remote thing is much weaker than towards a thing imagined as present to us; but it is still more intense than if we imagined that thing as contingent. Wherefore etc. , qed.

p. 13 **FEELINGS TOWARDS A THING WHICH DOES NOT PRESENTLY EXIST AND WHICH WE IMAGINE AS CONTINGENT, ARE RELATIVELY WEAKER THAN FEELINGS TOWARDS A THING OF THE PAST.** Dem.: In so far as we imagine a thing as contingent we are not affected by the image of any other thing which posits the existence of the former (d. 3); on the contrary, by our hypothesis, we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But, insofar as we imagine the thing in relation to the past, we are assumed to imagine something which recalls it to memory, or revives its image (II. /18 + sc.)and to that extent makes us regard it as present (II. /17 cor,) Hence, feelings etc. ,

p. 14 **THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, AS SUCH, CANNOT RESTRAIN ANY AFFECTIVE STATE, BUT ONLY INSOFAR AS IT IS ALSO CONSIDERED AS AN AFFECTIVE STATE.** Dem.: An affective state is an idea whereby we affirm of our body a greater or lesser force of existing as before (III. / gda.); it has therefore no positive element which could be abolished by the presence of truth; consequently, the true knowledge of good and evil, as such, cannot restrain any affective state. But, insofar as such a knowledge is an affective state (p. 8) and stronger than the one to be restrained, it will to that extent be able to restrain the former. qed.

p. 15 **THE DESIRE ARISING FROM THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL MAY BE SUPPRESSED OR RESTRAINED BY MANY OTHER DESIRES**

ARISING FROM AFFECTIVE STATES WHICH ARE SUFFERINGS. Dem.: From the true knowledge of good and evil, inasmuch as it is an affective state, necessarily arises desire (III. /af. 1) with a strength directly proportional to the strength of the emotion from which it arises (III. /37). But inasmuch as this desire is due to the fact that we understand something truly (by our hypothesis) it will also be present with us in our activity (III. /1) and must therefore be understood through our beingness (III. /d, 2); consequently, (III. /7) its force and increment must be defined by our self-power. Again, the strength of desires arising from sufferings is proportional to the strength of these affective states; wherefore their force and increment (p. 5) must be defined by the power of external causes in composition with our self-power, which (p. 3) infinitely surpasses it. Hence, the desire arising from the true knowledge etc. , qed.

p. 16 THE DESIRE ARISING FROM THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, INSOFAR AS THAT KNOWLEDGE HAS IN VIEW THE FUTURE, MAY BE SUPPRESSED OR RESTRAINED EVEN EASIER BY THE DESIRE OF THINGS WHICH ARE AGREEABLE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT. Dem.: Feelings towards a future thing are relatively weaker than those towards a present one. (cor. /p. 9). But the desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it is concerned with things good at the present moment, may be suppressed or restrained by any capricious desire (the proof of p. 15 being of universal validity). Wherefore, the desire arising from etc. qed.

p. 17 THE DESIRE ARISING FROM THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, INSOFAR THAT KNOWLEDGE HAS IN VIEW CONTINGENT THINGS, MAY BE SUPPRESSED OR RESTRAINED STILL EASIER BY THE DESIRE OF PRESENT THINGS. Dem.: Similar as for p. 16: from cor. /p. 12.

sc. I think I have thus shown the cause why people are moved more readily by opinion than by true reason, and why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up disturbances in our spirit, but often yields to every kind of caprice. That is why the poet says (Ovid. Met. VII. 20): "I see what's better and praise it highly, but I follow what's worse." Ecclesiastes (I. 18) seems to have had the same thought in mind when he says: "He who increases his knowledge, increases his pain."

If I say so, it is not to draw the conclusion that ignorance be preferable to knowledge, or that there be no difference between a wise man and a fool in the way they moderate their affectivity, but because **it is necessary to know the power as well as the weakness of our nature,** before we can determine what reason can do in restraining affectivity, and what is beyond her power. But, as I have said, in this part I shall merely treat of human weakness. The power of reason over our affectivity, I have settled to treat in part V.

p. 18 THE DESIRE ARISING FROM JOY IS RELATIVELY STRONGER THAN THE ONE ARISING FROM SORROW. Dem.: Desire is man's beingness (III. /af. 1) i.e. the effort whereby we strive to persist in our being. Wherefore the desire arising from joy is increased or helped by the very feeling of joy (III. /11 sc.); on the contrary, the desire arising from sorrow is diminished or hindered by the very feeling of sorrow; hence the strength of the desire arising from joy must be defined by our self-power concurrently with the power of an external. cause, whereas the desire arising from sorrow must be defined by our self-power alone. Thus, the former is the stronger of the two. qed.

sc. In these few propositions I have explained the cause of human weakness and inconstancy, and shown why people do not abide by the precepts of reason. It now remains to show what it is that reason prescribes us to do and, also, which affective states agree with the rules of reason and which are contrary thereto.

But before we begin to prove them in detail by our usual method ***more geometrico*****,** it is advisable to give here a short account of the **commandments of reason,** so that everybody may grasp easier what I have in mind.

Reason makes never demands contrary to nature, **for reason itself requires that everyone should love himself, that everyone should seek his self-interest**--I mean, what is really his interest--**in pursuing everything which is really conducive to a greater perfection and, absolutely speaking, that everyone should tend to preserve his own being, as much as he can**, This is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its parts (III. /4). Then, as virtue is nothing else (d. 8) but to act in accordance with the laws of one's own nature, and as nobody strives to preserve himself (III. /7) otherwise than according to the laws of his own nature, it follows **first**: that **THE URGE TO PRESERVE ONESELF IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF VIRTUE** and that our happiness consists in our ability to preserve our own being. It follows **secondly**: that **VIRTUE IS DESIRABLE FOR HER OWN SAKE** and that, besides her, nothing is more excellent or more useful to us, nor more desirable. It follows **thirdly** and lastly: that **THOSE WHO COMMIT SUICIDE ARE WEAK-MINDED** and are overcome by external causes, hostile to their own nature.

It follows further, from II. /po. 4 that we will never be able to free ourselves from the need of external things in view of our self-preservation, so as to make our life completely independent from our environment; as for our mind, it is obvious that our intellect would be more imperfect if we were alone and had nothing to understand besides our own concerns. In fact there are many things in the world which are useful to us and hence desirable. But of such, none can be compared in excellence to those who agree completely with our own nature. Indeed, if e.g. two individuals of the same nature are united, they form a compound twice as powerful as either of them singly. **Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man.** Nothing

better, I repeat, for preserving their being, can be wished for by people, than that they all be in complete agreement, so as to form all together, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and **that all should strive together for their self-preservation and seek what is useful to them all.**

It follows finally that those who are governed by reason, i.e. who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves nothing which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind and, to that extent, such men are just, faithful and honest.

Such are the commandments of reason which I intended to indicate briefly, before beginning to prove them in detail. I have taken this course, in order to gain the attention of those who believe that our principle--I mean, that everybody is bound to seek his self-interest--is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue. As we have thus shown that the contrary is the case, I will go on with my proofs by the same method as that whereby we have proceeded up to now.

p. 19 **EVERYBODY, BY THE LAWS OF HIS OWN NATURE, DESIRES NECESSARILY WHAT HE DEEMS TO BE GOOD, AND AVOIDS WHAT HE DEEMS TO BE EVIL.** Dem.: The knowledge of good and evil is (p. 8) nothing but a feeling of joy or sorrow, insofar as we are conscious of it; hence (III. /28) everybody necessarily desires that what he deems to be good, and avoids what he deems to be evil. Now, this desire is nothing but one's proper beingness or nature (III. /9 sc. & af. 1.) Therefore, everybody etc. qed.

p. 20 **THE MORE ONE STRIVES AND IS ABLE TO SEEK HIS SELF-INTEREST i.e. TO PRESERVE HIS OWN BEING--THE MORE ONE IS ENDOWED WITH VIRTUE; ON THE CONTRARY, INASMUCH AS ONE NEGLECTS TO SEEK HIS SELF-INTEREST i.e. TO PRESERVE HIS OWN BEING, ONE IS WEAK.** Dem.: Virtue is one's self-power, which is defined solely by his beingness(d. 8) i.e. (III. /7) by his effort of self-preservation. Wherefore, the more etc.

sc. No one therefore, neglects seeking his self-interest, or preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and hostile to his own nature. No one, I say, by the necessity of his own nature, dislikes food or kills himself, unless he be compelled by external causes: which may happen in many ways. Somebody for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another, when his right hand, wherewith he picked up a sword, is twisted around and forced to push the blade against his own chest; or again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins--that is to escape a greater evil by incurring a lesser; or lastly, some hidden external causes may affect his imagination and so dispose his body that it takes on a

nature hostile to its former one and whereof the idea cannot exist in his mind (III., 10). But, that somebody, from the necessity of his own nature, should seek annihilation or transmutation, is as impossible as that something be created out of nothing; everybody will O. K. that after some reflection

p. 21 **NOBODY CAN DESIRE TO BE HAPPY, TO ACT WELL, AND TO LIVE WELL, WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME WISHING TO BE, TO ACT, AND TO LIVE--IN OTHERS WORDS, SIMPLY TO EXIST.** Dem.: This is self-evident, and also plain from the definition of desire. For the desire of living well, or happily, of acting well etc. , is (III. /af. 1) one's proper beingness, i.e. (III. /7) one's effort for self-preservation. Therefore, nobody can desire to be happy etc. , qed.

p. 22 **NO VIRTUE IS THINKABLE PRIOR TO THIS (EFFORT OF SELF-PRESERVATION).** Dem.: The effort of self-preservation is one's proper beingness (III. /7) hence, if any virtue were thinkable prior thereto, the individual's beingness would have to be thinkable prior to itself, which is plainly absurd. Therefore, no virtue is thinkable prior to this. qed.

cor. **THE EFFORT OF SELF-PRESERVATION IS THE FIRST AND ONLY FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE.** **For, prior to this principle nothing is thinkable (p. 22) and without it no virtue is thinkable (p. 21).**

p. 23 **INASMUCH AS WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO SOMETHING OUT OF INADEQUATE IDEAS, WE CANNOT BE SAID TO ACT ABSOLUTELY OUT OF VIRTUE, BUT ONLY INSOFAR AS WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO SOMETHING BECAUSE WE UNDERSTAND.** Dem.: Inasmuch as we are determined to do something out of inadequate ideas, we suffer (III. /1) i.e. (III. /d. 1 & 2) we do something which cannot be explained solely through our beingness, that is (III. /d. 8) which does not follow from our virtue. But, insofar as we are determined thereto because we understand, we are active i.e. we do something which is explicable through our beingness alone, or which adequately follows from our virtue. Therefore, inasmuch as we are determined etc. qed.

p. 24 **TO ACT ABSOLUTELY OUT OF VIRTUE, IS FOR US NOTHING ELSE THAN TO ACT, TO LIVE, OR TO PRESERVE OUR BEING (WHICH THREE ARE IDENTICAL) UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON AND ON THE BASIS OF SEEKING OUR SELF-INTEREST.** Dem.: To act absolutely out of virtue, is nothing else (d. 8) but to act in accordance with the laws of one's own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (III. /3); hence, (cor. /p. 22) to act absolutely out of virtue is for us etc. , qed.

p. 25 NOBODY STRIVES TO PRESERVE HIS OWN BEING FOR THE SAKE OF SOMETHING (OR OF SOMEBODY) ELSE. Dem.: The effort by which everything strives to persist in its being is defined solely by the beingness of the thing itself (III. /7); from this alone, and not from the beingness of something else, it necessarily follows (III. /6)that everybody strives to preserve his own being. Moreover this proposition is plain from cor, /p. 22; for, if somebody should strive to preserve himself for the sake of something else, that thing would have to be the basis of virtue, which is absurd. qed.

p. 26 ALL WE SEEK THROUGH REASON IS TO UNDERSTAND AND, INSOFAR AS WE MAKE USE OF REASON, WE DO NOT JUDGE ANYTHING TO BE USEFUL TO US, SAVE WHAT IS CONDUCIVE TO UNDERSTANDING. Dem.: The effort by which each thing strives to persist in its being is nothing else but that thing's actual beingness (III. /7) and insofar as it exists, it has also the force for continuing in existence (III. /6) and for doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (cf. III. /9 sc. for the definition of instinct). But **reason as such is nothing else but our own mind insofar as we clearly and distinctly understand** (cf. its definition in II. /40 sc. 2). Therefore, whatever we seek through reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this our mental effort (by which we strive with rationality to preserve our being) is nothing else but understanding, this endeavor to understand (cor, /p. 22) is the first and only foundation of virtue, Furthermore, **our endeavor to understand things will not have in view some final objective** (p. 25), for insofar as we are rational (thinking logically) we find good only those things which are conducive to understanding (d. 1).

p. 27 WE KNOW WITH CERTAINTY TO BE GOOD THAT ONLY WHICH MAKES US REALLY UNDERSTAND, AND TO BE EVIL THAT ONLY WHICH CAN PREVENT US FROM UNDERSTANDING. Dem.: Insofar as we are thinking logically (rationally) we endeavor only to understand, and judge nothing to be useful to ourselves, save such things as are conducive to understanding (p. 26). But, we cannot possess any certainty (II. /41 & 43 + sc.) except insofar as we have adequate ideas i.e. (II. /40 sc,) insofar we reason. qed.

p. 28 OUR HIGHEST GOOD IS THE AWARENESS OF GOD, AND OUR HIGHEST VIRTUE IS TO BE AWARE OF GOD. Dem.: The highest that we can understand is God, i.e. (I. /d. 6) the absolutely infinite being, without which (I. /15) a thing is neither possible nor thinkable. Therefore, our highest interest or good (d. 1) is our awareness of God. Again, we are active only insofar as we understand (III. /1 & 3) and to that extent only can we be said to act absolutely out of virtue (p. 23). The mind's absolute virtue is to understand. Now, as we have already shown, the highest that we can understand is God; therefore, our highest virtue is to be (intellectually) aware of God. qed.

p. 29 A PARTICULAR THING WHICH, BY NATURE, COMPLETELY DIFFERS FROM US, CAN NEITHER HELP NOR RESTRAIN OUR SELF-POWER AND, ABSOLUTELY SPEAKING, NOTHING CAN DO US GOOD OR HARM, UNLESS IT HAS SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH US. Dem.: The power of any

particular thing, and consequently our self-power, whereby we exist and operate (II. /10 cor.) can only be limited by another particular thing (I. /28) whose nature (II. /6) must be understood through the same attribute as that through which our own nature is explained. Therefore our self-power, no matter how it be explained, can be determined and consequently helped or restrained, by the power of another particular thing which has something in common with us, but not by the power of something which differs completely from us; and since we call good or bad that which is cause of joy or sorrow (p. 8) i.e. (III. /11 sc,) which increases or diminishes, helps or restrains our self-power, a particular thing which by nature etc.

p. 30 **A THING CANNOT BE BAD THROUGH WHAT IT HAS IN COMMON WITH OUR NATURE, BUT INASMUCH AS IT IS BAD FOR US, IT IS CONTRARY TO OUR NATURE.** Dem.: We call a thing bad when it is cause of sorrow (p. 8) i.e. (III. /11 sc.) when it diminishes or restrains our self-power. Hence, if something were bad for us through what it has in common with our nature, it could also diminish or restrain that which it has in common with our nature, which is evidently (III. /4) absurd. qed.

p. 31 **INASMUCH AS A THING AGREES WITH OUR NATURE, IT IS NECESSARILY GOOD.** Dem.: Inasmuch as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be bad (p. 30), it will then necessarily be either good or indifferent. If we assume it to be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (d. 1) for our self-preservation, nor(by the hypothesis) to preserve the thing's own nature; but this (III. /6) is absurd.

cor. **THE MORE A THING AGREES WITH OUR NATURE, THE MORE IT IS USEFUL OR GOOD FOR US, AND VICE VERSA, THE MORE IT IS USEFUL, THE MORE IT AGREES WITH OUR NATURE.** For, inasmuch as it does not agree with our nature, it will be necessarily different from us or contrary to us. If different, it can neither be good nor bad (p. 29); if contrary, it will be contrary also to what it has in common with our nature, i.e. contrary to what is good, and hence bad. Therefore, nothing can be good, except in so far as it agrees with our nature. Hence, the more a thing agrees etc. , qed.

p. 32 **INASMUCH AS PEOPLE ARE DOMINATED BY AFFECTIVITY, THEY CANNOT BE SAID TO BE NATURALLY IN AGREEMENT.** Dem.: Things which are said to be naturally in agreement, are so in strength, but not in weakness or in negation (III. /7), and consequently (III. /3 sc.) not in passiveness. Hence, inasmuch as people are dominated etc. qed.

sc. This is self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that they do not agree in any respect. Also, if somebody says that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite, weak, not existing by the necessity of their own nature or, lastly, that both are infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes--he

simply does affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither has, do not agree at all.

p. 33 PEOPLE CAN DIFFER IN NATURE, INSOFAR AS THEY ARE AGITATED BY AFFECTIVE STATES WHICH ARE SUFFERINGS, AND TO THIS EXTENT WE, ALL, ARE UNSTABLE AND CAPRICIOUS. Dem.: The nature of affectivity is not explainable through our nature alone (III. /d. 1 & 2)but must be defined by the power i.e. (III. /7) by the nature of external causes in composition with our own. ; hence it follows that there are as many varieties of each affective involvement as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III. /56) and that people may be differently affected by one and the same object (III. /51) and to this extent may differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same person may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be unstable and capricious. qed.

p. 34 INSOFAR AS PEOPLE ARE AGITATED BY AFFECTIVE STATES WHICH ARE SUFFERINGS, THEY CAN BE CONTRARY ONE TO ANOTHER.

Dem One, e.g. Peter, can be the cause of Paul's dislike, because he (Peter) has in his possession something similar to what Paul hates (III. /16), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. /32 +sc.) or for other reasons--of which the chief are enumerated in III. /55 sc. It may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter (III. /af. 7), consequently it may easily happen also that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should attempt to injure the other (III>/39) i.e. (p. 30) that they be contrary one to another. But a feeling of dislike or sorrow is always a suffering (III. /59); hence, insofar as people etc. , qed.

sc. I said that Paul may hate Peter because he imagines that Peter has something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems to follow, at first sight, that these two men, through both loving the same thing and, thus, through agreement of their respective natures, stand ***ipso facto*** in one another's way; if this were so, p. 30 and p. 31 would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that all this is quite consistent. For the two men are not in one another's way through the agreement of their natures i.e. through both loving the same object, but insofar only as they differ one from the other. For, inasmuch as each loves the same object, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. /31) i.e. (III. /af. 6) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Thus, it is far from being the case that they stand in one another's way inasmuch as they love the some thing and agree in their natures. The cause of their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence, the one will rejoice and the other will be saddened, and they will be at variance one with the other. We can easily show in like manner that all the other cases of hatred depend solely on differences and not on the agreement of nature.

p. 35 ONLY INSOFAR AS MEN LIVE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON, DO THEY ALWAYS AND NECESSARILY AGREE IN NATURE. Dem.: Insofar as people are agitated by affective states which are sufferings, they can differ in nature (p. 33) and be at variance one with another. But we are said to be active only insofar as we live under the guidance of reason (III. /3); therefore, all which follows from our nature insofar as it is defined by reason (III. /d. 2) must be understood solely through our own nature as its proximate cause. But, since by the laws of his own nature everybody desires that which he deems good, and avoids that which he deems bad, (p. 19), and further, since that which we deem good or bad, under the guidance of reason, necessarily is good or bad ((II. /41), it follows that men, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason, necessarily do such things as are good for them as human beings, and thus good for each person (cor. /p. 31), i.e. which agree with each man's nature. Hence, only insofar as men etc.

cor. 1 NOTHING IN THE WORLD IS MORE USEFUL TO US THAN A MAN LIVING UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON. For that is most useful to us which agrees most with our nature (cor. /p. 31) i.e. as obvious, a human being. But a man acts absolutely in accordance with the laws of his nature when he lives under the guidance of reason(III. /d, 2) and only to this extent is he always and necessarily in agreement with the nature of somebody else. Hence, nothing in the world etc. , qed.

cor. 2 WHERE EVERYBODY SEEKS TO THE MAXIMUM HIS SELF-INTEREST, THERE PEOPLE BECOME MOST USEFUL ONE TO ANOTHER. For. the more everybody seeks his self-interest and strives to preserve himself, the more he is endowed with virtue (p. 20)i.e. (d. 8) the more he is able to act according to the law of his own nature, i.e. to live under the guidance of reason. But men are most in agreement when they live under the guidance of reason (p. 35); hence, where everybody seeks to the maximum etc. , qed.

sc. What we have just shown is attested so conspicuously by experience, that it is in the mouth of almost everybody: "Man is to man a god." Yet, it rarely happens that men live under the guidance of reason, for things are so ordered among us that people are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless, people are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, people do derive from social life much more convenience than damage. Also, let satirists laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians express their abhorrence, and let maniacs praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity and let them heap contempt on men and praise on beasts --when all is said, they will find that **men can provide for their wants much more easily by <u>mutual aid</u> and that <u>only by uniting their forces</u>, can they escape from the dangers which all around beset them,** not to say how more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is to study the behavior of man, than the behavior of beasts. But I will treat of this more at length in some other place.

p. 36 THE HIGHEST GOOD OF THOSE WHO FOLLOW VIRTUE IS COMMON TO ALL, AND ALL CAN EQUALLY REJOICE THEREIN. Dem.: To act in conformity with

virtue is to act under the guidance of reason (p. 24) and all we seek under her guidance is to understand (p. 26); hence (p. 28) for those who follow virtue, the highest good is to be aware of God; i.e. (II. /47 + sc.) a good which is common to all and which can be possessed by all human beings equally, inasmuch as they are of the same nature. Hence, the highest good etc. , qed.

sc. Someone may ask how it would be if the highest good of those who follow virtue, were not common to all? Would it then not follow from p. 34 that humans living under the guidance of reason, i.e. (p. 35) insofar as they agree in nature, be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry I make answer: it is not by mere coincidence, but by the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it follows from the very beingness of man, as defined by reason; and, because man is neither possible nor thinkable without the ability to rejoice in this highest good. For, **it belongs to the beingness of our mind (II. /47) to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite beingness of God.**

p. 37 THE GOOD WHICH A FOLLOWER OF VIRTUE SEEKS FOR HIMSELF, HE WILL ALSO DESIRE FOR EVERYBODY AND SO MUCH, THE GREATER HIS (ESPRITAL) AWARENESS OF GOD. Dem.: Humans, insofar as they live under the guidance of reason, are most useful to their fellow men (cor. 1/p. 35); therefore (p. 19) they attempt to bring it about that others should also live under the guidance of reason. But the good which a follower of virtue (p. 24) seeks for himself, is to understand (p. 26) and, thus, he will desire it also for others. Again, as referred to the mind, desire is its very beingness (III. /af. 1); now, our mind's beingness consists in knowledge (II. /11) which implies the esprital awareness of God (II. /47), without which (I. /15) it is neither possible nor thinkable. Hence, the good which a follower etc. , qed. Another dem.: The good which somebody desires for himself and loves, he will love it more constantly if he sees that others love it also (II. /31); he will therefore attempt that others should love it also; and as the good in question is common to all, and as all can rejoice therein, he will attempt, for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice therein, and the more so (III. /37) as his own enjoyment of the good is greater. qed.

sc. 1 He who, through mere affectivity, attempts to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse and inspires hatred, especially to those who take delight in something different and, by a similar zeal, try to bring it about that people live according to their fancy. Again, as the highest good sought through affectivity, is often such that it can be possessed only by a single person, it follows that those who love it are not really self-confident and, while they enjoy speaking of the beloved's perfection, they fear to be believed.

But he, who seeks to lead people by reason, does not act by zeal, but courteously and kindly, and is absolutely self-confident. Subsequently, whatever we do spontaneously and desire,

insofar as we have the esprital awareness and idea of God, I set down to **faith.** The desire of well-doing, due to the fact that we live under the guidance of reason, I call **devotedmess**. Further, the desire, whereby he who lives under the guidance of reason endeavors to associate others with himself in friendship, I call **honesty** By **honest** I mean that which is praised by those living under the guidance of reason, and by **dishonest** that which prevents the establishment of friendships.

In addition, I have also shown the foundations of the **State.** As to the difference which exists between true virtue and powerlessness, one may gather it readily from what has been said so far; namely, that **true virtue is nothing else but the fact of living exclusively under the guidance of reason;** while powerlessness is nothing else but one's passiveness to be led by external things and to be determined by them to operate in a way demanded by circumstances, rather than according to the needs of one's own nature. Such are the points which I engaged to prove in p. 18, whereby it is plain that **the law against the slaughtering of animals is based rather on vain superstition and womanish pity, than on sound reason.** Indeed, the rational quest of our interest teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts or with things whose nature is different from our own; for we have the same right over them, as they have over us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts, than beasts over men. Still I do not deny that beasts have feelings: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own interest and use them as we please and in treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature does not agree with our nature, and their affectivity is different by nature from human affectivity (III. /57 sc,). It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, by fault and merit. On these see the following scholium.

sc. 2 In the Appendix to part I. we undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and fault, justice and injustice. About praise and blame I have spoken in III. /29 sc. The time has come now to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few words about man's natural status and man's civil status.

Everybody exists by Nature's sovereign right and, consequently, by Nature's sovereign right, performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature. Therefore, by Nature's sovereign right everybody judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his self-interest, according to his own inventiveness (p. 19 & 20), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. /40 cor. 2) and seeks to preserve that which he loves, and to destroy that which he hates (III. /28). Now, if people lived under the guidance of reason, everybody would remain in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to his neighbor (cor. 1/p. 35). But, as they are agitated by

passions which far surpass human power and virtue (p. 6), people are often drawn in opposite directions (p. 33) and are contrary to one another (p, 34), while they need mutual aid (sc. /p. 35).

Wherefore, in order that people may live together in concord, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they abandon part of their natural right and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow men. How this could happen, that people, who are necessarily agitated by passions (cor. /p. 4) and who are unstable and capricious, be able to render each other secure and feel mutual trust, this fact becomes evident from p. 7 and from III. /39. We have shown there that an affective state can be restrained only by another affective state, stronger than and contrary to it, and that people avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves. On this basis **society** can establish itself, so long as at keeps in its own hand the right possessed by everybody, of avenging injury, and provided it also possesses the power to lay down general rules of conduct, and to pass laws which are sanctioned--not by reason, which cannot restrain affectivity (sc. /p. 17)--but by threats. **Such a society, established with laws and the power of preserving itself, is called the State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens.** We may well understand that in the natural status there is nothing which by universal consensus be pronounced good or bad; for in the natural status everybody has in view only his self-interest and, with this in mind, and according to his own way of thinking, he decides what is good or bad, and is bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the natural status, therefore, a fault is inconceivable; a fault can only exist in the civil status, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consensus, and where everybody is bound to obey the State. **Fault,** then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is thus punished by the laws of the land. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as **merit** of the citizen, inasmuch as he is thought worthy of merit, if he takes pleasure in the advantages provided by the State. Again, in the terms of the natural status no one is by common agreement master of anything, nor is there anything in Nature which could be said to belong to one person rather than to another: in the natural status all things are common to all. Hence, in the natural status it is unthinkable to render to every man his own, or to deprive somebody of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the natural status answering to justice and injustice. Such concepts are possible only in the social or civil status, where it is decreed by common consensus what belongs to one person and what to another. From all these considerations it is evident that justice and injustice, fault and merit, are extrinsic ideas and not any attributes explaining the nature of the human mind. But I have said enough.

p. 38 WHAT MAKES OUR BODY CAPABLE OF BEING DISPOSED IN MANY WAYS, OR OF DISPOSING EXTERNAL BODIES IN MANY WAYS THAT IS

USEFUL TO US--AND IS SO IN PROPORTION AS IT INCREASES OUR PHYSICAL FITNESS; CONTRARIWISE, THAT IS HARMFUL TO US WHICH REDUCES OUR PHYSICAL FITNESS. Dem.: The fitter the body, the fitter our mind for perception (II. /14); thus, what makes our body more capable, is necessarily good or useful (p. 26 &27)and is so in proportion as it increases our physical fitness; on the contrary (ibid,) that is harmful which diminishes the body's fitness. Hence, what makes etc. qed

p. 39 WHAT MAKES PRESERVE THE BASIC PROPORTIONS OF MOTION AND REST BETWEEN THE PARTS OF OUR BODY, IS GOOD; ON THE CONTRARY IS BAD WHAT MAKES CHANGE THEM. Dem.: Our body needs many other bodies for its preservation (II. /po, 4) But what makes up the specificity of our body, consists in the fact that its parts communicate one to another their motions at a fixed proportion (II. /13 def. /lem. 3) Therefore, what makes preserve the basic proportion of motion and rest between the parts of our body, that preserves the specific nature of our body and, consequently, renders it capable of being disposed in many ways and of disposing external bodies in many ways; hence it is good (p. 38). Again. , what brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion, causes our body (II. /13 def. /lem. 3) to alter its specific nature i.e. to be destroyed or rendered incapable of being disposed in many ways; hence, it is bad. qed.

sc. The extent to which such influence can be harmful or beneficial to our mind, will be explained in part V. But let us remark here that **a body is dying** when the basic proportions of motion and rest between its parts undergo a change. For I do not venture to deny that, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties which are held to be characteristic of life, a human body may none the less be changed into another nature, completely different from its own. There is no reason, indeed, which compels me to believe that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience suggests the opposite conclusion. Indeed it sometimes happens that a person undergoes such changes that I could hardly call him the same. As I have heard of a certain Spanish poet (Gongora?) who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom, yet remained so oblivious of his past life that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written, to be his own; indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that only the analogy of other people can persuade him that he, too, has once been an infant. However, I prefer to leave these questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to superstitious people for raising new issues.

p. 40 ALL WHICH CONDUCES TO SOCIAL UNITY, OR CAUSES PEOPLE TO LIVE TOGETHER IN CONCORD. IS USEFUL; WHEREAS IS BAD ALL WHICH

BRINGS DISCORD INTO THE STATE. Dem.: All which causes people to live together in concord, also causes them to live under the guidance of reason (p. 35)and therefore (p. 26 & 27) is good, Hence all which conduces etc. , qed.

p. 41 **JOY IS NOT BAD IN ITSELF BUT GOOD, WHEREAS SORROW IS BAD IN ITSELF.** Dem.: Joy (III. /11 sc,) is a feeling whereby our body's self-power is increased or helped; sorrow is a feeling whereby our body's self-power is diminished or restrained; hence (p. 38) joy is not bad etc.

p. 42 **GAIETY CANNOT BE EXCESSIVE BUT IS ALWAYS GOOD, WHEREAS AFFLICTION IS ALWAYS BAD.** Dem.: Gaiety (III. /11 sc.) is joy which, insofar as referred to the body, affects equally all its parts; thus the body's self-power is increased or aided in such a manner that the parts maintain their specific ratios of motion and rest; hence, gaiety is always good (p. 39) and cannot be excessive. But affliction (III, /11 sc,) is sorrow which, insofar referred to the body, consists in an absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's self-power and, thus (p. 38) is always bad. qed.

p. 43 **PLEASURE MAY BE EXCESSIVE AND BAD, WHEREAS PAIN MAY BE GOOD INSOFAR AS JOY IS BAD.** Dem.: Pleasure is joy which, insofar as referred to the body, makes that one or some of its parts be affected more than the rest (III. /11 sc.); the strength of this feeling may be such as to surpass other activities of the body (p. 6) and remain obstinately persistent, thus rendering the body incapable of being disposed in many other ways; therefore (p. 38) it may be bad. Again, pain which is sorrow, cannot be good as such (p. 41). But, as its force and increment is defined by the power of an external cause in composition with our own (p. 5), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength of this feeling (p. 3) and therefore conceive it as capable of restraining pleasure, and preventing its becoming excessive; thus, to this extent, as aiding the body's self-power, it will be good. qed.

p. 44 **LOVE AND DESIRE MAY BE EXCESSIVE.** Dem.: Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause(III. /af. 6); hence, pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is a kind of love and, thus, may be excessive. Again, desire's strength varies in proportion to the feeling from which it arises (III. /37). Now, feeling may surpass all the rest of our activities(p. 6); also can desire, arising from such a feeling, overcome all other desires and become excessive, as we showed (p. 43) concerning pleasure, qed.

sc. Gaiety, which I have stated to be good, is easily imagined but rarely found or experienced. For the feelings whereby we are commonly agitated, refer generally to some part of the body, more affected than the rest; hence our feelings are generally excessive and make stick the mind to the contemplation of one object, so that it is unable to think of others; and although people, as a rule, are agitated by many emotions--and very few are found who are always the prey to one and the same--yet there are cases where one and the same affective state remains obstinately fixed. Sometimes we see a person so absorbed in one object that, although it be not

present, he thinks to have it before him; when this happens to one who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are considered as less mad, and made objects of ridicule, those who are inflamed with love and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their beloved or their mistress. But when a miser thinks of nothing but profit and money, or when an ambitious thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally insufferable and are judged worthy of being hated. But, **in reality, avarice, ambition, lust etc. , are kinds of madness,** though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

p. 45 **HATRED CAN NEVER BE GOOD.** Dem.: When we hate somebody, we try to destroy him (III. /39), i.e. (37) we try to do something that is bad. Hence, hatred can never be good. qed.

sc. 1 Here and in what follows, I mean by hatred only that towards human beings.

cor. 1 **ENVY, DERISION, CONTEMPT, ANGER REVENGE, AND OTHER AFFECTIVE STATES ATTRIBUTABLE TO HATRED OR ARISING THEREFROM, ARE ALL BAD.** Evident from III. /39 and p. 37.

cor. 2 **ALL WE DESIRE THROUGH HATRED IS INFAMOUS AND UNJUST IN THE STATE.** This also is evident from III. /39 &p. 37 defining dishonesty and injustice (cf. sc. 1 & 2 /p. 37).

sc. 2 Between derision, which I have just stated to be bad, and **laughter** I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also **fun**, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is good in itself (p. 41). Indeed, **nothing but a grim and sad superstition forbids enjoyment.** For, why is it more becoming to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason as follows and have made up my conviction accordingly: No deity, nor anyone else, save envious people, takes pleasure in my weakness and trouble, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fears, and the like, which characterize a weakling. On the contrary, the greater the joy we experience, the greater the perfection whereto we pass, i.e. the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature.

To make use of things, therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible (not to the point of boredom, for that would not be delight any more) is the part of a wise man. I say, it is the part of a wise man to refresh and to recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with fragrances, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, with sports, with theaters, and the like, such as everybody may make use of without damage to his neighbor. For our body is composed of very many parts, of diverse nature, which continually

stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the body as a whole may be equally capable of realizing all which follows from the necessity of its own nature and, consequently, that our mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously.

This way of life agrees best, not only with our principles, but also with the general practice. Therefore, it is the best of all and is to be commended from every point of view. There is no need for me to enter more at length into the subject.

p. 46 **HE WHO LIVES UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON ENDEAVORS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, TO REPAY WITH LOVE OR GENEROSITY OTHER PEOPLE's HATRED, ANGER, CONTEMPT etc.** Dem.: All feelings of hatred are bad (cor. /p. 45); therefore, he who lives under the guidance of reason endeavors as much as possible to avoid of being agitated by such feelings (p. 19); consequently, he will also endeavor to prevent others from being so agitated (p. 37). But hatred is increased when reciprocated, and can be overcome by love(III. /43), so that hatred may pass into love (III. /44). Hence, he who lives etc. , qed.

sc. He who seeks to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he who tries to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence. He withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's help. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their own strength; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definition of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail.

p. 47 **HOPE AND FEAR, AS SUCH, CANNOT BE GOOD.** Dem.: Hope and fear cannot exist without sorrow. For, fear is sorrow (III. /af. 13) and hope (III. /af. 12 & 13) cannot exist without fear; therefore (p. 41) these feelings cannot be good, but only insofar as they restrain an excessive joy (p. 43); qed.

sc. We may add that these feelings show a mental weakness and a lack of awareness. For the same reason, confidence, despair, exultation, and remorse are signs of a weakling. For, also confidence and exultation are happy feelings, they nevertheless imply a preceding sorrow, i.e. hope and fear. Wherefore, the more we strive to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we try to free ourselves from fear and, as much as we can, to dominate fortune and to direct our actions by the sure advice of reason.

p. 48 **OVERESTEEM AND DISESTEEM ARE ALWAYS BAD.** Dem.: These feelings (III. /af. 21 & 22) are repugnant to reason and are therefore bad (p. 26 & 27) qed.

p. 49 **OVERESTEEM WILL EASILY RENDER PROUD HIM WHO IS OVERESTIMATED.** Dem.: If we see that somebody for love's sake rates us higher than it is fair, we are apt. to become at once elated (III. /41) or to feel happy (III. /af. 30); the good which we hear others affirm of us, we readily believe (III. /25) and therefore, for love's sake we will rate ourselves higher than it is fair i.e. we will become proud. qed.

p. 50 **COMPASSION, AS SUCH, IS BAD AND USELESS FOR ONE WHO LIVES UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON.** Dem. ; Compassion (III. /af, 18) is sorrow and therefore (p. 41) is bad in itself. The good effect of it, namely our effort to free from misery whom we pity (III. /27 cor. 3) is something which reason makes us anyhow desire (p. 37); and we know for certain to be good only what we do under reason's guidance (p. 27). qed. It follows therefrom that;

cor. **HE WHO LIVES UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON AVOIDS TO BE TOUCHED BY COMPASSION.**

sc. He who is plainly aware that all follows from the necessity of the divine nature and comes to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, of derision, or of contempt, not also will he bestow pity, but he will try, to the utmost extent of human virtue, to do well and to rejoice, as the saying goes. We may add, that he who is easily touched by compassion, and is moved by another's misfortune, or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly, because out of affectivity we can never be sure to do well, and partly, because we are easily deceived by false tears. But I am speaking here expressly of a man living under the guidance of reason. For, he who is neither moved by reason nor by compassion to help others, is rightly called inhuman (III. /27) because he does not behave like a human being should.

p. 51 **FAVOR IS NOT REPUGNANT TO REASON BUT CAN AGREE WITH IT, AND MAY ARISE FROM IT.** Dem.: Favor (kindness) is love towards one who has done good to another (III. /af. 19); hence it may be referred to the mind's activity (III. /59) i.e. to understanding (III. /3) qed. Another dem.: He who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (p. 37); hence, from seeing someone doing good to another, our own endeavor to do good is aided; i.e. we will experience joy (III. /11 sc,) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor, whom we shall favor. qed.

sc. Indignation, as we defined it (III. /af. 20) is necessarily bad (p. 45). Let us remark however that when the sovereign judicial power (of the State), for the sake of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who has injured another, the judge should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for he is not incited by hatred, but is led only by a sense of duty to punish a delinquent.

p. 52 SELF-CONTENTMENT MAY ARISE FROM REASON, AND ONLY THAT CONTENTMENT WHICH ARISES FROM REASON IS THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE. Dem.: Self-contentment is joy arising from one's contemplation of himself and his self-power (III. /af. 25). But one's self-power or virtue is reason herself (III. /3) clearly and distinctly reflected upon (II. /40 & 43); hence, self-contentment arises also from reason. Again, in reflecting upon ourselves, we perceive clearly and distinctly, or adequately, only such things as follow from our self-power (III. /d. 2) i.e. (III. /3) from our power of understanding. Therefore, self-contentment etc. ; qed.

sc. This true self-contentment is really the highest for which we can hope. For, as we showed in p. 25, nobody strives to preserve his being for the sake of something else and, as this contentment is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. /53 cor.) and contrariwise (III. /55 cor,) is more and more disturbed by blame, we are mostly led by the desire of glory (fame) and find almost unendurable a life charged with disgrace.

p. 53 HUMILITY IS NOT A VIRTUE i.e. DOES NOT ARISE FROM REASON. Dem.: Humility is sorrow arising from the fact that one regards his powerlessness (III. /af. 26). But, insofar as we know ourselves truly by reason, we are assumed to understand our beingness i.e. our self-power (III. /7). Hence, if in reflecting upon ourselves, we perceive there any weakness, it is not for lack of understanding but (III. /55) because our self-power is being restrained. But insofar we are said to comprehend our weakness, in understanding the strength of opposing elements , and through that knowledge to determine accordingly our activity, this is the same as saying that we understand ourselves distinctly (p. 26) and that our self-power is thereby aided. Wherefore, humility, the sorrow due to our contemplating our own weakness, does not arise from true reason and is a suffering and not a virtue. qed.

p. 54 REPENTANCE IS NOT A VIRTUE i.e. DOES NOT ARISE FROM REASON; BUT HE WHO REPENTS OF A DEED IS DOUBLY WRETCHED OR POWERLESS. Dem.: The first part is proved like p. 53. The second part is proved from the mere definition of that feeling (III. /af. 27). For, one suffers first to be overcome by a wrong desire and, therefore, by sorrow. qed.

sc. As people live seldom under the guidance of reason, these two affective states, namely humility and repentance, as also the feelings of hope and fear, bring more good than harm; hence, if we must trespass, we had better trespass in that direction. For, if those who are weak-minded were all equally arrogant, they would shrink from nothing and would fear nothing: how then could people be held together and kept under control? "The mob terrorizes when it has nothing to fear!" Hence, we need not wonder that **the prophets, who had in view the**

advantage not of the few, but of all, so strenuously commended humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, those who yield to these feelings may be led much easier than others, to live under the guidance of reason i.e. to become free men and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

p. 55 EXTREME PRIDE OR DESPONDENCY IS EXTREME IGNORANCE OF ONE's SELF. Dem.: Evident from III. /af. 28 &29.

p. 56 EXTREME PRIDE AND EXTREME DESPONDENCY SHOW AN EXTREME WEAKNESS OF SPIRIT. Dem.: The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (cor. /p. 22) under the guidance of reason (p. 24). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and thus of virtue as such. Again, to act virtuously is nothing else than to act under the guidance of reason (ibid,); now, he who acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. /43). Therefore, he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, acts not through virtue i.e. (d. 8) shows an extreme weakness of spirit, qed. Hence it follows most clearly;

cor. ARROGANT AND DESPONDENT PEOPLE YIELD THE MOST TO AFFECTIVITY.

sc. Yet, despondency can be easier corrected than pride, for a feeling of joy is relatively stronger (p. 18) than a feeling of sorrow.

p. 57 ARROGANT PEOPLE DELIGHT IN THE COMPANY OF FLATTERERS AND PARASITES, BUT HATE THE COMPANY OF GENEROUS MEN. Dem.: Pride is joy arising from the fact that one rates himself higher than it is fair (III. /af, 28 & 6); this illusion, the arrogant will try to foster by all the means in his power (III. /13 sc.); he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites--whose character is too well known as to require definition--and he will avoid the company of generous men who value him according to his merits.

sc. It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil consequences of pride, inasmuch as arrogant people yield to all emotions, though to none of them less than to love and to compassion. But I cannot pass over in silence the fact that **an arrogant is also one who rates other people lower than it is fair.** Therefore, **pride may be defined, in this sense, as joy arising from the false opinion, whereby one considers himself superior to others.** Despondency opposite to this kind of pride, may be defined as sorrow arising from the false opinion, whereby one considers himself inferior to his fellow men.

Under these conditions one can easily understand that an arrogant is necessarily envious (III. /55 sc.) and hates especially those who are the most praised for their virtues, and his hatred may not be easily overcome by love or by kindness (III. /41 sc,) and he takes pleasure only in the company of those who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish. Though despondency (dejection) is the affective state contrary to pride, yet is **the humble very near akin to the arrogant**. For, inasmuch as his sorrow arises from comparing his own weakness with other people's power or virtue, it will be removed i.e. he will feel happy if his imagination be occupied in contemplating the faults of those virtuous people, or in general anybody's faults; whence the proverb: "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." On the other hand he will be the more pained in proportion as he believes himself inferior to others; hence, none are so prone to envy as despondent people. They are particularly keen in observing one's actions, with a view more to fault-finding than to correction. Their praises go to despondency in all its glory, but always in keeping an air of humility. And these effects follow as necessarily from the said affective states, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the sum of its angles equals two right angles.

I have already said that I call these and similar affective states bad, only in regard to what is useful to mankind. But the laws of Nature have regard to Nature's general order, of which man is only a part. I mention this in passing, lest somebody should believe that I have intended to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of people, rather than the nature and property of things. For, as I said in the preface to part III. , I regard human affectivity and its properties exactly in the same way as other natural phenomena. Assuredly, human affectivity shows the power and ingenuity of Nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as other things which we admire and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to examine those factors in affectivity which are useful and those which are harmful to us.

p. 58 GLORY IS NOT REPUGNANT TO REASON, BUT MAY ARISE FROM IT. Dem.: Evident from af. 30 and also from the definition of the honest man (sc. 1/p. 37).

sc. What is called **vainglory**, is self-contentment fostered only by the good opinion of the multitude; when this opinion ceases, there ends also the self-contentment i.e. the highest objective of everybody's love (sc. /p. 52); consequently, he whose glory is rooted in popular approval, must anxiously strive, labor, and scheme, day by day, in order to retain his reputation. For public opinion is variable and inconstant, so that if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everybody wishes to catch popular applause for himself and readily eclipses the fame of others. The object of the strife being, as they think, the highest good, each competitor is

seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way till, at last, he who comes out victorious, is more proud of having done harm to others, than of having done good to himself. This sort of glory is thus really vain, being nothing.

The points to note concerning **shame** may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of pity and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good insofar as it shows that the person who is overcome by shame is really imbued with the desire to live honestly; in the same way as pain is good, in showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though the one who is ashamed of what he did, is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect then the one who is shameless and who has no desire to live honestly.

Such are the points which I undertook to examine concerning the feelings of joy and sorrow. As for the desires, they are good or bad, according as they spring from good or bad affective states. But inasmuch as the desires are engendered in us by affective states which are sufferings, they are all blind (cf. sc. /p. 44) and would be of no use if people could easily be induced to live under the exclusive guidance of reason, as I will now briefly show.

p. 59 TO ALL ACTIONS TO WHICH WE ARE DETERMINED BY AN AFFECTIVE STATE WHICH IS A SUFFERING (PASSION), WE CAN BE DETERMINED THERETO, WITHOUT IT, BY REASON. Dem.: To act rationally is nothing else (III. /3 & d. 2) but to do those things which follow from the necessity of our own nature considered in itself, But sorrow is bad, inasmuch as it diminishes or restrains our self-power (p. 41), Wherefore, the actions to which we are determined by sorrow are not such that we could not perform them. without that feeling. simply under the guidance of reason. Lastly, insofar as it is good, joy agrees with reason--for it consists in the fact that our self-power is increased or aided--and it is a passiveness (suffering) only to the extent as it does not increase our self-power to the point that we may understand ourselves and our actions clearly and distinctly i.e. adequately (III. /3 +sc.). Therefore, if through joy we could be brought to such a point of perfection as to understand ourselves and our actions adequately, we would be equally, nay more capable of all those actions under the sole guidance of reason and without that kind of "pleasure". But all affective states are attributable to joy, , to sorrow or to desire (cf. af. 4) and desire is (af. 1) nothing else but the very effort to act; hence. to all actions etc. qed.

Another dem.: An action is called bad insofar as it arises from hatred or from any bad affective state. But an action, considered in itself, is neither good nor bad (cf. preface to part IV.) because one and the same action is sometimes good and sometimes bad and we may, without that suffering, be led to that action by reason alone(p. 19).

sc. An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, insofar as it is considered physically, and inasmuch as we look to the simple fact that somebody raises his arm, clenches his fist and moves his arm downwards in applying force, is a virtue proper to the structure of the human body. If then, moved by anger or hate, one is led to clench the fist or to

move his arm, this happens because one and the same action may be associated with any images of things, as we have shown in part II. ; thus, we may be determined to the same action either by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from a suffering would become useless if people could be guided by reason. Now, let us see why a desire arising from a suffering (passion) is called by us blind.

p. 60 **A DESIRE ARISING FROM JOY OR SORROW THAT CONCERNS ONE OR SOME PARTS OF OUR BODY, BUT NOT THE WHOLE BODY, IS NOT REALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO US AS A WHOLE.** Dem.: Let us assume that "A", a part of our body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (p. 6). This part will not endeavor to reduce its strength, in order that the other parts of our body may perform their function; to this end it would be necessary for it to have the power of doing away with its own strength. which (III. /6) is absurd. The said part "A" and consequently our mind, will endeavor (III. /7 & 12) to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from such a kind of joy is without a real advantage to us. If, on the contrary, part "A" be assumed as restrained by some external cause, so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same manner that the desire arising from such a pain is not really advantageous to us as a whole.

sc. As most of the time (sc. /p. 44) a joy or pleasure refers only to one of our body's part, we generally strive to preserve our being, without taking care of our health as a whole; it may be also added that the desires which have most hold over us (p. 9) take account of the present but not of the future.

p. 61 **A DESIRE WHICH SPRINGS FROM REASON CANNOT BE EXCESSIVE.** Dem.: Absolutely speaking, desire (af. 1) is our proper beingness insofar as in a given state we are determined to do something. Hence, desire arising from reason i.e. (III. /3)engendered in us insofar as we act, is our proper beingness or nature, viewed as being determined to such activities as are adequately explainable through our nature alone (III. /d. 2). Now, if such a desire could be excessive, our own nature would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, which is a manifest contradiction, Therefore, a desire which springs from reason etc. qed.

p. 62 **INSOFAR AS WE THINK RATIONALLY, WE ARE AFFECTED EQUALLY, WHETHER THE IDEA BE OF A THING FUTURE, PAST, OR PRESENT.** Dem.: Whenever we think rationally, we always do it from the same angle of eternity and necessity (II. /44 cor.) and experience the same certitude (II. /43 + sc.). Hence, whether a thing be present, past, or future, we think it with the same necessity, and experience the same certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past or future, it will always be equally true (II. /41) i.e. it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II>/d. 4). Therefore, insofar as we think rationally etc. ; qed.

sc. If we could possess an adequate cognition of the duration of things, and could determine rationally their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same sentiment as things present; and we would desire, as though it were present, the good which we think as future; consequently, we would neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and we would not desire at all something which is good in the present, but is source of an evil in the future, as I shall presently show.

However, we can have but a very inadequate cognition of the duration of things (II. /31), and their periods of existence we can (II. /45 sc,) only evaluate by imagination, and our imagination is not as strongly affected by the future as by the present. Hence, such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess, is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes (in view to determine what is good or bad for us in the present) is rather imaginary than real. No wonder, thus, if the desire arising from such a knowledge of good and evil, inasmuch as it refers to the future, be more readily restrained than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present moment. (p. 16).

p. 63 HE WHO IS LED BY FEAR AND DOES GOOD IN ORDER TO ESCAPE EVIL, IS NOT LED BY REASON. Dem.: All affective states referred to our mind's activity i.e. to reason (III. /3) are those of joy and desire (III. /59). Thus, he who is led by fear etc. ; qed.

sc. 1 Superstitious people--who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who do not intend to guide men by reason, but to keep them under constant fear, so as to let them try to avoid evils, rather than to love virtue--they have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; it is therefore not surprising at all, if they be regarded as troublesome and odious by almost everybody.

cor. OUT OF REASON WE FOLLOW GOOD DIRECTLY AND AVOID EVIL INDIRECTLY. Dem.: A desire due to reason can only arise from a feeling of joy which is not a suffering (III. /59), i.e. from a joy which cannot be excessive (p. 61) and not from sorrow; therefore, this desire comes from the knowledge of good and not from the knowledge of evil. qed.

sc. 2 This corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man, through fear of death, eats what he naturally dislikes, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger, but from love for the public welfare, is led by reason alone.

p. 64 **THE KNOWLEDGE OF EVIL IS AN INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE.** Dem.: The knowledge of evil is sorrow (p. 8) insofar as we are conscious of it. Now, sorrow is the transition to a lesser perfection (af. 3) and thus cannot be explained through our own beingness (III. /6 & 7); therefore, it is a passiveness (III. /d. 2) which (III. /3) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently (II. /29) the knowledge of evil etc. ; qed. Hence it follows:

cor. **IF WE HAD ONLY ADEQUATE IDEAS, WE WOULD NOT HAVE A CONCEPT OF EVIL.**

p. 65 **RATIONALLY WE WILL CHOOSE THE GREATER OF TWO GOODS AND THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS.** Dem.: A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms of good and bad to things, insofar as we compare them one with the other (IV/preface); again, a less evil is really a good and (cor. /p. 63) rationally we will choose etc. ; qed.

cor. **RATIONALLY WE WILL CHOOSE A LESSER EVIL IN VIEW OF A GREATER GOOD, AND SHUN A LESSER GOOD WHICH IS CAUSE OF A GREATER EVIL.** For, the evil which we call here the lesser, is in reality a good, and the lesser good is in reality an evil.

p. 66 **RATIONALLY WE WILL SEEK A GREATER GOOD IN THE FUTURE IN PREFERENCE TO A LESSER GOOD IN THE PRESENT, AND A LESSER EVIL IN THE PRESENT RATHER THAN A GREATER FUTURE EVIL.** Dem.: If we could have an adequate cognition of things to come, we would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present (p. 62); therefore, rationally speaking, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be supposed as present or as future; hence (p. 65) rationally we will seek etc. ; qed.

cor. **RATIONALLY WE WILL SEEK A LESSER EVIL IN THE PRESENT WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF A GREATER GOOD IN THE FUTURE, AND WE WILL SHUN A LESSER GOOD IN THE PRESENT WHICH IS CAUSE OF A GREATER EVIL IN THE FUTURE.** This cor. is to p. 66, as cor. /p. 65 is to its pr.

sc. If these statements be compared with what we have shown up to p. 18 concerning the strength of affectivity, we shall readily see the difference between a person who is led solely by affectivity or opinion, and one who is led by rationality. The former, whether he wills it or not, does things of which he is completely ignorant, while the latter is his own master and does only such things as he knows are of primary importance in life, and which he therefore chiefly desires. In consequence, I call the former a **slave,** and the latter a **free man,** concerning whose mentality and way of life we will give now a few indications

p. 67 **A FREE MAN THINKS OF NOTHING LESS THAN OF DEATH, AND HIS WISDOM IS A MEDITATION NOT OF DEATH BUT OF LIFE.** Dem.: A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason; he, therefore, who is not led by the fear of death (p. 63), desires directly the good (cor. /0. 63) i.e. (p. 24) lives, acts, and preserves his being on the basis of seeking his self-interest.

p. 68 **IF MEN WERE BORN FREE, THEY WOULD NOT FORM A CONCEPT OF GOOD AND EVIL, AS LONG AS THEY WOULD REMAIN FREE.** Dem.: I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; hence (cor. /p. 64) he has no concept of evil nor of good, since good and evil are correlatives. Thus, if men were born free. etc. ; qed.

sc. It is evident from p. 4 that the hypothesis of p. 68 is false and unthinkable, unless insofar as we regard human nature alone, or rather God, not insofar as he is infinite, but only insofar as he is the cause of man's existence. This and other points which we have already proved, seem to have been signified by Moses in that legend of the first man. For, in that narrative no other power of God is conceived save the power whereby he created man, that is the power taking in consideration only the advantage of man. It is stated there that God forbade man, who was free, to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and that, as soon as he should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further it is written there that when man found a wife who was in complete harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in Nature more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their affectivity (III. /27) and to lose his freedom. This freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ i.e. by the idea of God, which alone makes one free and makes him desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as I have shown above (p. 37)

p. 69 **THE FREE MAN's VIRTUE IS SEEN TO BE AS GREAT IN AVOIDING DANGERS AS IN OVERCOMING THEM.** Dem.: An affective state can be restrained or removed by another affective state, contrary thereto and stronger than the one to be restrained (p. 7). But blind daring and fear are feelings which can be conceived as equally strong(p. 5 & 3); an equal presence of mind or heroism (III. /59 sc.) is hence required to restrain daring, as to restrain fear; i.e. (af. 40 & 41) the free man's virtue etc. ; qed.

cor. **THE FREE MAN's WHOLEHEARTEDNESS IS SEEN TO BE AS GREAT IN AVOIDING DANGERS AS IN OVERCOMING THEM**

sc. What wholeheartedness is and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. /59 sc. By danger I mean everything which can bring about an evil, such as sorrow, hate, discord etc.

p. 70 **A FREE MAN WHO LIVES AMONG THE IGNORANT, AVOIDS AS MUCH AS HE CAN THEIR GIFTS.** Dem.: Everybody judges what is good according to his frame of mind (III. /39 sc,). The ignorant person, therefore, who has conferred a benefit on somebody, puts his own estimate upon it, and if it appears to be not appreciated enough by the receiver, he (the donor) will feel sorry (III. /42). But all a free man desires is to join others to him in friendship (p, 37); not in repaying their gifts by equivalent ones, but in guiding himself and others rationally, and in doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. A free man, therefore, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires, their appetites, rather than rationality, will avoid, as much as he can, to become the recipient of their gifts.

sc. I say as much as he can. For, though people be ignorant, yet are they human beings and in case of necessity could afford us help, the most excellent of all things. It is therefore often necessary to accept gifts from them and, consequently, to reasonably repay such gifts; we must therefore exercise caution in declining favors, lest we should seem to despise those who bestow them, or to be unwilling to requite them for avaricious motives, and so give ground for offense, by the very fact of trying to avoid it. Thus, in declining gifts we must look both to the requirements of our self-interest and of courtesy.

p. 71 **ONLY FREE MEN ARE TRULY GRATEFUL TO ONE ANOTHER.** Dem.: Only free people are truly useful to one another and are held together by a friendship of closest mutual reliance (p. 35 + cor. 1); only such persons endeavor with a mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other(p. 37) qed.

sc. The goodwill, which people who are led by blind desire, have one for another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an affective state. Yet, it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows a person's excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice etc. He who, being stupid, knows not how to repay gifts, is not ungrateful, and much less he who is not gained over by gifts of a harlot to serve her lust, nor by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, nor by any other gifts of that sort. On the contrary, he who cannot be corrupted by gifts to harm himself or his nation, shows that he possesses a steadfast mind.

p. 72 **A FREE MAN NEVER ACTS WITH HYPOCRISY, BUT ALWAYS WITH LOYALTY.** Dem.: If a free man, as such, acted with hypocrisy, he would do so under the guidance of reason--for we call him free only to that extent. And so, to act with hypocrisy would be a virtue (p. 24) and consequently, it would be more advisable for everybody to act with hypocrisy. in order to preserve his own being; in other words, and obviously, it would be more advisable for people to agree only in words or on paper,

but to remain in reality opposed to one another, which (cor. /p. 31) is absurd. Hence, a free man never acts etc. qed.

sc. If it be asked: What should one's conduct be in a case where by breaking faith, by perfidy, he could free himself from the danger of imminent death? Would not the principle of self-preservation urge him to deceive? It should be answered: Suppose that reason urges him to do so, then it would urge everybody to act in that way, and thus reason would advise people to put always hypocrisy behind their assent to unite their forces and to have common laws--that is, not to have laws at all, which is absurd.

p. 73 ONE WHO IS GUIDED BY REASON IS MORE FREE IN A STATE WHERE HE LIVES UNDER COMMON LAWS, THAN IN SOLITUDE WHERE HE OBEYS HIMSELF ALONE. Dem.: One who is guided by reason does not obey through fear (p. 63) but insofar as he strives to preserve his being rationally, i.e. (sc. /p. 66) insofar as he strives to live in freedom, he desires to conform to the established way of life (p, 37) and consequently (sc. 2/p. 37) to live according to the laws of his country. Hence, in order to enjoy greater freedom, a free man desires to respect and to protect the common laws. qed.

sc. These and similar observations which we have made on man's **true freedom** are referred to **heroism,** i.e. (III. /59 sc,) to wholeheartedness and to generosity. I do not think it necessary to prove here in detail all the properties of heroism; much less need I show that a **heroic person hates nobody, is angry with nobody, envies nobody, is indignant with nobody, despises nobody and is never arrogant.**

_____ But these points and all those which concern **true life and faith or true religion** are easily deduced from p. 37 and p. 46; namely that hatred should be overcome with love, and that everybody should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we said in sc. /p. 50 and in other places; namely that **a heroic person is always aware of the fact that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature**, so that whatever we think annoying and evil and, thus, view as impious, horrible, unjust and base, assumes that appearance owing to our own disordered, mutilated and confused way of thinking. A heroic person strives, therefore, above all, to understand things as they really are and to remove all hindrances to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar affective states which I have mentioned above.

Thus, **a heroic man strives as much as he can, to be active and to rejoice** How far our virtue is capable of attaining that, I will show in part V.

APPENDIX

What I have said in this part concerning **the right way of life,** has not been arranged so as to provide a general view, but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I have decided therefore to rearrange here my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.

ch. 1 All our endeavors or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone as their proximate cause, or through the fact of our being a part of Nature, which part through itself and without other individuals is not adequately thinkable.

ch. 2 Desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can be understood through it alone, are referred to that part of our mind which consists in adequate ideas. The other desires are referred to the part of our mind which consists in inadequate ideas, and, the force and increment of these desires are generally defined not by our self-power, but by the power of things external to us. Thus, the former are rightly called **actions,** the latter however **sufferings.** For the former always indicate our self-power, whereas the latter show our weakness and deficient knowledge.

ch. 3 Our **actions,** i.e. those desires which are **defined by our self-power** or reason, **are always good;** the rest may be either good or bad.

ch. 4 Thus in life it is primarily useful to perfect our intellect or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone consists our highest happiness and blessedness. Indeed, **blessedness is nothing else but the serenity of spirit which arises from our intuitive (esprital) awareness of God.** Now, to perfect the intellect is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Thus, the ultimate aim or highest desire of a man led by reason, and whereby he seeks to moderate his affectivity, is his desire to understand adequately himself and all the things falling within the range of his intelligence.

ch. 5 Therefore, **there is no rational life without intelligence,** and things are good only insofar they help us to enjoy that inner life which is defined by intelligence. On the other hand, we call evil only those things which hinder us to perfect our reason and to enjoy a rational life.

ch. 6 As all things whereof we are the efficient cause, are necessarily good, no evil can befall us except through external causes; namely, because we are a part of the universal Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey and to conform to in almost infinite ways.

ch. 7 **It is impossible that man should not be part of Nature, or that he should not follow her common order. But if we live among individuals whose nature agrees with our own, our self-power will thereby be aided and fostered; whereas, if we find ourselves among individuals who do not agree at all with our nature, we will be hardly able to accommodate ourselves to them without undergoing a great change ourselves.**

ch. 8 **All things in the world which we judge to be evil, or able to hinder us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we may remove from us in whatever way we estimate to be the safest.** On the other hand, all things which we judge to be **good or useful** for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life, we may appropriate to our use and utilize as we think best. And, absolutely speaking, everybody, by the sovereign right of Nature, may do whatever he thinks will advance his self-interest.

ch. 9 Nothing can agree more with the nature of a being than other individuals of the same kind; therefore (ch. 7) **nothing is more useful for preserving our being and for enjoying a rational life, than a man who is led by reason**. Further, as we know nothing among particular things, which is more excellent than a man led by reason, nobody could better display his skill and his genius, than in educating people in such a way that they finally live under the exclusive guidance of reason.

ch. 10 Inasmuch as people are driven against one another by envy or any kind of hatred, they are contrary to one another and are therefore to be feared in proportion as they have more power than the other individuals of their kind.

ch. 11 Yet **minds are not conquered by armed forces but by love and generosity.**

ch. 12 **It is especially useful to people to form associations, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into a unity and, generally, to do whatever serves to strengthen concord and friendship.**

ch. 13 But **this requires skill and caution**. For people are changeable (because very few live under the guidance of reason), generally envious and more prone to revenge than to compassion. An exceptional force of character is therefore required to take everybody as he is and to restrain ourselves from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind and are more skilled in railing at vices than in teaching virtue, and not to strengthen the minds but to break them, are harmful both to themselves and to others. Thus, from too great impatience or from misguided religious zeal, many people have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths who cannot patiently endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and a despotic discipline, in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: suffering all kinds of burdens to be put upon them. in order that they may revenge themselves upon their sire.

ch. 14 Thus, **also people are generally guided in everything by their likings, yet their common society brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs people may do us, and to promote whatever serves to bring about concord and friendship.**

ch. 15 **Concord is generated by those things which refer to justice, equity and honesty**. For, people oppose not only what is unjust and unfair, but also what is considered shameful, i.e. that one should slight the accepted customs of their land. But, for winning love are especially necessary those things which refer to faith (true religion) and devotedness (sc. 1&2/p. 37; sc/p. 46; p. 73).

ch. 16 **Concord is often also the result of fear; but such a concord is not to be trusted.** Remark further that fear arises from weakness of mind, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason; the same is true for compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to devotedness.

ch. 17 **People are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary for the support of life.** But to assist every one who is needy, far

surpasses the strength and interest of a private person, for the wealth of a private person is altogether insufficient to supply such wants. Again, each one's ability is too limited to make friends of all his fellow-men. **Hence the care of the poor is a duty which falls on the State and refers to general welfare services.**

ch. 18 One has to be very careful also in accepting gifts and favors, and in returning bland gratitude (cf. sc, /p. 70 & sc. /p. 71).

ch. 19 **Sexual love, then, i.e. the lust of generation which arises from the (generic urge of) species, and absolutely all love motivated by something else than our inner freedom, readily passes into hatred: unless indeed, what is worse, it be a kind of madness stirred up even more by discord than by concord. (**III. /31 cor.).

ch. 20 As to **marriage, it is certainly in agreement with reason, if the desire for physical union is not merely generic but proceeds. also from the love to beget children and to educate them wisely; moreover, if the love of both, man and woman, has for its cause not merely the (generic urge of) species, but chiefly inner freedom.**

ch. 21 **Flattery creates also a kind of concord, but only by means of the disgraceful crime of slavishness or hypocrisy; for, none are more readily taken with flattery than the arrogant, who wish to be first but are not.**

ch. 22 **There is in despondency a spurious appearance of piety and religion. Although it is the opposite to pride, yet is the humble most akin to the arrogant.** (sc. /p. 57)

ch. 23 **Shame contributes also to concord, but only in such matters as cannot be concealed. Further, as shame is a kind of sorrow it is of no use to rationality**.

ch. 24 **All the other affective states of sorrow towards people, are directly opposed to justice, equity, honesty, devotedness and faith; and though indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet there is no law where everybody can pass judgment on another's deeds and vindicate his own or other people's rights.**

ch. 25 **Courtesy** (politeness), i.e. the desire of pleasing people is, when determined by reason, a kind of devotedness (sc. /p. 37). But if it springs from affectivity, it is ambition, or the

desire whereby people, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to assist other people, either by advice or by deed, in order that they may together enjoy the highest good, will strive, above all things, to win their love, and not to draw them into admiration, so that a doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give any occasion to envy. Further, in his public conversations he will avoid talking of people's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human weakness; but he will dwell at length on human virtue and power. and the way it may be perfected. Thus, p**eople will be stirred** not by fear, nor by aversion, but **only by the sentiment of joy,** to endeavor as much as they can, **to live in accordance with the commandments of reason.**

ch. 26 Beside man we know of no particular being in Nature in whose mind we may rejoice and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, **the principle of our self-interest does not call on us to preserve the other things in Nature besides man**, but to preserve or to destroy them at our convenience, and to adapt them to our use as best as we can.

ch. 27 The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and from recombining their elements, is chiefly the conservation of our body. From this point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish our body, that all its parts may properly perform their functions. For, in proportion as our body is capable of being disposed in a greater variety of ways, and of disposing external bodies, so much the more is our mind capable of thinking (p. 38 & 39). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in Nature; wherefore **for the due nourishment of our body we must use many foods of diverse nature**. For the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature, which stand in constant need of nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently, that the mind also be equally capable of understanding many things.

ch. 28 Now, for providing these nourishments, the means of each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not mutually assist one another. But **money has provided us with an economic epitome of all things** Hence, it is with the image of money that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed, for **people can hardly imagine any pleasure which be not accompanied with the idea of some cash as cause.**

ch. 29 But **this is a vice only in the case of those who seek money** not from poverty, or to supply their wants, but **because they have learned the arts of profit-making**, wherewith they swagger ostensibly. Yes, they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their riches as they spend on the preservation of their body. But those who know the true use of money and who fix the measure of their wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little.

ch. 30 **As those things are good which assist the various parts of our body and enable them to perform their functions, and, as joy consists in the fact that our self-power is increased or aided, it follows that all things which bring joy are good. But**, **on the other hand, things do not have our joy in view and their acting power is not tempered to suit our self-interest. Lastly, most of the time, joy concerns chiefly some specific part of the body. Hence, unless reason and watchfulness be at hand, sentiments of joy as also the desires arising therefrom, will be excessive most of the time**. Remark also, that affectivity leads us to pay attention to what is agreeable in the present and prevents us from considering with equanimity the future. (sc. /p. 44 & sc. /p. 60).

ch. 31 But **superstition**, on the contrary, **seems to account as good all that brings sorrow, and as bad all that brings joy.** However (sc. 2/p. 45) **none but envious people take delight in our weakness and trouble. Flatly, the greater the joy, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and thus the more do we partake of the divine nature. No joy can ever be evil when it is controlled by a true consideration of our self-interest. On the other hand, he who is led by fear and does good only in order to avoid evil, is not guided by reason** (p. 63)**.**

ch. 32 **But human power is limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. We have not an absolute power of shaping to our use the things which are external to us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with equanimity all which turns out against our advantage, when we are conscious of having done our duty, and that the power we have, could not reach so far as to avoid damage; remembering also that we are part of universal Nature and that we follow her order.**

If we have a clear and distinct idea of this, the part of ours which is defined as **intelligence** i.e. the better part of ourselves, will recover its peace and endeavor to remain undisturbed. For, to the extent that we understand we desire only which is necessary and, absolutely, **we find our peace of mind only in what is true.** Thus, through such understanding, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves concurs with the universal order of Nature.

PART FIVE: ABOUT HUMAN FREEDOM, OR THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT

PREFACE

I pass now to this remaining part of my Ethics dealing with the means or **the way leading to freedom**. I shall therefore treat here of the **power of reason,** showing what reason can against affectivity, and what is our **freedom of mind or blessedness;** we shall then be able to see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.

It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the intellect may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended as to be capable of the due performance of its functions; the latter is of the domain of **Medicine,** the former belongs to **Logic.** Here therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind or of reason; in first place I will show the extent and the nature of its control over affectivity, to restrain and to moderate our emotions. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown.

Yet the **Stoics** believed that affectivity depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern our affective states. But, by the protest of experience--not from their own principles--these philosophers were compelled to confess that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate our affectivity; and this, someone tried to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For, by long training it could be brought about that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.

To this opinion also **Descartes** inclines. For he maintains that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind feels all the movements produced in the body and also the external objects, and which gland, by a simple act of volition, the human mind can put in motion in various ways. This gland, he says, is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion

of the animal spirits, and that it is suspended in as many different ways as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the incoming animal spirits towards it. Whence it follows that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position wherein it has already been suspended once before, by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition in which they were when repulsed before, by a similar position of the gland.

He further states that every act of mental volition is naturally united to some given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever somebody desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to delate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland--which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil--is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but only with the wish to look at remote or very near objects.

Lastly, he assumes that--although every motion of the gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought, out of the whole number of thoughts from the very beginning of our life--yet, through habituation, that pineal gland can become associated with other thoughts; this he endeavors to prove in Passions de lâme (I. 50.) He thence concludes that "there is no soul as weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire unrestricted and absolute power over its passions." For passions, as defined by him, are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul in some specific way and which (mark his expression) are produced, preserved and strengthened through some movements of the animal spirits" (Passions de lâme I. 27).

But, as according to him, we can join any motion of the pineal gland (and consequently of the animal spirits) to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our powers; "if therefore, he continues, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we desire our actions to tend, and if we associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire, with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions."

Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher insofar as I gather it from his own words; it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder that a philosopher--who has stoutly asserted that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the

scholastics for trying to explain obscurities through some occult qualities--could advocate a hypothesis beside which those occult qualities are mere trifles!

What does he understand, I ask, by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept has he got of "the most intimate union" of some particular thought with some particle of matter? Truly, I should wish he had explained that "union" through its proximate cause. But he conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body, that he could not have assigned any particular cause of the union between the two, nor of the mind as such, but would have been obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.

Further, I should much like to know what degrees of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold so suspended? For, I am in ignorance whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger, the pineal gland might become suspended in a way which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except of running away. In truth, since there is no relation between will and motion, so there is no comparison possible between the power of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently, the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other.

We may also add that **there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain,** so placed that it be easily set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all his assertions concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Thus, as the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by intelligence alone, we shall determine the remedies against affectivity--which I believe everybody knows somehow by experience, but does not accurately observe or distinctly see-- in proceeding solely from our knowledge of the mind, and, from the same basis also, we shall deduce all those conclusions which have regard to our mind's blessedness.

AXIOMS

a. 1. IF IN THE SAME SUBJECT TWO CONTRARY ACTIONS BE STARTED, A CHANGE WILL NECESSARILY TAKE PLACE EITHER IN BOTH OR IN ONE OF THE TWO, UNTIL THEY CEASE TO BE CONTRARY.

a. 2 THE POWER OF AN EFFECT IS DEFINED BY THE POWER OF ITS CAUSE, INSOFAR AS ITS NATURE IS EXPLAINED OR DEFINED BY THE NATURE OF ITS CAUSE, (cf. III. /7)

PROPOSITIONS

p. 1 **AS THOUGHTS AND IDEAS OF THINGS ARE ASSOCIATED IN THE MIND, EXACTLY IN THE SAME WAY ARE THE SENSATIONS OR IMAGES OF THE THINGS ARRANGED AND ASSOCIATED IN THE BODY.** Dem. ; The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. /7) as the order and connection of things, and vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same (II. /6 cor,) as the order and connection of ideas. Thus, exactly as the order and connection of ideas takes place in the mind, according to the order and association of bodily sensations (II. /18), so vice versa (III. /2) the order and connection of bodily sensations takes place according to the way thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. qed.

p. 2 **IF WE DETACH AN EMOTION OR AFFECTIVE STATE FROM THE THOUGHT OF AN EXTERNAL CAUSE AND ATTACH IT TO OTHER THOUGHTS, THEN THE LOVE OR HATE TOWARD THAT EXTERNAL CAUSE, AS WELL AS OUR MIND's WAVERINGS WHICH ARISE FROM THESE FEELINGS, WILL BE DESTROYED.** Dem.: The specificity of love and hate consists in joy and sorrow accompanied by the idea of some external cause (af. 6 & 7). Hence, when this cause is removed, thus will also disappear the specific love or hate; therefore these feelings and our mind's waverings which arise therefrom, will be destroyed. qed.

p. 3 **AN AFFECTIVE STATE WHICH IS A SUFFERING, CEASES TO BE A SUFFERING, AS SOON AS WE FORM OF IT A CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA.** Dem.: An affective state which is a suffering is a confused idea (gda.). If therefore we form a clear and distinct idea of a given affective state, that idea and the affective state will be distinguished (as far as the mind is concerned) through reason alone (II. /21 + sc,); hence (III. /3) an affective state which is a suffering etc. ; qed.

cor. **AN AFFECTIVE STATE IS KEPT BETTER UNDER CONTROL AND WE SUFFER LESS FROM IT, THE BETTER WE LEARN TO KNOW IT.**

p. 4 **OF ANY SENSATION OF OUR BODY (WITHOUT EXCEPTION) WE CAN FORM SOME CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA.** Dem.: Which is common to all things can only be conceived adequately (II. /38); hence, by II. /12 and II. /13 lem. 2, of any sensation of our body etc. ; qed.

cor. **OF ANY AFFECTIVE STATE (WITHOUT EXCEPTION) WE CAN FORM SOME CLEAR AND DISTINCT CONCEPT.** For an affective state is the idea of a sensation and as such must (p. 4) imply some clear concept.

sc. As there is nothing which be not followed by some effect (I. /36) and as we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us (II. /40), it follows that everybody has the power of understanding himself and his affectivity, though not absolutely, but still to some extent, and to bring about a lessening of his sufferings.

To attain this result we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquire some clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion; thus we will be determined through the given affective state to think of that which we clearly and distinctly perceive and wherein we recover our peace of mind; thus the affective state itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with some true thoughts. So it will come to pass, not only that love, hate etc. be destroyed (p. 2), but also that the drives and desires which are wont to arise from such feelings, will not become excessive (IV. /61).

For it must be especially remarked that the drive through which we are said to act, and the drive through which we are said to suffer, is one and the same. We have shown for instance that human nature is so constituted that everybody desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. /31 cor.). In one who is not guided by reason, this tendency is a suffering which is called ambition and does not much differ from pride. Whereas in one who lives rationally, it is an action or virtue which is called devotedness (IV. /37 sc. 1 + dem. 2).

In like manner all drives and desires are only insofar sufferings as they spring from inadequate ideas (IV. /59) The same tendencies are accredited to virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. Indeed, all desires whereby we are determined to do something, may arise as well from adequate ideas, as from inadequate ones (ibid.).

As to the remedy for affectivity--to return to the point from where I started--consisting in the true knowledge of the affective states, nothing more excellent can be devised, which be within our power. For our mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as I have shown above (III. /3).

p. 5 **THE FEELING TOWARDS SOMETHING WHICH WE SIMPLY IMAGINE-- NOT AS NECESSARY, NOR AS CONTINGENT, NOR AS POSSIBLE--IS RELATIVELY THE STRONGEST.** Dem.: The feeling towards something which we imagine to be free is stronger than the feeling towards a thing which we imagine to be necessary (III. /49) and still stronger than towards something possible or contingent (IV. /11). But to imagine a thing as free, can

be nothing else than to imagine it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II, /35 sc,); hence the feeling towards something which we simply imagine etc. ; qed.

p. 6 **INSOFAR AS WE UNDERSTAND ALL THINGS AS NECESSARY, WE HAVE A GREATER POWER OVER OUR AFFECTIVITY, AND SUFFER LESS FROM IT.** Dem.: We understand all things to be necessary (I. /29) and as determined to exist and to operate by an infinite chain of causes (I. /28); and to that extent (p. 5) we suffer less from the affective states which arise from them (III. /48) and are less affected by them.

sc. The more this knowledge--that all things in the thinghood are necessary--is applied to particular things which we imagine distinctly and lively, the greater will be our power over affectivity, as experience also testifies. For we see that sorrow arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the person who lost it, realizes that she could not have preserved it by any means. So also we see that no one pities an infant because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years in a sort of unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, everybody would pity the infants; because then infancy would not be looked on as a natural and necessary state, but as a fault or vice of Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.

p. 7 **THE AFFECTIVE STATES WHICH ARISE FROM RATIONAL THINKING ARE RELATIVELY STRONGER THAN THOSE CONCERNING PARTICULAR THINGS WHICH WE CONSIDER AS ABSENT.** Dem.: What makes us consider a thing as absent, is not the feeling with which we imagine that thing, but it is the fact of the body being disposed by another feeling, in a way which excludes the existence of the said thing (II. /17). Thus, the affective state concerning a thing which we consider as absent is not of a nature to overcome the rest of our activities and power (IV. /6), but on the contrary, it is of a nature as to be restrained in some way by sensations which exclude the existence of its (external) cause(IV. /9). Whereas an affective state which arises from rational thinking refers necessarily to some common properties of things (cf. II. /40 sc, 2 for the definition of reason). always regarded as present--for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence--and which we always imagine in the same manner (II. /38). Wherefore, an affective state of this kind always remains the same; and consequently (a. 1) affective states which are contrary thereto and are not enhanced by their external causes, will be forced to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; thus, the affective states which arise etc. ; qed.

p. 8 **AN AFFECTIVE STATE IS STRONGER IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF SIMULTANEOUS AND CONCURRENT CAUSES WHEREBY IT IS AROUSED.** Dem.: Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III. 7), hence (IV. /5) an affective state etc. ; qed

sc. This proposition is also evident from a. 2.

p. 9 **AN EMOTION DUE TO MANY AND DIVERSE CAUSES (WHICH WE CONSIDER TOGETHER WITH IT), IS LESS HURTFUL AND WE WILL SUFFER LESS FROM IT, AND ARE LESS AFFECTED TOWARDS EACH OF ITS CAUSES, THAN AN EQUALLY STRONG EMOTION DUE TO FEWER CAUSES OR TO A SINGLE CAUSE.** Dem.: An emotion is bad or hurtful only insofar as it hinders us from thinking (IV. /26 & 27); hence the emotion whereby we are determined to consider several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally strong emotion which so engrosses our mind in the contemplation of a few objects or of a single one, that we are unable to think of something else; this is our first point. Again, as our mind's beingness or self-power (III. /7) consists only in thinking (II. /11) we will suffer less from an emotion which makes us think of several things at once, than we would suffer from an equally strong emotion, which keeps our mind engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object; this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion, as it is due to several external causes, is (III. /48) also less strong relatively to each of them. qed.

p. 10 **SO LONG AS WE ARE NOT AGITATED BY EMOTIONS CONTRARY TO OUR NATURE, WE HAVE THE POWER TO COORDINATE AND ASSOCIATE OUR SENSATIONS ACCORDING TO THE NORMS OF THE INTELLECT.** Dem.: The emotions which are contrary to our nature, i. e (IV. /30) which are bad, are in so far bad as they hinder us from understanding (IV. /27). Thus, so long as we are not agitated by such affective states, our power of understanding things (IV. /26) is not impeded and we are able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them from one another (IV. /40 sc. 2 & II. /47 sc,); hence, so long as we are not agitated etc. ; qed.

sc. By this power of properly coordinating and associating our sensations, we can guard ourselves from being easily overcome by bad emotions. For, a greater force (p. 7) is needed to overcome emotions when they are coordinated and associated according to the norms of the intellect, then when they are uncertain and unsettled.

The best we can do therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our affectivity, is to **establish a pattern of life and rules of conduct, to commit it to memory and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances** which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued with it, and that they be always ready to our use. For instance, among the rules of life (IV. /46 sc.) we have laid down is, that **hatred should be overcome with love and generosity, and not requited with hatred in return.**

Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our use in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by people, and in what manner and way, they may be best warded off by generosity. We shall then associate the idea of

wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will be always ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. /18). If we keep also in readiness the **principle of our true self-interest, and of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common life in society,** and if we remember further, that from the right way of life results our highest good, the peace of mind in self-contentment (IV. /52) and that we, as everything else, act by the necessity of our nature, then it will happen that the wrong done to us, or the hate which commonly arises from it, will keep a very small place in our imagination and will be easily overcome.

And if anger, which is the usual reaction to a very serious offense, be not overcome so easily, it will nevertheless be overcome--though not without some inner waverings--and far sooner than if we had not reflected beforehand on the subject. (p. 6. 7 & 8). We should in the same way reflect on wholeheartedness. as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby, through heroism and alertness, they could be avoided and overcome.

But we must note that in arranging our thoughts and concepts we should always pay attention to what is good in every particular being (IV. /63 cor. + III. /59) in order that we may **always be determined to action by a sentiment of joy.** For instance, if somebody sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of glory, let him think of its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse and its emptiness, and on the changing attitude of people, and the like, about which no one thinks except in a depressed mood. With thoughts like these, do greatly torment themselves those who are ambitious, when they despair of obtaining the honors for which they are striving; and while they vomit forth rage, they wish to appear wise. Indeed, it is certain that those who are out the loudest against the misuse of glory and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it.

This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all those who are not favored by fortune and weak-minded. For a poor man also, who is greedy, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself and shows to others that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty, but also the wealth of others.

So again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love: they think of nothing but the fickleness, the faithlessness, and the other oft-proclaimed failings of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, as soon as they are taken again into favor by their sweetheart. Thus, he who strives to moderate his affectivity and his drives out of his pervasive love of (esprital) freedom, he will try as much as he can to gain a knowledge of his virtues and their causes and to fill his mind with that joy which arises from a true knowledge of them; but he will never dwell on people's vices, or carp at his fellows, or revel in a false show of freedom. Everybody who will diligently observe and practice these precepts (which indeed are not

difficult) will surely, in a short time, be able to direct most of his actions according to the commandments of reason.

p. 11 THE MORE THINGS AN IMAGE CONCERNS, THE MORE IS IT FREQUENT OR EVOKED, AND THE MORE DOES IT OCCUPY OUR MIND

Dem. ; The more things an image or affective state (*imago seu affectus*) concerns, the more causes are found whereby it can be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) we consider at once in association with some emotion; hence that emotion is more frequently evoked and (p. 8) occupies more our mind. qed.

p. 12 IMAGES OF THINGS ARE ASSOCIATED EASIER WITH THE IMAGES OF THOSE THINGS WHICH WE UNDERSTAND CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY, THAN WITH OTHERS. Dem.: Things which we understand clearly and distinctly. are either the common properties of things or derivations from them (II. /40 sc, 2) and consequently (p. 11) are more often aroused in us. Hence, it may more readily happen that we should consider other things in conjunction with these images, than in conjunction with something else. qed.

p. 13 THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF IMAGES WITH WHICH AN IMAGE IS ASSOCIATED, THE MORE OFTEN IS IT EVOKED. Dem.: In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images , are there (II. /18) more causes whereby it can be aroused. qed.

p. 14 WE CAN BRING IT ABOUT THAT ALL OUR SENSATIONS OR IMAGES OF THINGS BE REFERRED TO THE IDEA OF GOD. Dem.: There is no sensation of which we may not form some clear and distinct concept (p. 4); hence we can bring it about etc. qed.

p. 15 HE WHO CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF AND HIS AFFECTIVITY, LOVES GOD AND SO MUCH THE MORE IN PROPORTION AS HE MORE UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF AND HIS AFFECTIVITY. Dem.: He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affectivity is joyful (III. /53) and his joy (p. 14) is accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (af. 6) he loves God and so much the more etc. ; qed.

p. 16 THIS LOVE TOWARDS GOD MUST OCCUPY COMPLETELY OUR MIND. Dem.: For this love is associated with all our sensations (p. 14) and is fostered by them all (p. 15); hence (p. 11) this love etc. qed.

p. 17 GOD IS FREE FROM PASSIONS AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY ANY EMOTION OF JOY OR SORROW. Dem.: All ideas insofar as they are referred to God are true (II. /32). i.e. (II. /d.

4) adequate; hence (gda.) God is free from passions (sufferings). Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. /20 cor. 2); hence, God is free etc. qed. , Strictly speaking.

cor. **GOD LOVES NOBODY AND HATES NOBODY.** For God (p. 17) is not affected by any emotion of joy or sorrow, and consequently (af. 6 & 7) he loves nobody and hates nobody. qed.

p. 18 **NOBODY CAN HATE GOD.** Dem.: The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. /46 &47). Hence, insofar as we contemplate God we are active (III. /3); consequently (III. /59) there can be no sorrow accompanied by the idea of God i.e. (af. 7) nobody can hate God.

cor. **LOVE TOWARDS GOD CANNOT BE TURNED INTO HATE.**

sc. It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, by that very fact we regard God as the cause of sorrow. But to that I answer: that insofar as we understand the causes of sorrow, to that extent (p. 3) it ceases to be a suffering; that is, it ceases to be sorrow (III. /59); therefore, **insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sorrow, we, to that extent, enjoy**.

p. 19 **HE WHO LOVES GOD CANNOT STRIVE THAT GOD SHOULD LOVE HIM IN RETURN.** Dem.: For, if somebody should so endeavor, he would desire (cor. /p. 17) that God whom he loves be no God, and thus he would desire to feel sorry (III. /19) which is absurd (III. /28). Hence, he who loves God etc. ; qed.

p. 20 **THIS LOVE TOWARDS GOD CANNOT BE STAINED BY ANY ENVY OR JEALOUSY; INSTEAD, IT IS THE MORE FOSTERED, THE MORE PEOPLE WE IMAGINE JOINED TO GOD BY THE SAME BOND OF LOVE.** Dem.: This love towards God is the highest good we can seek under the guidance of reason (IV. /28): it is common to all (IV. /36) and we desire that all rejoice in it (IV. /37) and hence (af. 23) it cannot be stained by any envy or jealousy (p. 18 + III. /35 sc.); qed.

sc. We can show in the same way that **there is no feeling directly contrary to this Love and by which this Love could be destroyed.** Hence we may conclude that this Love towards God is the most constant of all our sentiments and that, relatively to the body, it cannot be destroyed unless with the body itself. As of its nature, relatively to our mind, we shall speak hereafter.

I have now gone through all the remedies against affectivity and shown what our mind can do about. It appears therefrom that our mind's power over affectivity consists: 1) In the very knowledge of our affective states(sc. /p. 4); 2) In the fact that we separate our emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (p. 2 & sc. /p. 4); 3) In the fact that, relatively to time, emotions concerning things which we understand clearly and distinctly, surpass those concerning things which we grasp confusedly and incompletely (p. 7); 4) In the abundance of causes by which those of our sensations are supported which refer to the common properties of things, or to God (p. 9 & p. 11); 5) Lastly, in the order in which we can rationally coordinate our emotions and connect them one with another (sc. /p. 10. p. 12. p. 13 & 14).

But, in order to better understand this power of the mind over affectivity, it should be observed that we speak of **strong emotions** inasmuch as we compare the emotions of one person with those of another and see that one person is more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same individual and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another. For, the strength of each emotion (IV. /5) is defined by the power of an external cause in composition with our self-power. Now, **the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its weakness or passiveness by privation of knowledge only.** Hence, that mind is the most passive, or suffers, whose major part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its sufferings than by its activities. On the other hand, that mind is most active, whose major part is made up of adequate ideas, so that--although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former--it may yet be characterized more readily by ideas representing human virtue, than the ideas reflecting human weakness.

_____Again, it must be observed that psychic sicknesses and misfortunes can be generally traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many changes and which we can never possess. For nobody is troubled or anxious about an object he does not love, neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities etc. arise except from love towards objects of which no one can be truly the possessor.

All this shows us readily the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that **third kind of knowledge** (II. /47 sc.) **based on our (esprital) awareness of God,** possesses over affectivity. If it does not completely destroy emotions, insofar as they are sufferings, (p. 3 & sc. /p. 4), it makes them occupy a very small part of our mind (p. 14); it generates, further, the Love towards the Immutable and Eternal (p. 15) which Love can be truly ours (II. /45) and is not debased by the defects inherent in ordinary love, but which may keep growing in strength, so as to occupy the largest part of our mind (p. 16) and deeply penetrate it.

I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to **this present life.** For, as intended I have described in this scholium all the remedies against affectivity, as anyone may find by himself, in paying due attention to what we have advanced here, as well as to the definitions of mind and affectivity, and also to III. /1 and III. /3.

It is time therefore that I should now pass to those considerations which concern the duration of our mind independently from the body.

p. 21 **OUR MIND CAN IMAGINE THINGS OR REMEMBER PAST THINGS ONLY AS LONG AS OUR BODY LASTS.** Dem.: The mind expresses the actual existence of its body and is imagining as present the sensations of the body, only as long as the body lasts (II. /8 cor,); and consequently (II. /26) imagines (external) bodies as really existing, only as long as its own body lasts, qed

p. 22 **BUT THERE IS IN GOD NECESSARILY AN IDEA, WHICH EXPRESSES THE BEINGNESS OF THIS OR THAT HUMAN BODY FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY.** Dem.: God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its beingness (I. /25), which therefore must be comprehended through God's very beingness (I. /a. 4) and this by an eternal. necessity(I. /16), and this concept must necessarily exist in God (II. /3) qed.

p. 23 **OUR MIND CANNOT BE ABSOLUTELY DESTROYED WITH THE BODY, BUT SOMETHING OF IT REMAINS WHICH IS ETERNAL.** Dem.: There is necessarily in God a concept or idea which expresses the beingness of our body (p. 22), which necessarily belongs to the beingness of our mind (II. /13). But we do not assign to our mind any duration, definable by time, except insofar it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration and may be defined by time, i.e. (II. /8 cor.) we do not assign duration to our mind, except as long as the body lasts. As there is nevertheless "something" (*aliquot)* which by an eternal necessity is comprehended through God's very beingness, this "something" which belongs to the beingness of our mind, will necessarily be eternal.

sc. This idea which expresses the body's beingness from the angle of eternity is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking belonging to the mind's beingness and which is necessarily eternal. Yet **it is not possible for us to remember that we existed before our body**, for there is no trace in our body of such existence and neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or be related to time. **Nevertheless, we feel and come to know that we are eternal.** For we feel those things which we grasp through the intellect. no less than the things which we remember. For **the eyes of the mind, whereby the mind sees and observes things, are precisely its very demonstrations.** Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind--insofar as it implies the body's beingness from the angle of eternity--is eternal

and that its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus, only as it implies the present existence of our body, can our mind be said to last and can it be defined by some fixed time; and thus far only have we the power of determining the existence of things by time and viewing them from the angle of duration.

p. 24 **THE MORE WE UNDERSTAND PARTICULAR THINGS, THE MORE WE UNDERSTAND GOD.** Dem.: This is evident from I. /25 cor.

p. 25 **OUR HIGHEST ENDEAVOR AND OUR HIGHEST VIRTUE IS TO UNDERSTAND THINGS THROUGH THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE.** Dem.: The third kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of some attributes of God, to the adequate knowledge of the beingness of things (II. /40 sc.); and in proportion as we understand more things in that way, we better understand God (p. 24); hence (IV. /28) our highest mental virtue, i.e. (IV. /d. 8) power or nature, or (III. /7) our highest endeavor is to understand things etc. ; qed.

p. 26 **THE MORE WE ARE CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING THINGS THROUGH THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE, THE MORE WE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THINGS IN THAT WAY**. Dem.: This is self-evident. For, insofar as we think that we are capable of understanding things through this third kind of knowledge, to that extent we think ourselves as determined to do so; consequently (af. 1), the more we are capable etc.

p. 27 **FROM THIS THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE ARISES THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PEACE OF MIND.** Dem.: Our highest virtue is to be aware of God or to understand things through the third kind of knowledge (p. 25) and this virtue is greater in proportion as we know more things in that way (p. 24). He who knows things in such a way, thus passes to the summit of human perfection and is therefore experiencing (af. 2) the highest joy, associated with the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (af. 25) from this third kind etc. ; qed.

p. 28 **THE ENDEAVOR OR DESIRE TO KNOW THINGS THROUGH THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE CANNOT ARISE FROM THE FIRST KIND OF KNOWLEDGE, BUT FROM THE SECOND KIND.** Dem.: This is self-evident. For, whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through something else which is self-evident; i.e. ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which pertain to the third kind of knowledge (II. /40 sc. 2) cannot follow from ideas that are incomplete and confused and pertain to the knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas pertaining to the second or to the third kind of knowledge. Hence the endeavor etc. ; qed.

p. 29 WHAT WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY, WE UNDERSTAND IT NOT BECAUSE WE THINK THE PRESENT EXISTENCE OF OUR BODY, BUT BECAUSE WE THINK ITS BEINGNESS FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY. Dem.: Insofar as we think the present existence of our body, we think also duration which can be determined by time, and to that extent only have we the power to imagine things in relation to time (p. 21 + II. /26). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. /d. 8 + expl.). Hence to this extent we do not have the power to understand things from the angle of eternity. But we possess such a power, because it is of the nature of reason to perceive things from the angle of eternity(II. /44 cor. 2) and also because it is of the nature of our mind to think our body's beingness from the angle of eternity (p. 25); and as nothing else constitutes the beingness of our mind (II. /13), what we understand etc. qed.

sc. We think in two ways the reality of things: either as existing **relatively** to a given time and space, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. And what we think in this second (esprital) way as true and real, we think it f**rom the angle of eternity,** and such ideas imply God's eternal and infinite beingness (II. /45 sc,)

p. 30 INSOFAR AS WE KNOW OURSELVES AND OUR BODY FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY, WE ARE NECESSARILY AWARE OF GOD AND KNOW THAT WE ARE IN GOD AND THAT WE ARE CONCEIVED BY GOD. Dem.: Eternity is God's very beingness, insofar as it implies necessary existence (I. /d. 8). Hence, to view things from the angle of eternity, is to think them such as they are conceived as real entities through God's beingness, or insofar as they imply existence through God's beingness. Therefore, insofar as we know ourselves etc. ; qed.

p. 31 THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS ON OUR MIND AS ITS SPECIFIC CAUSE, INSOFAR AS OUR MIND ITSELF IS ETERNAL. Dem.: We do not think anything from the angle of eternity, except insofar as we think our own body from the angle of eternity (p. 29); i.e. insofar as our mind is eternal (p. 21 & 23); therefore (p. 30) to that extent we possess the (esprital) awareness of God, which awareness is necessarily adequate (II. /46). Hence, our mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which may result from the (esprital) awareness of God (II. /40) i.e. of knowing all those things through the third kind of knowledge, qed.

sc. Therefore, the richer we are in this kind of knowledge, the more will we be conscious of ourselves and of God, i.e. more perfect and blessed, as I will show in a moment. But let us observe here that although we are already certain that our mind is eternal, insofar as we think reality from the angle of eternity, yet--in order that, what I wish to prove, may be easier explained and better understood--we will, as I have hitherto done, consider our mind as if it has

just begun to be, and had just begun to understand things from the angle of eternity. This we can do without any risk of error, provided only we are careful to conclude nothing except from clear premisses.

p. 32 **WHAT WE UNDERSTAND THROUGH THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE, WE TAKE DELIGHT IN, AND OUR DELIGHT IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF GOD AS CAUSE.** Dem.: From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind i.e. (af. 25) joy, and this contentment is accompanied by the idea of ourselves (p. 27) and consequently (p. 30) also by the idea of God as cause. qed.

cor. **FROM THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE NECESSARILY ARISES THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD.** Indeed, from this kind of knowledge arises joy accompanied by the idea of God as cause, i.e. (af. 6) the Love towards God; not insofar as we imagine him as present (p, 29) but **insofar as we understand him to be eternal. And this is what I call the "Intellectual Love of God ".**

p. 33 **THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD WHICH ARISES FROM THE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE IS ETERNAL.** Dem.: The third kind of knowledge is eternal (p. 31 + I. /a. 3), hence the Love which arises from it is necessarily eternal (ibid.) qed.

sc. Although this Love towards God has (p. 33) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just **as if** it had originated--as we tentatively supposed in cor. /p. 32. Nor is there here any difference, except that our mind possesses from all eternity those same perfections which we tentatively supposed to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If joy consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly: **Blessedness must consist in the very fact that our mind is endowed with perfection itself.**

p. 34 **ONLY WHILE THE BODY LASTS ARE WE EXPOSED TO AFFECTIVE STATES WHICH ARE SUFFERINGS.** Dem.: Imagination is the idea by which we regard a thing as present (II. /17 sc,); yet, this idea indicates rather the present state of our body than the nature of the external thing (II. /16 cor. 2). Hence, an affective state (gda.) is imagination insofar it indicates the present state of our body. Therefore (p. 31) only while the body lasts etc. ; qed.

cor. **NO LOVE IS ETERNAL SAVE THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD.**

sc If we pay attention to what **people** generally believe, we shall find that they **are indeed conscious of the eternity of their minds**, **but** that **they confound it with duration and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe remain after death.**

p. 35 **GOD LOVES HIMSELF WITH AN INFINITE INTELLECTUAL LOVE.** Dem.: God is absolutely infinite (I. /d. 6) i.e. (II. /d. 6) God's nature delights in an infinite perfection; and such delight is (II. /3) accompanied by the idea of himself i.e. (I. /11 & I. /d. 1) by the idea of his own cause; now this is what we have described as Intellectual Love (cor. /p. 32). Hence, God loves himself etc. ; qed.

p. 36 **THE MIND's INTELLECTUAL LOVE TOWARDS GOD, IS THAT VERY LOVE WITH WHICH GOD LOVES HIMSELF, NOT INSOFAR AS HE IS INFINITE, BUT INASMUCH AS HE CAN BE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE BEINGNESS OF OUR MIND, VIEWED FROM THE ANGLE OF ETERNITY i.e.: THE MIND's INTELLECTUAL LOVE TOWARDS GOD IS PART OF THE INFINITE LOVE WITH WHICH GOD LOVES HIMSELF.** Dem.: This love of the mind must be referred to the mind's activities (cor. /p. 32 + III. /3) such as the activity whereby we contemplate ourselves, accompanied by the idea of God as cause (p. 32 + cor.) i.e. (I. /25 cor. & II. /11 cor.) an activity whereby God, insofar as he can be explained through our mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (p. 35) this love of the mind is part of the infinite Love with which God loves himself. qed. Hence

cor. **GOD, INSOFAR AS HE LOVES HIMSELF, LOVES MAN, AND GOD's LOVE TOWARDS US AND OUR INTELLECTUAL LOVE TOWARDS GOD, ARE ONE AND THE SAME.**

sc. From what has been said we clearly understand wherein consists **our salvation or happiness or freedom**, namely in the constant and eternal Love towards God, or in God's Love towards man. In the Bible this Love or blessedness is called **Glory** and not undeservedly. For, whether this love be referred to God or to our mind, it may be rightly called self-contentment which (af. 25 & 30) is not really distinguished from glory. Insofar as it is referred to God it is (p. 35) joy, (if we may still use that word) accompanied by the idea of himself; and insofar as it is referred to our mind, it is the same (p. 27). Again, since **the beingness of our mind consists in the fact of knowing**, whose beginning and foundation is God (I. /15 & II. /47 sc,) it becomes clear to us how our mind follows from the divine nature, in beingness and existence, and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worthwhile to call attention to this fact, in order to show by that example how the knowledge of particular things which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. /40 sc. 2) is more powerful and efficient than the universal knowledge, which I have called knowledge of the second kind. For, although in part I. we have shown in general terms that all things (and thus also our mind) depend on God as to their beingness and existence, yet that demonstration, though it is legitimate and out of any doubt's reach, does not impress us

so much, as when the same conclusion **is derived from the fact of a particular thing** which we say depends on God.

p. 37 **THERE IS NOTHING IN NATURE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THIS INTELLECTUAL LOVE. OR WHICH COULD ABOLISH IT.** Dem.: This Intellectual Love follows necessarily from the mind's nature, viewed as an eternal truth out of God's nature (p. 33 & 29). Thus, if there be anything contrary to this Love, that thing would be contrary to truth; consequently, if that thing be able to abolish this Love, it would cause that truth become false, which is absurd. Hence there is nothing etc. qed.

sc. IV. /a. 1 refers to particular things considered relatively to time and space; of this, I think, no one can doubt.

p. 38 **THE MORE THINGS WE UNDERSTAND THROUGH THE SECOND AND THIRD KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE, THE LESS WE SUFFER FROM AFFECTIVITY AND THE LESS WE FEAR DEATH.** Dem.: Our mind's beingness consists in the fact of knowing (II. /11); thus in proportion as we understand more things through the second and the third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be our mind's lasting part (p. 29 & 23) and (p. 37) untouched by affective states contrary to our nature, or bad (IV. /30). Therefore the more things etc. ; qed.

sc. Hence we understand that, which I touched upon in IV. /39 sc. and which I promised to explain in this part, namely that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as our esprital awareness or our clear and distinct knowledge is greater and, consequently, the more we love God. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind (p. 27), it follows that a mind may be of such a nature that the part of it, which we have shown to perish with the body (p. 21) be insignificant in comparison with its lasting part. But more fully about that, in what follows.

p. 39 **HE WHO HAS AN EXTREMELY CAPABLE BODY, HAS A MIND OF WHICH THE MAJOR PART IS ETERNAL.** Dem.: He who has a body capable of great many activities, is least upset by affectivity, inasmuch as it is bad (IV. /38) i.e. (IV. /30) by affective states contrary to his nature; therefore (p. 10) he has the power of coordinating and associating his sensations according to the norms of the intellect, and thus of bringing it about that all his sensations be referred to the idea of God; hence (p. 15) he will experience love towards God, which love (p. 16) must completely absorb his mind. Hence (p. 33) he, who has an extremely capable body etc. ; qed.

sc. Since human bodies are extremely capable, they could without any doubt be of such a nature that they correspond to minds which to a great extent know themselves and God, and of

which the major part is eternal, and thus, that they should scarcely fear death. To understand this more clearly, we must recall here that we live in a state of perpetual change, and according as we are changed for the better or for the worse, we are called happy or unhappy. For he, who still an infant or child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness if we have been able to live through the whole cycle of life with a sound mind and a sound body.

And in reality, he who like an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, as such, is scarcely conscious of itself, of God, or of the world. Whereas he, who has a body capable of very many things, has a mind which, as such, is highly aware of himself, of God and of the world.

In this life we therefore primarily endeavor that the body of a child, inasmuch as its nature allows it and conduces thereto, be changed into another body, greatly capable and having a mind highly conscious of himself, of God and of the world; so that what is referred to imagination and memory be insignificant in comparison to his intellect. (cf. sc. /p. 38).

p. 40 **THE MORE PERFECTION A THING HAS, THE MORE DOES IT ACT, AND THE LESS IS IT PASSIVE; AND CONVERSELY, THE MORE A THING ACTS, THE MORE IS IT PERFECT.** Dem.: The more a thing is perfect, the more reality does it have (II. /d. 6) and (III. /3 +sc,) to this extent does it more act and be less passive. In reversing the demonstration, we may prove that conversely the more a thing acts, the more is it perfect. qed. Hence:

cor. **THE LASTING PART OF OUR MIND, BE IT GREAT OR SMALL, IS MORE PERFECT THAN THE REST.** For the eternal part of our mind (p. 23 & 29) is the Intellect, through which alone we are said to act (III. /3); the part which we have shown to perish is Imagination (p. 21) through which alone we are said to be passive or to suffer (gda.).

sc Such are the facts which I intended to show regarding our mind, insofar as it is considered independently from the body From these facts and also from I. /21. it is plain that, insofar as we understand, our mind is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity**;** so that all together, these eternal modes of thinking, constitute the eternal and infinite Intellect of God.

p. 41 **EVEN IF WE DID NOT KNOW THAT OUR MIND IS ETERNAL, WE WOULD STILL CONSIDER AS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE <u>DEVOTEDNESS AND FAITH</u>, AND ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING WHICH CONCERNS <u>WHOLEHEARTEDNESS AND GENEROSITY</u>, AS SHOWN IN PART**

FOUR. Dem.: The first and only foundation of virtue or of the proper conduct of life (IV. /22 cor,) is seeking one's self-interest (IV. /24). Now, while determining what rationality prescribes as useful, we took no account of our mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this part five. Although we were at that time ignorant of our mind's eternity, we stated nevertheless that all the things concerning wholeheartedness and generosity were of primary importance. Hence, even if we did not know that our mind is eternal etc. ; qed.

sc. People's general belief seems to be different. **Most seem to believe that they are only insofar free as they may obey their lusts**, and that they give up a portion of their rights, insofar as they are bound to live according to the commands of divine law. They therefore believe that devotedness, faith i.e. true religion, and absolutely all things related to **heroism**, are burdens which they hope to lay aside after death and **to receive the reward for their bondage, that it to say, for their piety and their religion.**

It is not only by this hope but also, and chiefly, **by the fear of dreadful punishments after death**, that they are induced to live according to the commandments of divine law, that is to say, as far as their weakness and their impotent mind will carry them.

If this hope and this fear were not in them, but if people, on the contrary, believed that our mind perishes with the body, and that there is no prolongation of life for the miserable creatures who are broken down with the burdens of piety and morality, they would return to ways of their own liking; they would prefer to let everything be controlled by their own passions, and to obey haphazard events rather than themselves.

Such a behavior appears to me not less absurd than if somebody, because he does not believe that he will be able to feed his body with wholesome food to all eternity, should desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether and to live in madness, without reason; absurdities so great that they scarcely deserve to be mentioned.

p. 42 TRUE HAPPINESS IS NOT THE REWARD OF VIRTUE, BUT IS VIRTUE ITSELF; NOR DO WE REJOICE IN TRUE HAPPINESS BECAUSE WE REFRAIN OUR LUSTS, BUT ON THE CONTRARY: BECAUSE WE REJOICE IN TRUE HAPPINESS, ARE WE ABLE TO RESTRAIN OUR LUSTS. Dem.: True happiness consists in Love towards God (p. 36 + sc,), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (cor. /p. 32); hence this love (III. /3 & III. /59) must be referred t o our self-power i.e. to our mind insofar as it is active; thus (IV. /d. 8) it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as we rejoice more in this divine Love, or true happiness (blessedness), the more we understand (p. 32) i.e. (cor. /p. 3) so much the more power do we have over our affectivity and (p. 38) so much the less do we suffer from affective states which are bad; therefore, in proportion as we rejoice in this divine Love or true happiness, we have the power of restraining lusts. And, since human power in restraining affectivity, consists solely in the intellect, it follows that nobody

rejoices in true happiness or blessedness because he has restrained his lusts, but on the contrary, one's power of restraining lusts arises from happiness itself. qed.

sc. I have thus finished all I intended to set forth concerning our mind's power over affectivity and concerning our freedom of thinking. From what has been said we see how efficient the sage is, and how much he surpasses the ignorant who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant is not only distracted in various ways by external causes, without ever enjoying the true peace of mind, but he lives as it were, unaware of himself, of God, and of the world, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, he also ceases to be.

The sage, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely disturbed in his mind, but, being conscious of himself, of God, and of the world, through some eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always enjoys happiness and true peace of mind.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading thereto, seems exceedingly hard, it can nevertheless be discovered.

And must be hard, indeed, what is so seldom found. Also, how would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand and could be found without great effort, that it should be neglected by almost everybody?

But the sublime is as difficult as it is rare.

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